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Abstract
My dissertation addresses questions in two topic areas, intergenerational mobility and
migration. I first study the dynamic response of income mobility to structural changes
in a model of intergenerational transmission. I illustrate that mobility today depends
on past policies and institutions, such that a decline in mobility may reflect past gains
rather than a recent deterioration of “equality of opportunity”. How to measure income
mobility is addressed in the next chapter, in which I document that heterogeneity in
the shape of income profiles generates large life-cycle biases, which cannot be eliminated
with standard methods used in the current literature. Finally, in the fourth chapter
I study how elements of the transmission process a↵ect the relation between mobility
over two generations and the long-run persistence of economic status within families. I
provide various arguments why long-run mobility is likely lower than predictions from
intergenerational evidence suggest.
In the final chapter I analyse the e↵ect of migration on labor markets. Triggered by
the fall of the iron curtain, Germany experienced a sudden inflow of Czech workers that
reached a local employment share of up to ten percent. I exploit this natural experiment
to assess how immigration a↵ects native workers, and to examine the mechanisms by
which labor markets adjust. I find a strong and rapid response in both native wages
and employment, and document substantial heterogeneity across age groups: native
employment decreases most strongly among older workers, even though their wages are
less a↵ected than for other age groups. This finding suggests that the elasticity of labor
supply di↵ers across demographic groups, with important implications for the analysis
of responses to labor supply shocks. When distinguishing between the di↵erent types of
adjustment, I find that native employment decreases predominantly through diminished
inflows into work, less so through outflows into non-employment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Summary
This thesis consists of four self-contained essays, on intergenerational mobility of economic
status and the labor market e↵ect of migration. I spent about half of my work on each
topic, resulting in three chapters of di↵erent length on intergenerational mobility (the first
two are based on joint work with Martin Nybom, Swedish Institute for Social Research)
and one long chapter on the impact of migration on local labor markets (joint with
Christian Dustmann and Uta Scho¨neberg, University College London). I start with a
more detailed introduction of my work on migration, and provide then a short summary
of the other three chapters.
1.1 The Immigration Equation
Sometimes one strikes it lucky, as in my project on migration. It started in 2009 as a
collaboration with my supervisors Christian Dustmann and Uta Scho¨nberg, who tasked
me to study how the the fall of the iron curtain and German reunification a↵ected labor
markets in Germany’s border regions. Provided with data from German social security
records, my mission turned quickly interesting when I discovered that in the early 1990s,
a high share of workers in Eastern Bavaria were of Czech nationality. It was easy to
understand why Czechs at that time wanted to work in Germany, where the wage level
was multiple times higher than in the Czech Republic. But I was surprised that they
were allowed to enter, as the movement of labor from Central and Eastern European
countries to Germany was (and still is) heavily restricted. Moreover, the distribution
of those Czech workers was odd – their inflow occurred very suddenly, and while they
were heavily concentrated in rural municipalities close to the Czech-German border, their
11
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share in other areas was negligible.
A search in legislative texts revealed the source of that inflow – a policy that gave
permission to Czech and Polish workers to work, but not to live in the German border
region. The commuting policy received little attention in the national press at the
time, as it applied only to a small number of remote areas. The “Grenzga¨ngerregelung”,
which existed in similar forms along the Western and Southern German borders, was
in turn possible only because of the unexpected revolutions of 1989 that preceded its
introduction. As such, we observed a sudden, rapid, unanticipated, and large labor
supply shock, triggered by political events that did not relate to the specific conditions in
the German border region. Moreover, the strong variation of the share of Czech workers
within Germany – commuting is costly, which explains their low share in municipalities
farther from the border – in an instrumental variable strategy. Finally we had access to
population-wide panel data of all men and women covered by the social security system
in Germany, which allowed us to not only assess labor market outcomes in detailed
subgroups, but also to follow a↵ected individuals over time and space.
A short discussion of the existing literature will illustrate why these conditions were
so valuable. The literature on the labor market e↵ects of immigration on labor markets
is large, but little agreement exists on the degree to which it can have adverse e↵ects
on the employment and wages of native workers.1 The literature lacks consensus even
while it features some of the most elegant and influential papers in economics: Card’s
classic study on the impact of the Mariel Boatlift (Card 1990), in which a large number
of Cubans entered the Miami labor market, is one of those papers that attracted me (and
probably many others) to the field of labor economics in the first place.
However, the literature faces countless problems. Immigrants tend to self-select into
areas in which the local economy is growing, giving rise to a positive spurious correlation
between immigrant inflows and native outcomes. Second, the local impact of immigration
might progressively dissipate to the rest of the economy as capital, firms and the native
population respond. Over time it becomes therefore increasingly unclear how the local
e↵ect of immigration relates to its overall impact on the host economy. Third, the
tendency of immigrant inflows to cluster in specific dimensions (e.g. location, occupation,
or education) complicates the statistical analysis. Labour market conditions vary along
1An entertaining account of that lack of consensus and the main contributors to the literature is given
by Roger Lowenstein in his article “The Immigration Equation”, published in the New York Times on
July 9, 2006.
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those dimensions for other reasons than migration. This needs to be taken into account
for robust statistical inference, which is not possible in simple before- and after-type of
analyses, as are often employed in the literature.
In particular the first two problems are at the center of attention in the literature, and
have been addressed in various ways. The spatial or area approach exploits di↵erences in
immigrant density across areas, but has been criticised with the argument that immigrant
inflows might lead to native outflows, dissipating their e↵ects across the wider economy.
The skill-cell approach instead exploits di↵erences in immigrant density across skill and
demographic groups – often under strong assumptions, which in this chapter 5 I show to
not always hold.
Given the amount of existing work in the literature, and the di culties it faces, an
observer may be excused for concluding that we should just give up to find any consensus.
But not only is the provision of factual information directly relevant for public policy
in this politically sensitive area. The core questions in the immigration literature are
essentially questions on how labor markets work, and the idea that changes in the supply
factors of production generate responses in its prices is at the core of economic theory.
If we do not agree how natives are a↵ected by immigration-induced labor supply shocks
then perhaps we do not understand how labor markets work in general.
In chapter 5 we revisit the “immigration equation”, by studying the consequences
of the commuting policy in detailed, population-wide panel data on individual workers.
Studying the short-run response, we document a modest but rapid decline in wages, and
a large decline in the employment of native workers. The observed response supports one
of the core hypothesis held by the literature: as of imperfect substitutability, the negative
e↵ect of immigration falls most strongly on those workers whose qualifications become
relatively more abundant. In our setting, the inflow of predominantly unskilled Czech
workers led to particularly negative responses in employment and wages for unskilled
native workers.
However, our findings are in stark contrast to other assumptions that are standard
in the literature. First, we find both skilled and unskilled workers to be negatively
a↵ected – in contrast to the strand of literature that assume immigration to have (or
that can identify) only distributionary, but no average e↵ects. More importantly, we find
that the notion of imperfect substitutability, while useful, does not su ce to explain the
distributionary e↵ect of immigration. In particular, we find the decline in employment to
13
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be strongest among older native workers, even though only few Czech commuters enter
that age group.
Within our theoretical model, we can explain that finding by variation in workers’
responsiveness to wage changes, that is, heterogeneity in the elasticity of labor supply
across groups. This innovation, while consistent with evidence from other literatures,
overturns standard assumptions on the distribution of the wage e↵ect of immigration
– with potentially severe implications, as these assumptions are directly used for the
identification in one of the two dominant strands of the literature, the skill-cell approach.
Our results suggest that while di↵erences in immigrant density across education groups
can indeed be exploited, extension of that strategy along other dimensions, such as age
or experience, are fragile, as workers are likely to respond di↵erently to wage changes
along those dimensions.
Overall, our results appear to paint a quite negative picture on the e↵ect of immig-
ration on native labor market outcomes. However, the results are less dramatic upon
closer inspection. First, we focused on the short run, and the region under consideration
is rural and received only few migrants before the fall of the iron curtain. Such areas may
be less able to absorb large immigrant inflows than, for example, Miami or California.
The particularities of the observed supply shock are also important. The unexpected
and sudden arrival of a large number of migrants is likely to have far more negative
e↵ects than the gradual and potentially anticipated arrival of smaller numbers. Second,
Czech workers had to commute, such that their contribution to local consumption was
comparatively small. Indeed, we find that local population levels decreased in response
to Czech inflows. The absence of a simultaneous demand shock distinguishes our setting
from other studies in the literature.
As such, the numbers presented in this study cannot be directly applied to other
immigration-induced supply shocks. Instead, our estimates reflect the result from what I
consider an atypical, but highly informative experiment – an experiment that in my view
provides a more direct test of the core theoretical models in the literature than previous
empirical work. Theoretical work almost always considers sudden, unexpected supply
shocks that occur in isolation – ignoring the fact that immigrants may also shift local
demand. Our “pure” supply shock comes closer to that stylised thought experiment than
other natural experiments that have been studied in the literature. Our results suggest
that such shock can indeed have substantially negative, both absolute and distributionary,
14
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
e↵ects on native workers. This result may come as a relief to those who argue that
standard theories of factor demand are simply not consistent with studies that find
immigration to have no negative e↵ects on natives even in the short run.
Our findings may thus help to reconcile some of the existing arguments in the liter-
ature. However, the availability of population-wide of our data allowed us also to extend
our work in various new directions, and to study aspects of the adjustment process in
local labor markets about which only little is known – the mechanisms via which the
level of employment adjusts, the timing of those processes, and the degree to which they
matter for di↵erent groups of workers.
First, we find the decline in native employment to be predominantly explained by
movements from and to non-employment, while geographic movements across areas are
far less important. The relative importance of the two channels varies with education
and age, with young or skilled natives being more geographically mobile than older and
unskilled workers.
Second, we decompose the overall employment e↵ect further into changes in inflows –
native workers who enter local employment – and changes in outflows of existing workers.
Our findings suggest that inflows explain a far greater share of the total employment
response than outflows, in stark contrast to the way employment responses to immigration
are commonly interpreted. Inflows respond also more rapidly than outflows, which may
explain why employment can adjust so rapidly – the adverse e↵ect on native employment
achieves full strength only one year after the inflow of Czech workers reached its peak.
Finally, we find the relative importance of the various inflow and outflow channels to
di↵er in distinct ways with age and skill.
These findings are interesting not only for the immigration literature, but more
generally, as they shed light on the channels via which labor markets, and native workers,
adjust to local shocks. Our analysis provides a coherent picture of these processes, but
I believe more work is needed to assess their implications. For example, as each process
a↵ects di↵erent groups of workers, the welfare implications of immigration may depend
crucially on what channel dominates in the adjustment of employment levels. Moreover,
it seems likely that the importance of some processes depends strongly on the institutional
environment, such as employment protection laws. The ways via which labor markets
adjust to immigration, and the type of workers that are predominantly a↵ected, might
then be quite case-specific.
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1.2 Intergenerational Mobility
The other three chapters shed light on various questions on intergenerational mobility –
the degree to which status di↵erences are (not) transmitted from parents to their children.
My work addresses in particular conceptual issues that relate to the measurement and
interpretation of mobility.
The third chapter in this thesis, based on joint work with Martin Nybom, is a detailed
treatment of issues that arise in the measurement of income mobility. Researchers
typically observe incomes only over a few years, but the use of such snapshots will cause a
so-called life-cycle bias if the snapshots cannot mimic lifetime outcomes. We use uniquely
long series of Swedish income data to assess how large this bias is in the intergenerational
income elasticity, the most commonly used statistic in economic research on mobility.
We confirm various existing arguments from the literature, in particular that life-cycle
bias is smallest when incomes are measured around midlife, a central implication from a
widely adopted generalization of the classical errors-in-variables model. However, we also
show that the model cannot predict the ideal age of measurement, and that the life-cycle
bias can be substantial at other ages. We explain the conceptual reasons behind these
empirical findings, and discuss how the the generalized model can be extended to reduce
life-cycle bias further.
Even if mobility can be correctly measured, how do we interpret changes in mobility?
For example, does declining mobility reflect a diminished e↵ectiveness of current policies
and institutions in the promotion of“equal opportunities”, as is a common interpretation?
In chapter 2, likewise based on joint work with Martin Nybom, we answer such questions.
We show theoretically and empirically that mobility trends may instead be caused by
events in a more distant past, as structural changes a↵ect mobility over multiple genera-
tions. We argue that such dynamic responses are of particular importance in the study
of intergenerational persistence, since even a single transmission step – one generation –
corresponds to a very long time period. Institutional reforms or other systemic changes
generate therefore long-lasting mobility trends.
The interpretation of such trends necessitates a dynamic perspective, but existing
theoretical work focuses instead on the relationship between causal mechanisms and the
implied long-run or steady-state level of intergenerational mobility. We thus study the
dynamic response of income mobility to structural changes in a simultaneous equation
16
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model of intergenerational transmission. We first show that the level of intergenerational
mobility depends not only on contemporaneous transmission mechanisms, but also on the
distribution of income and skills in the parent generation – and thus on past mechanisms.
This result leads to a number of implications. First, changes in policies and institutions
can generate long-lasting mobility trends. Conversely, changes in mobility today might
not be explained by recent structural changes, but by major events in the more distant
past. Second, di↵erences in mobility across countries, or across groups within countries,
might reflect not only the consequences of current but also of past policies, institutions
and conditions.
A fairly general class of changes in transmission mechanisms cause non-monotonic
transitions between steady states, and our analysis suggests that mobility tends to be
highest when a structural change occurs. Times of change are thus times of high mobility,
while declining mobility today may reflect past gains rather than a recent deterioration of
“equality of opportunity”. We finally exploit data over three generations and a compulsory
school reform in Sweden to test the dynamic implications of our model. The reform had a
large, long-lasting, and non-monotonic e↵ect: it reduced the transmission of disparities in
income and education from parents to their o↵spring in the directly a↵ected generation,
but increased intergenerational persistence in the next.
My final chapter on intergenerational mobility relates to both the measurement and
interpretation of mobility. While a vast empirical literature has estimated the degree of
intergenerational persistence in socio-economic characteristics between parents and their
children, there exists little evidence on the degree of long-run mobility acrossmultiple gen-
erations, such as between grandparents and their grandchildren (Lindahl et al, 2014, is a
recent exception). In its absence we rely on extrapolations from parent-child correlations,
and predictions were routinely derived by exponentiation of intergenerational measures.
Importantly, such predictions imply high long-run mobility even when intergenerational
mobility is low.
The underlying idea, that regression implies iterated regression, appears quite nat-
ural in a linear regression context. However, it turns out to be a common statistical
fallacy, which as I discuss in chapter 4 arises frequently also in other economic literatures
and disciplines. I then examine how elements of the transmission process a↵ect the
relation between intergenerational and multigenerational mobility. Considering direct
and indirect transmission, the multiplicity of skills, and the role of grandparents I con-
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clude that long-run mobility will likely be lower, possibly much lower, than predictions
from intergenerational evidence suggest. I further argue that the observed deceleration
of regression to the mean beyond two generations is more plausibly explained by the
multiplicity and indirectness of parent-child transmission processes than the existence
of important higher order causal e↵ects, such as from grandparents. While my main
objective is to provide a theoretical complement to the recent wave of recent empirical
studies on the subject, I also provide a brief illustration of my arguments using data on
three generations from Swedish registers.
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Chapter 2
Interpreting Trends in
Intergenerational Mobility
The evolution of inequality in economic status over time is a fundamental topic in the
social sciences and in public debate. Two central dimensions of interest are the extent of
cross-sectional inequality between individuals and its persistence across generations, as
status di↵erences are transmitted from parents to their children. Both have important
implications for individual welfare and the functioning of political and economic systems.1
A significant rise in cross-sectional income inequality from the late 1970s in the US,
UK and (more recently) other OECD countries is well documented, but much less is
known about trends in intergenerational mobility.2 Yet, we do know that income mobility
di↵ers substantially across countries, and the observation that those di↵erences appear
negatively correlated with cross-sectional inequality has received much attention.3 A
central theme in the recent literature is thus if income inequality has not only increased,
but also become more persistent across generations. This question is debated particularly
in countries that experienced rising cross-sectional inequality, such as the US, where com-
mentators argue that low mobility threatens social cohesion and the notion of “American
1Intergenerational mobility is for example seen to contribute to the stability of liberal democracies, by
legitimating income and status inequalities and by reducing the potential for class-based collective action
(see Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992).
2Autor and Katz (1999) discuss trends in wage inequality across countries. Atkinson, Piketty, and
Saez (2011) find a substantial rise in top income shares in the US and various other countries.
3A large empirical literature (see Solon, 1999, and Black and Devereux, 2011) seeks to quantify how
intergenerational mobility di↵ers across countries, groups and time. Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (2009), Blanden
(2011), and Corak (2013) present evidence on the correlation between cross-sectional inequality and
mobility.
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exceptionalism”.4
But how should evidence on declining mobility be interpreted – does it reflect a
diminished e↵ectiveness of current policies and institutions in the promotion of “equal
opportunities”? In this paper we show theoretically and empirically that mobility trends
may instead be caused by events in a more distant past, as structural changes a↵ect mo-
bility over multiple generations. We argue that such dynamic responses are of particular
importance in the study of intergenerational persistence, since even a single transmission
step – one generation – corresponds to a very long time period. Institutional reforms or
other systemic changes generate therefore long-lasting mobility trends.
The interpretation of such trends necessitates a dynamic perspective, but existing
theoretical work focuses instead on the relationship between causal mechanisms and the
implied long-run or steady-state level of intergenerational mobility. We thus contribute to
the literature by examining the dynamic implications of a simultaneous equations model
of intergenerational transmission. We deviate from previous work also by assuming that
income depends on human capital through a vector of distinct productive characteristics
instead of a single factor. This choice is in accordance with the growing evidence on the
importance of distinct, including noncognitive types of skills (e.g., Heckman et al., 2006).
We find that such multiplicity also matters in the intergenerational context.
Using our model we first show that the level of intergenerational mobility depends
not only on contemporaneous transmission mechanisms, but also on the distribution
of income and skills in the parent generation – and thus on past mechanisms. This
result leads to a number of implications. First, changes in policies and institutions can
generate long-lasting mobility trends. Conversely, changes in mobility today might not
be explained by recent structural changes, but by major events in the more distant past.
Second, di↵erences in mobility across countries, or across groups within countries, might
reflect not only the consequences of current but also of past policies, institutions and
conditions.
A fairly general class of changes in transmission mechanisms cause non-monotonic
transitions between steady states. We show that changes in the relative returns to
4Exemplary articles are “Ever Higher Society, Ever Harder to Ascend” in The Economist (Dec. 2004),
“Moving Up: Challenges to the American Dream” in the Wall Street Journal (May 2005), “The Mobility
Myth” in The New Republic (Feb. 2012), or the recent“Great Divide” series on nytimes.com. The political
importance of the topic is exemplified by a speech of Alan Krueger, Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers, who warned that intergenerational mobility should be expected to decline further as of the
recent rise in income inequality in the US (speech at the Center for American Progress, January 12th,
2012).
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di↵erent types of human capital or endowments generate transitional mobility, as some
families gain while others lose. Technological, institutional or other structural change may
thus increase mobility initially, followed by a decreasing trend that lasts over multiple
generations. We conclude that times of change tend to be times of high mobility, while
mobility is likely to decrease when the economic environment stabilizes. A shift towards a
more meritocratic society has similar consequences. A rise in the importance of own skill
relative to parental status is to the advantage of talented o↵spring from poor families,
providing opportunities that were not yet available to their parents. Intergenerational
mobility is thus particularly high in the first a↵ected generation, but is bound to decline
in subsequent generations. Even structural changes that are clearly mobility-enhancing
in the long-run can therefore cause negative trends over some generations.
Declining mobility today may then not signal that current policies and institutions
promote equality of opportunity less e↵ectively, but might instead be a repercussion of
major improvements in the past. These results are important for policy evaluation and
for the interpretation of mobility trends. Observed mobility shifts are commonly related
to contemporaneous changes in policy or institutions, which may result in misleading
conclusions about determinants of the former and long-run consequences of the latter.
A dynamic view of intergenerational transmission does not only reveal such pitfalls, it
may also aid our understanding of causal mechanisms (as di↵erent structural shocks have
di↵erent dynamic implications) and of mobility di↵erences across countries and time that
have been documented by the empirical literature. Our main objective is to illustrate the
general relationship between causal mechanisms and mobility trends, but we comment
briefly also on various practical implications that seem particularly relevant for the recent
literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. We next discuss the related literature. In Section 2.2
we present our model of intergenerational transmission, derive current and steady-state
mobility levels in terms of its structural parameters, and analyze the dynamic content of
the model. In Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 we study three theoretical examples to illustrate
our main theoretical findings. the introduction of a cohort dimension into our model in
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.1 The Literature
Many studies examine the theoretical relationship between causal transmission mechan-
isms and the implied long-run or steady-state level of intergenerational mobility, but there
exists little work on transition paths between those steady states. In the standard simul-
taneous equations approach as developed by Conlisk (e.g., Conlisk, 1974a) only Atkinson
and Jenkins (1984) focus on systems that are not in steady state.5 While they show that
failure of the steady-state assumption impedes identification of invariable parameters
of the structural model, we instead consider how changes in structural parameters a↵ect
mobility in subsequent generations. Solon (2004) notes that the interpretation of mobility
trends would benefit from a theoretical perspective, and examines how structural changes
(such as in the return to human capital and the progressivity of public investment) a↵ect
mobility in the first a↵ected generation. Davies et al. (2005) compare mobility and
cross-sectional inequality under private and public education in a model of human capital
accumulation. They note that the observation of mobility trends may help to distinguish
between alternative causes of rising cross-sectional inequality.
While theoretical work is sparse, it exists much empirical work on mobility trends
in the US and other countries. A long-standing and mostly sociological literature is
concerned with occupational and class mobility (see Breen, 2004, Hauser, 2010, and
Long and Ferrie, 2013b), examining both absolute (subject to changes in the occupational
structure at the aggregate level) and relative mobility rates across countries and time. A
more recent but fast-growing economic literature examines mobility trends in income or
educational attainment, which are important indicators and potentially key mechanisms
for the reproduction of economic advantage (see Black and Devereux, 2011). Most
economic studies assess how strongly absolute or relative di↵erences among parents are
transmitted to their o↵spring, abstracting from mean changes over generations.
Some of the emerging evidence on income mobility appears conflicting, perhaps as a
result of the substantial data requirements that such studies face. Measurement ideally
requires income data that span over two generations, but often only sparse data are
available or exploited.6 Hertz (2007) and Lee and Solon (2009) find no evidence of a
5Moreover, Jenkins (1982) discusses stability conditions for systems of stochastic linear di↵erence
equations with constant coe cients, Conlisk (1974b) derives stability conditions for systems with random
coe cients.
6In chapter 3 I summarize methodological advances in the recent literature, and argue that these can
still not fully eliminate life-cycle bias in mobility estimates based on incomplete income data. This bias
22
CHAPTER 2. INTERPRETING TRENDS IN INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY
major trend across cohorts of sons born 1952-1975 in the US, but cannot reject more
gradual changes over time. Levine and Mazumder (2007) as well as Aaronson and
Mazumder (2008) argue that mobility has fallen in recent decades – the latter based
on intergenerational estimates from synthetic families (constructed from census data),
the former based on estimates of sibling correlations in various economic outcomes. Such
decline has also been found for the UK, in Blanden et al. (2004) and Nicoletti and
Ermisch (2007).7Other studies examine how educational mobility di↵ers between groups,
how it is a↵ected by institutional aspects, or how it changes over time. Hertz et al. (2008)
present trends in educational mobility over 50 years for 42 countries, noting that Nordic
countries display comparatively high intergenerational mobility.
A central concern in many of these papers, policy-related outlets, and the public
press is that mobility may have declined in conjunction with the recent rise in income
inequality.8 Various potential causal factors for observed trends – such as educational
expansion, rising returns to education, or changes in welfare policies – are considered
in the literature (e.g., Levine and Mazumder, 2007, and further articles in the same
issue). Common to all explanations is that they relate trends to recent events that may
have directly a↵ected the respective cohorts. We argue that this is only one potential
interpretation, and that the key to an understanding of current mobility levels and trends
might lie in the more distant past.
2.2 A Model of Intergenerational Transmission
Measuring intergenerational mobility. In our theoretical analysis we consider the in-
tergenerational elasticity of income, which is a popular descriptive measure of persistence
in relative economic status. Our main arguments extend to mobility in other outcomes,
such as educational attainment, which we will consider in our empirical analysis. Consider
a simplified one-parent one-o↵spring family structure, with yi,t as log lifetime income of
the o↵spring in generation t of family i and yi,t 1 as log lifetime income of the parent.
can di↵er by cohort and may mask gradual changes of mobility, or generate a false impression of such
trends.
7See Erikson and Goldthorpe (2010) and Blanden et al. (2012) for a debate of divergent findings in
measures of income and occupational mobility.
8See references in footnote 4 for the US, or Blanden (2009) for the UK.
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The intergenerational elasticity is given by the slope coe cient in the linear regression
yi,t = ↵t +  tyi,t 1 + ✏i,t. (2.1)
The elasticity  t captures a statistical relationship and the error ✏i,t is uncorrelated with
the regressor by construction. Under stationarity in the variance of yi,t it equals the
intergenerational correlation, which adjusts the elasticity for changes in cross-sectional
inequality. The intergenerational income elasticity is the most commonly estimated
parameter in the empirical literature and captures to what degree percentage di↵erences
in parents’ incomes tend to be transmitted to the next generation. A low elasticity or
correlation indicates high mobility.
A model of intergenerational transmission. We model intergenerational transmission as
a system of stochastic linear di↵erence equations, in the tradition of the simultaneous
equation approach developed and elaborated by Conlisk (1969, 1974a) and Atkinson and
Jenkins (1984). We show in Appendix A.1 that the“mechanical”pathways represented by
these equations can be derived from the optimizing behavior of parents in an underlying
utility-maximization framework (see Becker and Tomes, 1979, Goldberger, 1989, and
Solon, 2004). The equations of our baseline model are
yit =  y,t yit 1 +  0t hit + uy,it (2.2)
hit =  h,t yit 1 +⇥t eit + uh,it (2.3)
eit = ⇤t eit 1 + vit. (2.4)
From equation (2.2), income yit in generation t of family i is determined by parental
income yit 1, own human capital hit, and chance uy,it. The parameter  y,t captures a
direct e↵ect of parental income that is independent from o↵spring productivity, which
may arise as of nepotism, statistical discrimination under imperfect information on
individual productivity, or other reasons.9 Human capital consists of a Jx1 vector hit
with elements h1,it, ..., hJ,it, reflecting distinct characteristics such as formal schooling,
health, and cognitive and non-cognitive skills. These characteristics are valued on the
9For example as of credit constraints influencing choices on the labor market, parental information
and networks, or (if total market income is considered) returns to bequests. The exact mechanism and
the distinction between earnings and income are not central for our purposes.
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labor market according to a Jx1 price vector  t with elements  1,t, ...,  J,t. The random
shock term uy,it captures factors that do not relate to parental background. For our
analysis it makes no di↵erence if these are interpreted as (labor market) luck or as the
impact of other characteristics that are not transmitted within families.
From equation (2.3), human capital hit is a↵ected by parental income yit 1, own
endowments eit, and chance uh,it. A role for parental income may for example stem
from parental investment into o↵spring human capital. Elements in the Jx1 vector  h,t
may di↵er if parental investments are more targeted or more e↵ective on some types of
human capital than others. Parental income may thus a↵ect o↵spring income directly
(through  y,t) or indirectly (through  h,t).10 The JxK matrix ⇥t governs the role that
endowments such as abilities or preferences play in the accumulation of di↵erent types
of human capital. Those endowments, consisting of the Kx1 vector eit with elements
e1,it, ..., eK,it, are partly inherited from parental endowments eit 1 and partly due to
chance vit. The elements of the KxK matrix ⇤t with elements  11,t, ..., KK,t govern
the heritability of each endowment. We consider ⇤t to represent a broad concept of
intergenerational transmission potentially working through both nature (e.g. genetic
inheritance) and nurture (e.g. family environment). The random shock uy,it and elements
of uh,it and vit are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other and past values of
{yit,hit, eit, uy,it,uh,it,vit}.
For convenience we drop the individual subscript i and make a few simplifying
assumptions. As we focus on relative mobility assume that all variables are measured
as trendless indices with constant mean zero (as in Conlisk, 1974a). To avoid case
distinctions assume further that those indices measure positive characteristics with a
non-negative e↵ect on income (such that  y,t and the elements of  h,t and  0t⇥t are non-
negative) and that parent and o↵spring endowments are not negatively correlated (such
that elements of ⇤t are non-negative), for all t.
Using equation (2.3) to substitute out hi,t we have
yt =  t yt 1 + ⇢0t et + ut (2.5)
et = ⇤t et 1 + vt, (2.6)
10The distinction may not be sharp in practice; for example, parental credit constraints might a↵ect
educational attainment and human capital acquisition of o↵spring, but might also a↵ect their career
choices for a given level of human capital.
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where the parameter  t =  y,t+ 0t h,t aggregates the direct and indirect e↵ects of parental
income, the 1xK vector ⇢0t =  0t⇥t captures the returns to inherited endowments and
human capital (a↵ected both by the importance of endowments in the accumulation of
and the returns to human capital), and where ut = uy,t +  0tuh,t aggregates the random
shocks in income and human capital.
Our model has a similar structure as the model in Conlisk (1974a), but in contrast
to the previous literature we assume that income depends on human capital through
a vector of distinct productive characteristics. This generalization will prove to be
central for some of our findings. Similarity to the existing literature in other dimensions
is advantageous since it suggests that our findings do not arise due to non-standard
assumptions. The second deviation from previous work is simply the addition of t
subscripts to all parameters, reflecting our focus on the dynamic response to changes
in the transmission framework. A parameter may change as of various underlying
mechanisms. For example, an expansion of public childcare may a↵ect the degree to
which human capital is inherited across generations, or technological change may a↵ect
relative demand and thus returns to skills on the labor market. For simplicity we do not
explicitly model any particular mechanism.
We will consider mobility trends following a single structural change in generation
t = T , assuming that the moments of all variables were in steady-state equilibrium before
the shock. For simplicity we assume that the process is infinite. This assumption (which
imposes restrictions on the parameters of our model, see Appendix A.2) nor the existence
of pre- and post-shock steady states are necessary for our arguments, but simplify the
discussion and facilitate comparisons to the existing literature on steady-state mobility.
For convenience we normalize the variances of yt and all elements of ht and et in
the initial steady state to one. The variances of uy,t and elements of uh,t and vt are
then implicitly a function of the slope parameters of the model, and the requirement
for those variances to be non-negative leads to additional constraints on the parameters.
Cross-sectional inequality may change after a structural change occurs. However, we will
frequently consider changes in the relative strength of di↵erent transmission mechanisms
that do not a↵ect the cross-sectional variances of income, human capital, and endow-
ments. Abstracting from changes in those variances simplifies the discussion and helps
to isolate other adjustment mechanisms that are of particular interest.
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2.2.1 The Importance of Past Transmission Mechanisms
We express intergenerational mobility as a function of our model to illustrate some central
implications. Consider a simplified example, assuming ⇤t to be diagonal and cross-
sectional inequality to remain constant, V ar(yt) = V ar(ej,t) = 1 8j, t. The intergenera-
tional elasticity then coincides with the intergenerational correlation, and is derived by
plugging equations (2.5) and (2.6) from our model into equation (2.1), such that
 t =
Cov(yt, yt 1)
V ar(yt 1)
=  t + ⇢
0
t⇤tCov(et 1, yt 1). (2.7)
Thus,  t depends on current transmission mechanisms (parameters  t, ⇢t and ⇤t) and
on the cross-covariance between income and endowments in the parent generation. The
intuition is simple. If income and other favorable endowments are concentrated in the
same families then intergenerational mobility will be particularly low (the elasticity
will be high). Expression (2.7) illustrates that two populations subject to the same
transmission mechanisms (e.g., institutions and policies) today can still di↵er in their
levels of intergenerational mobility, since current mobility depends also on the joint
distribution of income and endowments in the parent generation.
The cross-covariance between income and endowments in the parent generation is in
turn determined by past transmission mechanisms, and thus past values of { t,⇢t,⇤t}.
We can iterate equation (2.7) backwards to express  t in terms of parameter values,
 t =  t + ⇢
0
t⇤t (⇤t 1Cov(et 2, yt 2) t 1 + ⇢t 1)
= ...
=  t + ⇢
0
t⇤t⇢t 1 + ⇢
0
t⇤t
 1X
r=1
 
rY
s=1
 t s⇤t s
!
⇢t r 1
!
, (2.8)
assuming that the process is infinite.11 The level of intergenerational mobility today
thus depends on current and past transmission mechanisms.12 If no structural changes
occur,  s =  , ⇢s = ⇢, ⇤s = ⇤ 8s  t, then equation (2.9) simplifies to the steady-state
11For a finite process,  t will depend on past parameter values and the initial condition Cov(e0, y0).
12If cross-sectional inequality varies over generations, or if ⇤t is not diagonal, the derivation of equation
(2.8) would require backward iteration of the variance of yt and the variance-covariance matrix of et.
Accordingly,  t would also depend on the variances of ut and vt in past generations.
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elasticity
  =   + ⇢0⇤
1X
s=0
( ⇤)s ⇢ =   + ⇢0⇤ (IKxK    ⇤) 1 ⇢, (2.9)
where the second step follows since the geometric series
P1
s=0 ( ⇤)
s converges (the ab-
solute value of each eigenvalue of  ⇤ is below one). The literature has almost exclusively
focused on how changes in structural parameters a↵ect intergenerational mobility in
steady state, as given by (2.9). We will instead analyze the transition path towards the
new steady state as determined by equation (2.8).
Some properties can be readily generalized. The transition path of Cov(et 1, yt 1) is
governed by the eigenvalues of the reduced-form coe cient matrix and is thus monotonic
(see eq. 2.44 in Appendix A.2). But from (2.7) it follows that income mobility in the
first generation subject to a structural change is directly a↵ected by parameter changes,
not indirectly by changes in the covariance between parental income and endowments.
Trends in income mobility are thus not necessarily monotonic (even if cross-sectional
inequality remains constant), as we will show in the next section. Other properties, such
as the speed of convergence, depend on the parameterization of the model and can thus
not be generalized.
2.2.2 From Simple Examples to Non-Monotonic Trends
We start with simplified versions of our baseline model and then move to more general
models. For our first examples it is su cient to consider a single endowment et and thus
scalar versions of equations (2.5) and (2.6), such that
yt =  tyt 1 + ⇢tet + ut (2.10)
et =  tet 1 + vt. (2.11)
Our qualitative findings do not rely on specific parameter choices, but the quantitative
implications of our examples will be more plausible if we choose values that are consistent
with empirical evidence. The evidence in the literature, and our cross-validations within
the model, suggest the following rough order of magnitudes for the US case:
0.45     0.55, 0.15     0.25, 0.60  ⇢  0.70, 0.50     0.65.
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We discuss these choices in detail in Appendix A.3. It will be useful to first look at an
even simpler case in which parental income has no causal e↵ect.
Example 1: A simple meritocratic economy. Assume that the heritability of
endowments ( t) or the returns to endowments and human capital (⇢t) change
in a simple meritocratic economy ( t = 0 8t).
Assume first that cross-sectional inequality remains constant.13 From equation (2.8), a
change in the heritability of endowments in generation T from  t<T =  1 to  t T =  2
shifts the intergenerational elasticity (or correlation) according to
  T =  T    T 1 = ⇢( 2    1)⇢. (2.12)
Mobility remains constant afterwards. A change in returns from ⇢1 to ⇢2 in generation
T instead shifts  t over two generations. The first shift equals
  T =  T    T 1 = (⇢2   ⇢1) Cov(eT 1, yT 1) = (⇢2   ⇢1) ⇢1, (2.13)
and is induced by the change in returns for the o↵spring generation in T . The second
shift,
  T+1 =  T+1    T = ⇢2  (Cov(eT , yT )  Cov(eT 1, yT 1)) = ⇢2 (⇢2   ⇢1), (2.14)
is induced by the change in the correlation between income and endowments among the
parents of the o↵spring generation T + 1, in turn caused by changing returns to those
endowments in generation T . The second shift is larger than the first if returns increase
(⇢2 > ⇢1). Figure 1 gives a numerical example.
Cross-sectional inequality. An additional source of dynamics stems from changes
in cross-sectional inequality. Intuitively, if individual endowments and skills are linked
over generations due to inheritance within families, then cross-sectional inequality will
also be linked over generations; the variance of equation (2.11) can be iterated backwards
13Assume that the importance of parental background relative to unrelated factors changes, such that
shifts in  t or ⇢t are o↵set by corresponding shifts in the variance of ut or vt.
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such that
V ar(et) =  
2k
t kV ar(et k) +
k 1X
s=0
 2st sV ar(vt s) 8k   1. (2.15)
Models of intergenerational transmission therefore imply that the impact of a structural
change on cross-sectional inequality may propagate in subsequent generations, in turn
a↵ecting mobility measures over multiple generations.14
Implications. The example illustrates that the dynamic response of mobility meas-
ures can be informative on the type of structural shock that occurred. Changes in the
heritability of endowments and skills have a more immediate e↵ect than changes in the
returns to those skills, as income mobility depends directly on returns in both parent
and o↵spring generations. The e↵ect of changing returns on steady state mobility levels
may thus not become fully evident before both the parent and child generations have
experienced the new price regime. We can relate this argument to the evidence on
rising skill di↵erentials in wages from the late 1970s in the US, UK, and (more recently)
other OECD countries. The notion that widening wage di↵erentials could decrease
intergenerational mobility (e.g., Blanden et al., 2004, and Solon, 2004) contributes greatly
to the current interest in mobility trends. But recent studies do not yet observe o↵spring
cohorts whose parents have fully experienced the changing wage regime; its impact on
mobility may thus become more evident in future empirical work.15
Not only will the dynamic response of mobility depend on the type of structural change
that occurred; di↵erent measures of the importance of family background may also show
di↵erent dynamic responses. Sibling correlations, which capture influences on economic
outcomes that are shared by siblings, depend less directly on conditions in the parent
generation and thus respond more immediately to rising returns than intergenerational
measures of persistence.16 This argument may explain why US studies find a sharp
14For example, if the changing heritability of endowments a↵ects its cross-sectional variance (because
the variance of vt remains constant) then the elasticity shifts not only in the first but also subsequent
generations, as
  T+1 = ⇢ 2
✓
V ar(eT )
V ar(yT )
  V ar(eT 1)
V ar(yT 1)
◆
= ⇢ 2
✓
1 + ( 22    21)
1 + ⇢2( 22    21)
  1
◆
is non-zero for  1 6=  2.
15For example, the last o↵spring cohort observed in Lee and Solon (2009) were born in 1975. Their
parents were not subject to the widening skill di↵erential in their early careers.
16The sibling correlation equals ⇢21 
2 before and ⇢22 
2 in generations after returns change in the example.
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increase in sibling correlations since 1980 (Levine and Mazumder, 2007), while there
seems to be less evidence for such shift in intergenerational measures of persistence. The
former are directly a↵ected by changing wage di↵erentials, but the latter also depend on
conditions in the parent generation. Sibling correlations may then be a preferred measure
in the analysis of mobility trends over time, as they tend to react more immediately to
structural changes.17
These results have general implications for the interpretation of mobility trends: shifts
in mobility may not reflect a changing e↵ectiveness of current policies and institutions in
the promotion of equality of opportunity, but a lagged e↵ect of major changes in the more
distant past. The next example illustrates that such repercussions can be both sizable
and non-monotonic. We move to a more general model that allows for parental income
to have causal e↵ects (  6= 0). Consider first an example of “equalizing opportunities”, in
which o↵spring outcomes become less dependent upon parental income.18
Example 2: Equalizing opportunities. Assume that the importance of parental
status diminishes ( 1 >  2) while skills that are partially inherited are instead
more strongly rewarded (⇢1 < ⇢2).
In other words, assume that in generation T the economy becomes less plutocratic and
more meritocratic. For example, parental status may become less and own merits more
important for appointment into jobs and occupations. Mobility then shifts in the first
a↵ected generation according to
  T = ( 2    1) + (⇢2   ⇢1) Cov(eT 1, yT 1), (2.16)
a↵ected both by the declining importance of parental income and the increasing returns
to endowments or skills. However, the latter e↵ect is attenuated, for two reasons. First,
endowments are only imperfectly correlated within families, such that   < 1. Second,
parental endowments eT 1 explain only a fraction of the variation of incomes in the parent
generation, such that Cov(eT 1, yT 1) < 1. Income mobility thus tends to increase if
a generation is subject to a more meritocratic setting than their parents, as might be
expected.
17Analysis of trends in sibling correlations, with its weaker data requirements, may also often be more
feasible (see Bjo¨rklund et al., 2009).
18As noted by Conlisk (1974a), “opportunity equalization” is an ambiguous term that may relate to
di↵erent types of structural changes in models of intergenerational transmission.
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However, income mobility will also shift in the second generation, according to
  T+1 = ⇢2 

Cov(eT , yT )
V ar(yT )
  Cov(eT 1, yT 1)
V ar(yT 1)
 
. (2.17)
Apart from changes in the variance of income, the elasticity may also shift because of
changes in the correlation between income and endowments in the parent generation.
The relative importance of parameter changes on the latter is now reversed, since
@Cov(eT , yT )
@ 2
=  Cov(eT 1, yT 1) and
@Cov(eT , yT )
@⇢2
= 1.
Changing returns have a strong e↵ect on the correlation between own endowments and
incomes. A change towards a more meritocratic society tends to increase the correlation
between endowments and income, thereby decreasing income mobility from the second
a↵ected generation onwards.
The dynamic response of the intergenerational elasticity thus tends to be non-monotonic,
with an initial rise in mobility and a subsequent decline. Intuitively, a rise in the
importance of own skill relative to parental status will be detrimental for o↵spring with
high-income, low-skill parents. In contrast, the shift will benefit talented o↵spring from
poor families, providing opportunities for upward mobility that were not yet available
to their parents. Mobility is thus highest when these relative gains and losses occur,
when a generation faces new institutions, policies and opportunities that di↵er markedly
from those in their parents’ generation. But the o↵spring of those who thrived under the
meritocratic setting will also do relatively well, due to the inheritance of talent; mobility
hence decreases subsequently.19
Exact conditions for such non-monotonic adjustment can be given if the shifting
importance of parental background and own characteristics does not a↵ect cross-sectional
inequality, such that V ar(yt) = 18t.20 Figure 2.2 plots a numerical example, illustrating
that the response in mobility trends can be long-lasting; it becomes insignificant only in
19The idea that a shift towards “meritocratic” principles can also have depressing e↵ects on mobility
was already noted by the sociologist Michael Young, who coined the term in the book The Rise of
the Meritocracy (1958). In contrast to its usage today, Young intended the term to have a derogatory
connotation.
20From equation (2.8), a change to a more meritocratic society will then increase mobility initially
i↵  1  2⇢2 ⇢1 >  Cov(eT 1, yT 1). However, mobility decreases in subsequent generations i↵
⇢2 ⇢1
 1  2 >
 Cov(eT 1, yT 1). These conditions will be satisfied for any changes  1    2 and ⇢2   ⇢1 that are of
similar magnitude in absolute terms.
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the third generation, or more than half a century after the structural change.21
Implications. The example illustrates that we need to be careful when interpreting
mobility trends. Not only may those trends be a response to events that occurred in
past generations, this response may also be non-monotonic. Changes that are mobility-
enhancing in the long run may nevertheless cause a decreasing trend in mobility measures
that lasts over several generations. Declining mobility today may then not necessarily
reflect a recent deterioration of equality of opportunity, but rather major gains made in
the past.
In the numerical example, mobility responded much more strongly in the first two
than in subsequent generations. Can we then conclude that more distant events have
only a negligible e↵ect on current trends? We believe not, for two reasons. First,
plausible extensions of our model would generate slower transitions between steady
states (e.g., considering wealth or capital accumulation, and direct causal e↵ects from
grandparents). Second, past events may have been more dramatic than more recent
changes. For example, in the late 19th and early 20th century the US experienced rapid
industrialization and urbanization, a strong decline in agricultural employment, mass
migration, and a vast expansion of public schooling. The US participated in two world
wars and went through a highly turbulent interwar period. Other countries experienced
similarly stark transformations.
Much of the recent empirical literature measures trends in income mobility for o↵-
spring cohorts born from around 1950 to the 1970s, which are separated by only one or
two generations from those events. Recent trends may thus partly reflect repercussions
from such changes in the first half of the 20th century. Finally, our example illustrates
that if those changes led to a more meritocratic society, mobility should perhaps be
expected to decline in more recent cohorts.
2.2.3 Intergenerational Mobility in Times of Change
Our finding that a change to a more meritocratic society can lead to long-lasting and
non-monotonic mobility trends is important for the interpretation of recent trends. But
it relates to a rather specific structural change; one may thus expect that non-monotonic
responses are more of an exception than a rule.
21We will illustrate the timing of mobility trends over cohorts further in Section 2.4.
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We next illustrate that such responses are instead quite typical. We now consider
multiple types of human capital and endowments, as in equations (2.5) and (2.6). The
notion of individual ability has recently shifted from a one-dimensional concept primarily
related to IQ (as in Herrnstein and Murray, 1994) to a multidimensional set of traits that
also recognizes the importance of noncognitive skills. A stream of evidence has supported
this idea, showing that several distinct skills a↵ect various labor market outcomes (e.g.,
Heckman et al., 2006; Lindqvist and Vestman, 2011). Such multiplicity has not yet been
stressed in the intergenerational context (an exception is Bowles and Gintis, 2002), but
our analysis illustrates that it provides implications that cannot be captured by single-
skill models.22
Example 3: Changing returns to skills. Assume that the returns to di↵erent types
of human capital or endowments change on the labor market (⇢1 6= ⇢2).
Changes in the returns to di↵erent types of skills could stem from changes in demand
(e.g., as of trade, or industrial and technological change) or in relative supplies (e.g.,
as of immigration or changes in the production of skills). A specific example is the
decrease in the demand for physical relative to cognitive ability as a labor market moves
from agricultural to white-collar jobs. But relative returns may change also in periods
that are much shorter than the time scale underlying our intergenerational analysis – a
typical example is the job-polarization literature, which highlights how the IT revolution
has implied a shift in demand from substitutable manual skills to complementary abstract
skills (e.g., Levy, Murnane, and Autor, 2003).
Figure (2.3) illustrates a simple symmetric case: two endowments k and l are equally
transmitted within families ( ij =   for i = j and  ij = 0 for i 6= j), but their prices on
the labor market swap at time T (p2,k = ⇢1,l 6= p1,k = ⇢2,l). Adapting equations (2.5)
and (2.6) for K = 2 endowments and iterating backwards we find that mobility increases
in the first a↵ected generation, but decreases in the next.23
Intuitively, those endowments or skills that have been more strongly rewarded in past
generations are also more strongly correlated with parental income. As a consequence,
22Multiplicity of skills matters also for other questions in the literature. For example, in chapter 4 I
show that income persistence over generations may decline more slowly than at a geometric rate if the
degree of heritability varies across characteristics.
23We find   T =   (⇢k,2   ⇢k,1)2  /(1   ), which is negative. The elasticity in the second generation
shifts according to   T+1 =  (⇢k,2   ⇢k,1)2 +  (⇢2k,2 + ⇢2k,1 + (2⇢k,1⇢k,2  )/(1     ))(1/V ar(yT )   1),
which is positive since V ar(yT ) = 1  2  (⇢k,2  ⇢k,1)2/(1    ) < 1. These findings are not due to shifts
in cross-sectional inequality; if instead V ar(yT ) = 1 (i.e. changes in ⇢k and ⇢l are o↵set by changes in
the variance of ut) we still have that   T < 0 and   T+1 > 0.
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mobility tends to initially increase if relative prices change, since endowments for which
prices increase from low levels are less prevalent among high-income parents than en-
dowments for which prices decrease from high levels. But the endowment for which
prices increase becomes increasingly associated with high parental income in subsequent
generations, causing a decreasing mobility trend. The key assumptions underlying these
results are that endowments are positively correlated within families and imperfectly
correlated within individuals.
We can derive that non-monotonic responses in mobility are also typical when the
returns to any number of skills change, by expressing the elasticity in generation T as
a function of the steady-state elasticities before and after the structural change ( T 1
and  t!1). We assume here a diagonal heritability matrix ⇤. The derivation for more
general cases (non-diagonal ⇤ and correlated endowments) is given in Appendix A.4. If
the steady-state variance of income remains unchanged we have
 T 1 =   + ⇢01⇤ (I    ⇤) 1 ⇢1 (2.18)
and
 t!1 =   + ⇢02⇤ (I    ⇤) 1 ⇢2, (2.19)
such that
 T =
1
2
( T 1 +  t!1)  1
2
 
⇢02   ⇢01
 
⇤ (I    ⇤) 1 (⇢2   ⇢1) . (2.20)
The quadratic form in the last term is greater than zero for ⇢2 6= ⇢1 since ⇤ (I    ⇤) 1
is positive definite. Eq. (2.20) states that intergenerational mobility in the first a↵ected
generation can be decomposed into two parts. Mobility in generation T equals the average
of the old and the new steady-state mobility (first term), plus a purely transitional gain
(second term). Price changes then lead to a temporary spike in mobility ( T is below
both the previous steady state  T 1 and the new steady state  t!1) if the steady-state
elasticity does not shift too strongly, i↵
| t!1    T 1| < (⇢02   ⇢01)⇤ (I    ⇤) 1 (⇢2   ⇢1). (2.21)
This argument also holds if cross-sectional inequality is lower in the new than in the
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old steady state.24 Any symmetric changes (as in the numerical example) or changes in
returns that do not a↵ect long-run mobility much fulfill condition (2.21) and will thus
lead to non-monotonic trends as in Figure 3.
We should thus expect “short-term”mobility gains if returns change, but those gains
may not persist. These results have general implications on how we expect institutional or
technological change to a↵ect mobility. Previous authors have shown that technological
progress can lead to non-monotonic mobility trends through repeated changes in skill
returns (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997). We find that even a one-time change tends to generate
such trends.
Implications. We can formulate a more general intuition, which applies to both
of our last two examples. A change in the relative importance of di↵erent channels of
intergenerational transmission will tend to increase mobility temporarily, as it a↵ects the
prospects of families di↵erently. For example, a decline in the importance of parental
income relative to own skills diminishes the prospects of o↵spring from high-income
parents. The declining relative importance of a particular skill or endowment is to the
disadvantage of those families in which it is abundant. Technological, economic, and
social changes will often generate such relative gains and losses, generating transitional
intergenerational mobility in the generation in which they occur.
The implications of our findings are not restricted to those particular types of struc-
tural changes that we examined explicitly. This may become more apparent if we allow
for a broader definition of the endowment vector. For example, assume that et captures
also the geographic location of individuals (“inherited” with some probability from their
parents). We can then relate our last example to Long and Ferrie (2013b), who argue that
US occupational mobility may have been comparatively high in the 19th century as of
exceptional internal geographic mobility. Our framework can support this hypothesis, but
with a di↵erent emphasis. Intergenerational mobility may not necessarily increase due to
internal migration itself (that depends on who migrates), but certainly due to one of its
underlying causes: variation in labor demand across areas and time incentivizes internal
migration, but it also directly increases intergenerational income mobility by generating
di↵erent local demand conditions for parents and their (non-migrating) children.
24Eq. (2.20) includes then the additional term ⇢02⇤ (I    ⇤) 1 ⇢2 (1   1V ar(yt!1) ), which is negative
if V ar(yt!1) < V ar(yT 1) = 1.
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We thus come to a quite general conclusion. First, times of change tend to be times of
high intergenerational mobility. Moreover, such gains will be succeeded by a long-lasting
decline in mobility, unless further structural changes occur. Countries experiencing a
period of stable economic conditions will thus tend to be characterized by negative
mobility trends if they were preceded by more turbulent times.
As noted above, countries such as the US may have experienced much greater societal
transformations in the first than in the second half of the 20th century. Our findings
suggest that such transformations may have strengthened intergenerational mobility in
economic status in those generations that were directly a↵ected.25 Our model also
illustrates that these mobility gains diminish in subsequent generations, providing another
reason why mobility of more recent cohorts should perhaps be expected to decline.
2.3 Empirical Application
The core implication from our model is that even a single structural change should
be expected to a↵ect intergenerational mobility measures over long time periods. We
examine now if such dynamic e↵ects can be observed empirically.
We considered intergenerational mobility trends over generations in our theoretical
framework, but empirical studies estimate mobility trends over cohorts (typically o↵-
spring cohorts). These two dimensions, which do not match due to variation of parental
age at birth, have to our knowledge not yet been linked in the literature. An explicit
consideration of cohorts (Section 2.4) will provide additional implications, some of which
will already become apparent in our empirical analysis.
Our objective is to cleanly identify the e↵ects of a major structural reform on mobility
not only in the directly a↵ected cohorts, but also in subsequent cohorts and generations.
This intention leads to considerable requirements on both data coverage (requiring data
on family links and individual outcomes over multiple decades) and identifiability of the
reform impact among other determinants of mobility trends. Fortunately, the Swedish
compulsory school reform and access to long-run registry data make such analysis pos-
sible.
25Note that much of the economic literature and our findings relate to relative mobility, how di↵erences
in economic outcomes among parents relate to di↵erences among their o↵spring. Economic development
or transitions may also generate absolute mobility, by generating di↵erences in economic status between
generations (see Goldthorpe, 2013).
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2.3.1 The Swedish Compulsory School Reform
We describe here only the most important elements of the Swedish compulsory school
reform, which is comprehensively discussed in Holmlund (2007). Gradually implemented
across municipalities from the late 1940s, the reform’s two main components were to
raise compulsory schooling from seven (eight in some municipalities) to nine years, and
to postpone tracking decisions from the fifth or seventh to after the ninth grade. The
reform prescribed a unified national curriculum and municipalities received additional
funding to cover costs from its implementation.
Our choice of application is motivated by three main reasons. First, education and
educational systems are key mechanisms for the reproduction of economic advantage.
Family background explains a large share of the variation in educational attainment ,
and institutional aspects are believed to a↵ect that relationship (Bjo¨rklund and Salvanes,
2010). Educational reforms or expansion are thus potential determinants of observed mo-
bility changes over time (Machin, 2007), and school reforms are often directly motivated
by a desire to increase mobility – indeed, one of the Swedish reform’s objectives was
to increase educational attainment among students from less advantaged backgrounds
(Erikson and Jonsson, 1996). The Swedish and similar reforms in other Scandinavian
countries have appeared to achieve this objective, raising income mobility in directly
a↵ected generations (see Meghir and Palme, 2005, Holmlund, 2008, and Pekkarinen et
al., 2009).
Second, administrative data in Sweden cover an extraordinarily long time span.
Coverage over three generations is needed to assess the reform’s impact on mobility not
only on directly a↵ected but also the subsequent generation. Large sample sizes allow
us to exploit fine geographic variation for causal identification and to detect gradual
mobility changes over time.
Third, the reform’s gradual implementation over municipalities allows separation
of the reform from regional or time-specific e↵ects. A number of studies exploit this
characteristic to assess the causal e↵ect of the reform on individual outcomes in directly
a↵ected, or spillover e↵ects in subsequent generations (see e.g. Meghir and Palme, 2005;
Holmlund et al., 2011; Meghir et al., 2011). While we follow a similar identification
strategy, our objective is to examine the reform’s e↵ect on standard summary measures
of intergenerational mobility instead of individual outcomes. Both aspects are related
38
CHAPTER 2. INTERPRETING TRENDS IN INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY
(e.g., Havnes and Mogstad, 2012), but mobility can respond dynamically even in the
absence of intergenerational spillover e↵ects, as we showed theoretically in Section 2.2.2.
We estimate the reform’s impact on intergenerational mobility in income and educa-
tional attainment over two generations and compare the results against our theoretical
predictions.
2.3.2 Compulsory Schooling in the Intergenerational Model
The impact of a compulsory schooling policy on educational and income mobility can
be predicted from our theoretical framework. We first include constants ↵y and ↵h into
the scalar variants of our baseline equations (2.2)-(2.3), thus allowing for mean changes
in income and education. To capture the main component of the school reform assume
then that eq. (2.3) determines intended schooling h⇤, while from generation T onwards
actual schooling ht is compulsory until x years, such that
ht =
8>><>>:
h⇤t
max(h⇤t , x)
if t < T
if t   T
. (2.22)
The school reform raises schooling of individuals with particularly low educational attain-
ment. This “mechanical” shift may in turn a↵ect the attainment of others via potential
general equilibrium responses. Compositional changes may generate peer e↵ects, and
changes in supply may alter the returns to schooling and thus schooling decisions.26
However, a theoretical discussion of the numerous responses that may occur over such
long time intervals can be only incomplete and speculative. We instead focus on the main
“mechanical” e↵ect of the school reform, which explains the observed empirical pattern
well.
We study the dynamic response in the most popular measure of income and educa-
tional mobility, the intergenerational elasticity of income  inc and educational coe cient
 edu,
 inc,t =
Cov(yt, yt 1)
V ar(yt 1)
and  edu,t =
Cov(ht, ht 1)
V ar(ht 1)
. (2.23)
In the previous section we derived this measure by repeated insertion of the structural
26Spillover e↵ects on educational attainment of individuals not directly a↵ected by the reform were
found to be small in Holmlund (2007).
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equations of our model, using linearity of the expectation operator to solve for the required
moments. But the compulsory schooling requirement generates a non-linear relationship
between ht and ht 1, which depend also on the distributions of uy, uh and v.
Figure 2.4 provides a simulated numerical example based on simple parametric as-
sumptions (e.g., normally distributed errors). From generation T schooling becomes
compulsory until x = 9 years. We assume that parental schooling has only modest
indirect intergenerational spillover e↵ects ( h = 1) and choose other parameters such to
generate pre-reform first and second moments for income yt and schooling ht that are
similar to the observed moments in the Swedish data.
Panel A plots the response of the intergenerational educational coe cient  edu. In
o↵spring generation T the reform compresses the variance of schooling strongly, which
decreases the numerator of  edu – di↵erences in schooling between parents result into
smaller di↵erences among their o↵spring. However, from generation T +1 the variance of
schooling is also compressed among parents, who were already subject to the school reform
in the previous generation. The coe cient  edu is inversely scaled by this variance, and
thus tends to rise. The non-monotonic response is thus mainly a consequence of strong
changes in the variance of the marginal distributions (a direct and mechanical e↵ect of
the reform).
The reform could lead to further substantial compressions of educational attainment
in subsequent generations if schooling has very strong causal e↵ects on o↵spring outcomes
( h   1). However, the existing empirical literature points to modest intergenerational
“multiplier” e↵ects of education (see Plug et al., 2011). The dashed line illustrates one
important potential general equilibrium response. Increased supply of formal schooling
may decrease its returns on the labor market (a decrease in  ), decreasing inequality
in income and thus (if human capital accumulation is subject to parental investments)
educational inequality and intergenerational persistence.
A reduction in the degree to which di↵erences in educational attainment are trans-
mitted from parents to o↵spring will also reduce the transmission of income di↵erences,
if formal schooling improves an individual’s earnings potential – the intergenerational in-
come elasticity  inc decreases in generation T (panel B in Figure 2.4). General equilibrium
responses may a↵ect this prediction. For example, increased supply of formal schooling
may reduce its returns, thus decreasing the intergenerational elasticity further (dashed
line). The second-generation response in  inc is less clear-cut. Changes in the numerator
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of  inc in eq. (2.23) are not as easily dominated by a decrease in the denominator in
generation T + 1, which will tend to be weaker for  inc than for  edu since di↵erences in
formal schooling are not the only source of di↵erences in income. The direction of the
second-generation response in  inc is thus an empirical question.
2.3.3 Data
Our source data is based on a 35 percent random sample of the Swedish population
born between 1932 and 1967. Using information based on population registers we link
sampled individuals to their siblings (all sibling types) as well as their (and their siblings’)
biological parents and children. We then individually match data on personal character-
istics and place of residence based on bi-decennial censuses starting from 1960, as well
as education data stemming from o cial registers. We do not use the sibling-parent
subsample in our main analysis: it can provide additional precision in mobility estimates
in 1940/50 cohorts, but is not representative for earlier and later cohorts.
Educational registers were compiled in 1970, 1990 and about every third year there-
after, containing detailed information on each individual’s educational attainment.27
Data in 1970 were collected only for those born 1911 and later. We can therefore not
observe schooling for parents who were 33 years or older at their child’s birth in 1943
(at the onset of the reform implementation). This age limit increases by a year for
each subsequent o↵spring cohort, potentially creating a confounding trend in mobility
measures over cohorts due to non-random sample selection. For comparability we thus
restrict our intergenerational sample to parent-child pairs in which parents were no older
than 32 years when their child was born. Educational data may also be missing for other
reasons, in particular if parents had died or emigrated before 1970. The probability
of such occurrences is potentially related to individual characteristics, but the share of
a↵ected observations is small.28 As the data are collected from o cial registers there are
no standard non-response problems.
The most recent educational register was compiled in 2007, which allows us to consider
27We consider for each individual the highest attainment recorded across these years. The information
on schooling levels is translated into years of education with 7 years for the old compulsory school being
the minimum, and 20 years for a doctoral degree the maximum.
28Educational information are less often missing among o↵spring, due to their younger age and the
more frequent measurement of education after 1990. The share of missing observations does not vary
with reform status (conditional on municipalities and o↵spring cohorts), and has thus little e↵ect on our
causal analysis.
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mobility trends for cohorts born from the early 1940s up until 1972. Attainment of
individuals at the top of the educational distribution is not reliably covered for more
recent cohorts; only a small population share is a↵ected, but measurement error in the
tails of the distribution would have a disproportionately large e↵ect on intergenerational
mobility measures.
We construct a measure of long-run income status based on age-specific averages
of annual incomes, which are observed for the years 1968-2007.29 Incomes for parents
are necessarily measured at a later age than incomes for their o↵spring, which may
bias estimates of the intergenerational elasticity of lifetime income. Such bias is less
problematic for our purposes as we are interested in mobility di↵erences between groups
instead of the overall level of income mobility in the population.
We present evidence on mobility in father-child pairs, but the consideration of max-
imum parental education and income yields similar results. We test the robustness of our
results using other samples with no or di↵erent restrictions on parental age, or alternative
measures of parental education and income, some of which we will also report below.
To construct the reform dummy, which indicates whether an individual was subject
to the new system of comprehensive schooling, we follow the procedure first used by
Holmlund (2008). Reform status can be approximated using information on an indi-
vidual’s birth year (from the administrative register) and place of residence during school
age (from the censuses).30 The gradual implementation of the reform a↵ected cohorts
born between 1938 and 1955, but the school municipality cannot be reliably determined
for individuals born before 1943. As the share of individuals a↵ected by the reform was
very small we set the reform dummy to zero for all cohorts before 1943 (and one for all
cohorts after 1955).31
Table 2.1 describes, by birth cohort, both the source data and the intergenerational
sample, which was drawn according to the conditions described above. The number of
29We use total (pre-tax) income, which is the sum of an individual’s labor (and labor-related) earnings,
early-age pensions, and net income from business and capital realizations. We express all incomes in 2005
prices and exclude observations with average incomes below 10000 SEK.
30Reform status across cohort-municipality cells can be inferred by tracing in which cohort, for each
municipality, the share graduating from the old school system discontinuously drops to zero (or close to
zero). Helena Holmlund has kindly provided us with her coding, and we refer to Holmlund (2007) for
further details on the coding procedure and potential measurement issues.
31Cohorts born before 1943 were subject to the new school system in 33 out of a total of 1034
municipalities. With the exception of less than a handful mid-sized urban municipalities, all of these
were small, rural municipalities. We further drop a small number of municipalities for which the
implementation date is unclear.
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observations for each cohort are listed in columns 2 and 5. Columns 6 and 7 describe
the number of observations with non-missing education or income information. Columns
3-4 and 8-9 describe how the share of o↵spring and fathers attending reformed schools
increases over cohorts. It increases faster among fathers in the intergenerational sample
than in the source data, due to oversampling of younger parents in the former.32
2.3.4 Empirical Evidence
Descriptive Evidence. To illustrate the timing of the reform further, Figure 2.5 plots
the shares of o↵spring and fathers attending a reformed school in our source data over
half a century of (o↵spring) birth cohorts. The share of children subject to the reform
increases nearly linearly in cohorts 1943-1955 (gray area). These individuals become
parents themselves from the early 1960s, but their share among all parents increases more
slowly due to variation in parental age at birth (black area). Up until the early 1980s
only a minority of fathers had themselves been a↵ected by the compulsory school reform.
This observation leads to a first important point: the dynamic e↵ect of structural changes
on mobility measures in subsequent generations should be gradual, due to variation of
parental age at birth. We will discuss this implication in more detail in Section 2.4. As
noted, the share of fathers subject to the reform increases faster in our intergenerational
sample, which is restricted to younger parents (dashed line). Our results will therefore
understate the longevity of the reform’s e↵ect on mobility measures. The reform had a
direct impact on educational attainment, which can be also measured with high precision
over long time intervals.33
Figure 2.6 plots the mean and variance of years of schooling of o↵spring cohorts (1933-
1972) and their fathers (1911-1935) in our intergenerational sample. Vertical bars at the
1943 and 1955 cohorts indicate the start and end point of the reform’s implementation.
A reform e↵ect on average years of schooling is not easily discernible from panel (A).
Indeed, Holmlund (2007) finds the reform e↵ect on mean schooling to be small (lower
32A smaller share of individuals from the raw data are sampled among earlier cohorts, as their fathers
are less likely to be identified in the source data. Identification of the reform e↵ect requires that
the probabilities that fathers, education and income are observed do not change systematically with
introduction of the reform. While sampling probabilities di↵er across birth cohorts and municipalities,
the correlation with reform status is negligible.
33A measure of education in later life is likely to capture an individual’s entire educational attainment,
as most people complete schooling in early life. In contrast, di↵erences in current incomes are poor proxies
of di↵erences in lifetime income, such that measures of income mobility (in particular of mobility trends)
are sensitive even to small changes in the age at which incomes are observed (the life-cycle bias problem,
see Jenkins, 1987, Haider and Solon, 2006, and Nybom and Stuhler, 2011).
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bound estimate of 0.19 years), as only a share of children are a↵ected by the compulsory
requirement. In contrast, the shift in the variance of schooling is more striking: the
reform period coincides with a sudden and strong compression of the distribution of
schooling. Comparison with earlier trends for their fathers in the first half of the 20th
century illustrates the exceptional magnitude of those changes.
Intergenerational Mobility Trend. Figure 2.7 plots cohort trends in the intergener-
ational educational coe cient, the slope coe cient in an ordinary least-squares regression
of o↵spring’s years on father’s years of schooling. The solid line includes estimates
from our main intergenerational sample, spanning from 1943 to 1972. The dashed line
represents estimates from a restricted sample containing younger fathers (aged below 30),
allowing us to plot trends also for earlier cohorts not yet a↵ected by the reform. We find
estimated trends to be very robust to changes in sample restrictions concerning parental
age, as exemplified by the close overlap for the 1943-1945 cohorts (plotted) and beyond.
The reform’s implementation period coincides with a large drop in the intergenera-
tional coe cient, contrasting with stable estimates before the onset of the school reform.
The degree to which di↵erences in schooling are transmitted to the next generation
declines by more than a third. This decline is consistent with our theoretical expectation:
the reform compresses the distribution of years of schooling in the o↵spring generation,
such that di↵erences in parental education correspond to smaller di↵erences in o↵spring
attainment.
Reform E↵ect. Figure 2.8 provides more direct evidence on the reform impact. Re-
centering the data within each municipality, we compare educational attainment and
the intergenerational educational coe cient before and after a cohort was first subject
to the new school type. The share of individuals with less than 9 years, the variance
of schooling and the intergenerational schooling coe cient all drop strongly with local
reform implementation.
We can exploit the gradual introduction of the reform to verify its causal impact,
adapting a di↵erence-in-di↵erences specification as similarly used in Holmlund (2008)
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and Pekkarinen et al. (2009). Consider the regression equation for schooling (income)
hcfm,t = ↵1 +  1ht 1| {z }
baseline
+ ↵2Rcm +  2 (ht 1 ⇥Rcm)| {z }
reform e↵ect
+↵03Dc +  
0
3 (ht 1 ⇥Dc)| {z }
o↵spring cohort e↵ect
+↵04Dm +  
0
4 (ht 1 ⇥Dm)| {z }
municipality e↵ect
+ "cfm,t, (2.24)
where hcfm,t represents years of schooling (log income) of the o↵spring in generation t
of family i (subscript suppressed) born in cohort c, to a father of generation t   1 born
in cohort f , attending school in municipality m. The variable ht 1 represents years of
schooling (log income) of fathers. The indicator Rcm equals one if the reform was in e↵ect
for cohort c in municipality m. We control for di↵erences in both schooling levels and the
intergenerational coe cient across child cohorts (captured in the indicator vector Dc)
and across municipalities (captured in Dm).
The identifying variation that we exploit in this specification are municipality-specific
changes in the intergenerational coe cient after local introduction of the reform. While
controlling for common time trends and for persistent di↵erences across areas, this
strategy is still susceptible to di↵erences in municipality-specific trends. Moreover, the
reform indicator is measured with error, which may introduce attenuation bias. We
address both issues below.34
Table 2.2 presents OLS estimates from di↵erent variants of specification (2.24), based
on a pooled sample of those cohorts that were a↵ected by the reform introduction phase
(1943-1955). Panel (A) presents our findings on educational mobility. The estimated
schooling coe cient for a simple pooled regression (column 1) of 0.359 approximates
the average of cohort-specific estimates over that period (see Figure 2.7).35 The second
column presents separate estimates for children who were and who were not subject to the
reform. Di↵erences in parental educational attainment are associated with much smaller
di↵erences in attainment among the former. To identify the reform’s causal contribution
we successively introduce cohort and municipality fixed e↵ects and interactions in the
next columns. Standard errors are clustered on the municipality level. Estimates for the
full di↵erence-in-di↵erences specification are presented in column 4. We find that the
34Some pupils may have moved in response to local reform implementation, but Holmlund (2007) finds
that there was little selective mobility with respect to parental background.
35Di↵erences in yearly means also a↵ect the pooled coe cient (Hertz, 2008), but their contribution is
small.
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Swedish compulsory school reform reduced the degree to which di↵erences in educational
attainment were transmitted from fathers to their children by about ten percent ( ˆ2 =
 0.0371, p < 0.001).
Panel (B) of Table 2.2 presents corresponding estimates on income mobility. Our
measure of long-run income of o↵spring (fathers) is based on average incomes in age 30-35
(age 53-59). Given observation of incomes at such a young (old) age for o↵spring (fathers),
the pooled coe cient of 0.164 is likely to understate the true degree of intergenerational
persistence in lifetime income (see chapter 3). We can nevertheless identify if the reform
had an e↵ect on income mobility. Our di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimate implies that the
degree to which percentage income di↵erences were transmitted from fathers to their
children decreased by about ten percent due to the reform ( ˆ2 =  0.0196, p < 0.05).
These results are consistent with findings by Holmlund (2008).
Our estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of father cohort e↵ects and remain
statistically significant also for a number of alternative specifications, as discussed in more
detail below. We conclude that the reform had a clear positive e↵ect on both educational
and income mobility in the first a↵ected generation.
Heterogeneity. Yet, this e↵ect may be smaller than expected. The intergenerational
educational coe cient dropped by more than a third during the reform introduction
phase (from about 0.42 to 0.27, see Figure 2.7). Furthermore, a sudden trend change
occurred in the mid-1940s, even though few municipalities had yet been subject to the
reform. This pattern can be understood if we examine the heterogeneity in the reform’s
e↵ect over time. We interact the reform with o↵spring cohort dummies, exploiting that
in each cohort additional municipalities switch to the new school system. The reform
e↵ect in specification (2.24) then equals
↵2 (Rcm ⇥Dc) +  2 (ht 1 ⇥Rcm ⇥Dc) . (2.25)
Figure 2.9 plots the resulting estimates for the elements of  2 (black line). The reform
had a very strong impact in earlier cohorts, reducing the intergenerational coe cient by
almost 25 percent in those municipalities that were subject to the reform already in the
early 1940s. But coe cient estimates decrease over cohorts, implying that its impact on
later cohorts was small. The reason becomes clear from Figure 2.6. The general trend
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towards higher educational attainment made the main component of the reform (the rise
of the compulsory school level to nine years) less consequential: as by the early 1950s
most pupils were attending school for at least nine years anyways. The reform e↵ect can
thus be seen as an intention-to-treat estimate, with the share of compliers diminishing
over cohorts. We therefore conclude that the reform caused the sudden drop in the
intergenerational coe cient in the early 1940s, but that much of its overall decline until
the mid 1950s might have occured even in the absence of the reform.36
The pooled (di↵erence-in-di↵erences) coe cient that we presented in Table 2.2 can
be decomposed as a weighted average of these cohort-specific reform e↵ects,
 2(DD) =
cX
c=1
 2,cw( 2,c), (2.26)
where c denotes cohorts,  2,c the cohort-specific reform e↵ects, and w( 2,c) the weight
assigned to each cohort. These weights are defined as
w( 2,c) =
V ar(ht 1 ⇥Rcm | ht 1, Rcm,Dc = Dc)P (Dc = Dc)
cP
c=1
V ar(ht 1 ⇥Rcm | ht 1, Rcm,Dc = Dc)P (Dc = Dc)
. (2.27)
The pooled estimator will assign more weight to large cohorts, and cohorts with greater
variance in father’s schooling and the reform dummy (conditional on their covariance).
Thus, the pooled coe cient is likely to be most a↵ected by cohorts in which the shares of
a↵ected and una↵ected by the reform are similar in size (i.e. the variance of the reform
dummy is maximized). This will especially hold if the variance of father’s schooling
is relatively stable over the implementation period, which is true in our case. Sample
analogs of these weights are plotted in the grey line in Figure 2.9. As suspected, the
weights are highest around the 1950 cohort and still high for later cohorts. In contrast,
the weights are close to zero for earlier cohorts. The pooled coe cient (Table 2.2) reflects
therefore mostly the reform impact on later cohorts, which was comparatively small.
Our example points to a general feature of di↵erence-in-di↵erences analyses with
gradual (or staggered) treatment implementation. Treatment e↵ects are assumed to
be constant over time in a standard specification, but are likely heterogeneous if the
36Our estimates may understate the reform e↵ect in later cohorts if it generated anticipation or spillover
e↵ects in non-reform schools (individual schooling decisions may depend on the educational attainment
of others). Our argument that the reform’s impact was larger in earlier cohorts still holds, as educational
attainment was steadily increasing even before the reform was introduced.
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counterfactual is subject to trends. The pooled coe cient then gets a more complex
interpretation and may to a large extent reflect the reform impact at a particular point
in time, which can be quite di↵erent from its initial impact.
Second generation e↵ect. Figure 2.7 documents a second, more gradual but never-
theless pronounced change in mobility over time. After its large and long decline, the
coe cient starts rising again among cohorts born in the late 1960s. Incidentally, these
were the first cohorts in which some children were born to fathers who already themselves
attended a reform school (see Figure 2.5).
But is the modest increase in the data really the dynamic impact of the reform,
and not the product of coincidental (and potentially contemporaneous) factors? We can
distinguish these sources by adapting regression equation 2.24 for the next generation.
We estimate
hcfm0,t =↵1 +  1ht 1| {z }
baseline
+ ↵2Rfm0 +  2
 
ht 1 ⇥Rfm0
 | {z }
father reform e↵ect
+↵03Df +  
0
3 (ht 1 ⇥Df )| {z }
father cohort e↵ect
+↵04Dm0 +  
0
4 (ht 1 ⇥Dm0)| {z }
father municipality e↵ect
+ "cfm,t, (2.28)
where the indicator Rfm0 equals one if the reform was in e↵ect for father cohort f born
in municipality m0.
Table 2.3 presents OLS estimates from variants of specification (2.24), using o↵spring
cohorts 1966-1972 in which the share of reform fathers is above one percent (adding earlier
cohorts has little e↵ect on the estimates). Panel (A) presents our results on educational
mobility. Estimates for the full di↵erence-in-di↵erences specification (column 4,  ˆ2 =
0.0655, p < 0.001) indicate that the observed rise in the intergenerational educational
coe cient is indeed a dynamic response to the school reform that occurred in the previous
generation.
Panel (B) presents estimates of the reform’s second-generation e↵ect on income mo-
bility. We can observe parental incomes at an earlier age for later cohorts, and use
observations in age 35-45 to construct our measure of long-run status. The pooled
coe cient estimate of 0.207 is thus likely to be less biased than the corresponding estimate
for the first generation. As with education, the reform’s impact on the intergenerational
coe cient ( ˆ2 = 0.041, p < 0.05) is larger than the corresponding estimate for the first
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generation. Two factors explain this finding. First, fathers who themselves were subject
to the reform had their children at young age. Young fathers tend to have less educational
attainment, the reform impact on this group was thus large. A second explanation follows
from Figure 2.9 – children born in the late 1960s are more likely to have parents born
in the early 1940s than later We showed that the reform impact was much larger on the
former, due to underlying trends in education.
In our data we can track the intergenerational coe cient only up to 1972, but
the share of reform fathers will continue to climb until the early 2000s (see Figure
2.5). Unless dominated by contemporaneous events we thus expect the intergenerational
income elasticity and educational coe cient to rise for several decades after our records
end.
Intergenerational Correlation. The reform’s impact on the intergenerational
regression coe cient exemplifies our argument that current mobility levels and trends can
be a↵ected by events that occured in a more distant past. The school reform compresses
the distribution of years of schooling, first decreasing the regression coe cient when
a↵ecting the o↵spring’s distribution, and increasing it in later cohorts when also a↵ecting
parents. But it is less obvious what trend we should expect in the intergenerational
correlation, which abstracts from di↵erences in cross-sectional inequality over generations.
Figure 2.10 plots estimates of the intergenerational correlation from 1940 to 1972.
Estimates from our main intergenerational sample are represented by the solid line, while
the dashed line shows estimates from a restricted sample containing fathers aged below
30 to examine trends also for earlier cohorts. Estimated levels are sensitive to changes
in sample restrictions concerning parental age, but the pattern over cohorts appears
robust. The intergenerational correlation is strongly increasing among cohorts not yet
a↵ected by the reform, but the correlation starts declining shortly after introduction of
the reform from 1943 and remains lower until the end of our observation period in the
early 1970s. The overall change in the correlation is smaller than the change in the
regression coe cient.
Estimates are comparatively low already in the early 1950s. The di↵erence is not
statistically significant, but such pattern would not be surprising: our model predicts that
the intergenerational correlation should be particularly low when the shares of children
subject and not subject to the reform are similar, as a larger part of the variation in
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schooling is then explained by reform status instead of parental background. The rising
coe cient towards the end of our sampling period is not predicted by our model; given
its suddenness it is likely due to contemporaneous instead of past events. We return to
this argument in our next section.
Robustness. We perform a number of tests to probe the robustness of our results.
Table 2.4 compares our baseline estimates of the reform e↵ect on the intergenerational
educational coe cient and income elasticity with estimates from six alternative specific-
ations. First, we include matched siblings in our sample, which increases its size but
also diminishes representativeness for some cohorts (see data subsection). Second, we
restrict the sample to younger fathers with age at birth below 30, to probe the sensitivity
of our results to such age restrictions. Our third robustness tests address measurement
error in the reform indicator. Individuals who have been in a lower than expected grade
from delayed school entry or grade repetition may have been subject to the reform before
others from the same birth cohort (see Holmlund, 2007). The resulting attenuation
bias can be reduced by dropping all individuals born in the cohort just preceding local
implementation of the reform. Fourth, we use the maximum of both parents’ (instead of
the father’s) educational attainment or income. Fifth, we include additional controls for
the birth cohort of fathers (first generation) or o↵spring (second generation estimates).
Finally, we include municipality-specific linear time trends to support the common trends
assumption that is underlying our di↵erence-in-di↵erences analysis.
Our estimates of the reform e↵ect on the intergenerational educational coe cient
remain statistically significant on the p < 0.001 level across all specifications. Their
sizes vary either very little or as expected. In particular, they increase in absolute
size when measurement error in the reform indicator is being addressed (column 4).
Estimates di↵er slightly also when we estimate a parent-o↵spring (instead of father-
o↵spring) measure of persistence, using maximum education among both mothers and
fathers as independent variable (column 5). Estimates of the reform e↵ect on the
intergenerational income elasticity have always the same sign, but vary more strongly
and are not always statistically significant on the p < 0.05 or even p < 0.1 level. Two
factors reduce precision. First, long-run income is measured with much larger error than
educational attainment. Second, the reform had a mechanic and strong e↵ect on the
distribution of educational attainment, while incomes were only indirectly a↵ected.
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Overall the tests corroborate the existence and the direction of reform e↵ects on
the intergenerational persistence in both education and income, but underscore that the
former is more precisely estimated. We provide further evidence on the suitability of
our identification strategy and the common trends assumption by performing a number
of placebo tests. Following Meghir et al. (2011) we falsely assume that the reform took
place before or after the actual implementation date. We first sample only those o↵spring
born in 1966 to 1972 whose fathers were subject to the reform and generate a placebo
“non-treated”group by pretending that the school reform was implemented one year later,
two years, three years, and so on. Similarly, we sample only those fathers who were not
treated and pretend that the reform was implemented earlier, thus generating a placebo
“treated” group. The resulting estimates are plotted in Figure 2.11.37
Each dot represents the estimate of the reform e↵ect on the intergenerational educa-
tional coe cient assuming the reform took place at the specified period before or after
the actual implementation date. The largest estimate is obtained when we use the correct
timing for the reform assignment (at zero). We find small and insignificant estimates in
all other cases, except when we assume that the reform was implemented one year before
the actual date. Measurement error in reform status is a potential explanation for this
observation, as discussed above and also visible from Figure 2.8 – those in a lower than
expected grade may have been subject to the reform even though not captured by our
reform indicator (see Holmlund, 2007).
2.4 From Generations to Cohorts
Our model is broadly in line with the previous literature, but motivated by our empir-
ical application we will next relax its coarse generational perspective.38 The existing
theoretical literature considers intergenerational transmission between generations, but
empirical studies estimate mobility trends over cohorts. These two dimensions, which
do not match due to variation of parental age at birth, have to our knowledge not yet
been linked in the literature. We therefore introduce a cohort dimension into our model.
37Corresponding tests provide supportive evidence also for the first-generation estimates (available
upon request).
38A more detailed discussion of our theoretical model is given in Nybom and Stuhler (2013), in which we
discuss some of its other simplifying assumptions. We demonstrate that our results are not sensitive to the
way the influence of parental income is modeled, and that more recursive causal mechanisms (independent
e↵ects from grandparents) lead to prolonged dynamic responses of mobility trends to structural shocks.
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Our initial motivation was to provide a closer match to the empirical literature, but this
extension will also reveal a prospective avenue for identification of past structural changes
in mobility levels and trends.
We adopt the following notation to distinguish cohorts and generations. Let the
random variable Ct denote the cohort into which a member of generation t of a family
is born. Let At 1,C(t) be a random variable that denotes the age of the parent at birth
of the o↵spring generation t born in cohort Ct. For simplicity assume At 1,C(t) to be
independent of parental income and characteristics, but allow for dependence on Ct, so
that its distribution can change over time. Member t   j of a family is then born in
cohort
Ct j = Ct  At 1,C(t)   ... At j,C(t j+1). (2.29)
Denote realizations of these random variables by lower case letters. For simplicity
we consider the scalar case with a single skill. Our reduced two-equations model for
intergenerational transmission between o↵spring born into cohort Ct = ct and a parent
born in cohort Ct 1 = ct 1 is then given by
yt,c(t) =  c(t)yt 1,c(t 1) + ⇢c(t)et,c(t) + ut,c(t) (2.30)
et,c(t) =  c(t)et 1,c(t 1) + vt,c(t), (2.31)
where we keep the simplifying assumptions as in our baseline model in equations (2.5)
and (2.6). By considering a single set of equations for each generation we abstract
from life-cycle e↵ects within a given generation. The transmission parameters in (2.30)
and (2.31) can thus be interpreted as representing an average of e↵ective transmission
mechanisms over the life-cycle. For example, the price parameter ⇢c(t) reflects average
returns throughout the working life of an individual born in year ct.39
Consider for simplicity again the special case in which cross-sectional inequality
remains constant, such that V ar(yt,c(t)) = V ar(et,c(t)) = 1 8t, c(t). Using (2.30) and
(2.31), the intergenerational income elasticity of the o↵spring generation t born in cohort
39A consideration of life-cycle e↵ects (as in Conlisk, 1969, or Cunha and Heckman, 2007) would be
interesting, but the general implications that we discuss here hold as long as some intergenerational
transmission mechanisms tend to be e↵ective in early life (e.g., genetic transmission, childhood
environment, and education).
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ct then equals
 t,c(t) =
Cov
 
yt,c(t), yt 1,C(t 1)
 
V ar
 
yt,c(t)
  =  c(t) + ⇢c(t) c(t)Cov  et 1,C(t 1), yt 1,C(t 1)  , (2.32)
where for convenience we do not explicitly condition on Ct = ct. Mobility for a given
cohort depends on cohort-specific transmission mechanisms and the covariance of income
and endowments in the parent generation. However, this cross-covariance may vary with
parental age, since di↵erent parental cohorts might have been subject to di↵erent policies
and institutions. Using eq. (2.29) and the law of iterated expectations we rewrite eq.
(2.32) as
 t,c(t) =  c(t) + ⇢c(t) c(t)EA(t 1)
 
Cov
 
et 1,c(t) A(t 1), yt 1,c(t) A(t 1)|At 1,c(t)
  
=  c(t) + ⇢c(t) c(t)
X
at 1
fc(t)
 
at 1
 
Cov
 
et 1,c(t) a(t 1), yt 1,c(t) a(t 1)
 
, (2.33)
where fc(t) is the probability mass function for parental age at birth of cohort ct. Income
mobility thus depends on current transmission mechanisms and a weighted average of the
cross-covariance of income and endowments in previous cohorts, where the weights are
given by the cohort-specific distribution of parental age in the population.40
We can iterate backwards to express  t,c(t) in terms of parameter values only, and
find
 t,c(t) =  c(t) + ⇢c(t) c(t)
X
at 1
fc(t)(at 1)⇢c(t) a(t 1) + ⇢c(t) c(t)
1X
r=1
zr, (2.34)
where
zr =
X
at 1
⇣
fc(t)(at 1) . . .
X
at r 1
⇣
fc(t r)(at r 1)
rY
s=1
⇣
 c(t s) c(t s)
⌘
⇢c(t r 1)
⌘⌘
.
Equation (2.34) summarizes how mobility trends across cohorts respond to structural
changes. The insights from the generations-only model still hold, but the explicit consid-
eration of cohorts leads to a number of additional implications.41
40The decomposition of the cross-covariance of income and endowments into conditional cross-
covariances was simplified here by assuming that first moments of the distribution of those variables
are constant over cohorts. In the empirical application we consider cases in which those moments are not
constant.
41In steady state, both equations (2.8) and (2.34) simplify to equation (2.9). The explicit consideration
of cohorts has consequences only for transitions between steady states, which may explain why existing
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First, while a rapid structural change may have a sudden impact on mobility in the
first generation, their e↵ect on mobility trends in subsequent generations will be gradual
due to variation of parental age at birth. This is exactly the pattern we found in our
empirical application (see Figures 2.5 and 2.7).
Second, the importance of past institutions and policies on current mobility rises
with parental age at birth. Likewise, the impact of structural changes on mobility trends
will die out faster in populations in which individuals become parents at younger ages.
Cross-country mobility di↵erentials are thus not only driven by di↵erences in both current
and past transmission mechanisms, but also by di↵erent weights on past mechanisms.
This argument might be particularly relevant for comparisons between developed and
developing countries.42
Finally, equation (2.34) points to a potential avenue for identification of past struc-
tural changes in current mobility trends, exploiting that the influence of the former on
the latter is a function of parental age at birth. As an example, assume that from cohort
c⇤ onwards an expansion of public childcare reduces the heritability of endowments from
 1 to  2.43 Assume that all parents of generation t were not yet subject to the new
regime, such that
 C(t 1) =
8>><>>:
 1
 2
for Ct 1 < c⇤
for Ct 1   c⇤
.
Other parameters remain unchanged and all grandparents have been subject to the
old regime. From equation (2.34), the conditional intergenerational elasticities among
children with old (Ct 1 < c⇤) or young (Ct 1   c⇤) parents equal
 t,c(t)
    
Ct 1<c⇤
=   + ⇢ 2  1Cov
 
et 2,C(t 2), yt 2,C(t 2)
 
+ ⇢2 1 (2.35)
and
 t,c(t)
    
Ct 1 c⇤
=   + ⇢ 2  2Cov
 
et 2,C(t 2), yt 2,C(t 2)
 
+ ⇢2 1. (2.36)
steady-state models have not yet been explicitly linked to cohort-specific measures of mobility.
42Our results imply that mobility in developing countries, in which parents tend to be younger, is less
dependent on past institutions. Our example in Section (2.2.3) points to another potential source for
high mobility in developing countries, in which returns to certain skills or regional wage levels may be
comparatively variable over time (e.g., due to internal conflict or rapid economic and societal change).
43For example, Havnes and Mogstad (2012) find that access to subsidized childcare in Norway benefited
children from low-income parents the most.
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Di↵erencing equations (2.35) and (2.36) then reveals the dynamic, or second-generation
impact of the reform on current mobility levels. In practice we may of course encounter
various obstacles that are ignored in this simple example. In particular, parental age is
likely to correlate with other parental characteristics and thus mobility of their o↵spring.
A more targeted analysis was feasible in our empirical application: we directly con-
ditioned on parental exposure to a particular school reform, exploiting our knowledge of
the geographic variation in its time of e↵ectiveness. We can use the same application to
illustrate that even in the absence of such direct evidence, a comparison of conditional
mobility measures may still provide a first clue about dynamic e↵ects of past events on
current trends. Panel (A) in Figure 2.12 plots conditional coe cients from a regression of
o↵spring on father’s years of schooling, for cohorts born from the 1960s until 1972. The
pattern is consistent with our previous results: the intergenerational coe cient increases
first among families with younger fathers, who were more likely to have been subject
to the school reform themselves. Panel (B) shows that the corresponding trend in the
intergenerational correlation coe cient is not systematically related to parental age at
birth.
2.5 Conclusions
We examined the dynamic relationship between intergenerational mobility in economic
outcomes and its underlying structural factors. We showed, theoretically and empirically,
that changes in the economic environment a↵ect intergenerational persistence not only
in directly a↵ected but also in subsequent generations.
Our objective in the empirical application was to identify such dynamic e↵ects for
a particular policy reform. Using administrative microdata over three generations, we
showed that a Swedish compulsory schooling reform decreased educational and income
persistence in directly a↵ected cohorts – by up to a fourth among earlier cohorts, in
which the compulsory requirement a↵ected a larger share of the population. But the
reform’s impact in the subsequent generation was of comparable magnitude, increasing
the intergenerational educational coe cient and income elasticity and thus lowering
mobility. This second-generation e↵ect is likely to extend to very recent cohorts, as the
majority of parents who were themselves subject to the reform had not yet had children
when our sample ends. By looking solely at directly a↵ected cohorts, previous research
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on similar reforms has thus likely overstated their long-run (or net) mobility e↵ects.
We based our theoretical analysis on a simple simultaneous-equations model, de-
viating from the existing literature in our focus on its dynamic properties and our
consideration of a multidimensional skill vector. We showed that mobility today depends
not only on current transmission mechanisms, but also on the joint distribution of
income and endowments in past generations – and thus on past mechanisms. Policy
or institutional reforms generate therefore long-lasting mobility trends, which are often
non-monotonic. Some implications may be surprising, especially our finding that negative
mobility trends today can stem from gains in equality of opportunity in the past. Other
conclusions may have a more intuitive appeal, such that mobility will tend to be higher
in times of structural changes.
While the focus was on the general relationship between causal transmission mech-
anisms and mobility trends, we also noted various practical implications. For example,
we showed that the impact of rising wage di↵erentials in US and other countries on
mobility may not yet have been fully realized in current data. Changing returns to skills
shift intergenerational mobility over at least two generations, while other measures of
persistence respond more immediately. This argument may explain why the empirical
literature finds increasing sibling correlations in earnings in the US, but less evidence for
a corresponding increase in intergenerational persistence. The latter has been surprising
as both theoretical (Solon, 2004) and cross-country evidence (e.g., Corak, 2013) suggest
a negative relation between cross-sectional inequality and intergenerational mobility.
This implication may be of concern for mobility proponents, as it suggests that a
recent decline in mobility might yet to be uncovered by empirical research. But our
results also point to a rather innocuous explanation for such observation. We showed
that a shift towards a more meritocratic society (a rise in the importance of own skill
relative to parental status) tends to generate a non-monotonic response – a mobility gain
in the first a↵ected generation, followed by a long-lasting negative trend. We should
then perhaps expect mobility to decline in countries that became more meritocratic and
mobile in the first half of the 20th century.
Finally, our finding that intergenerational mobility tends to be high in times of change
seems consistent with recent evidence from the empirical literature. Long and Ferrie
(2013b) find that US occupational mobility was comparatively high in the late 19th
century, and suggest that an exceptional degree of geographic mobility may have raised
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intergenerational mobility. Our model points to a potential joint cause for both: strong
variation in economic conditions across areas and time not only incentivizes internal
migration, it also increases intergenerational mobility by altering the local demand con-
ditions that parents and children face during their lifetimes.
Our model is of course highly stylized, and a thorough discussion of related applica-
tions requires careful treatment of issues that we only touched upon (such as the timing
of intergenerational transmission over an individual’s life-cycle, or the di culties that
hinder reliable estimation of trends in income mobility). We briefly addressed promising
avenues for future empirical research, noting that di↵erent potential causes of mobility
shifts could be distinguished by their divergent dynamic implications; that the covariance
between income and endowments in the parent generation plays a central role in the
evolution of income mobility over generations; and that estimation of mobility measures
conditional on parental age at birth may provide initial evidence on the e↵ect of past
events on current mobility trends.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Sample Statistics by Birth Cohort
Source data Intergenerational samples
# obs. reform shares # obs. with non-missing reform shares
(o↵spring) (fathers) (educ.) (inc.) (o↵spring) (fathers)
1943 42,138 0.04 0.00 17,211 15,008 11,059 0.04 0.00
1944 44,715 0.06 0.00 18,425 16,179 14,016 0.06 0.00
1945 44,682 0.06 0.00 18,604 16,441 15,984 0.07 0.00
1946 44,299 0.11 0.00 19,124 17,101 16,800 0.11 0.00
1947 43,288 0.18 0.00 19,078 17,103 16,775 0.18 0.00
1948 42,527 0.31 0.00 19,063 17,192 16,881 0.31 0.00
1949 40,628 0.39 0.00 18,449 16,768 16,424 0.40 0.00
1950 38,854 0.53 0.00 19,421 17,657 17,288 0.54 0.00
1951 36,951 0.56 0.00 18,644 17,016 16,693 0.57 0.00
1952 37,031 0.69 0.00 19,102 17,442 17,085 0.70 0.00
1953 37,537 0.79 0.00 19,452 17,904 17,565 0.80 0.00
1954 35,668 0.86 0.00 18,453 16,955 16,589 0.87 0.00
1955 36,440 0.95 0.00 19,122 17,569 17,179 0.96 0.00
1956 36,666 1.00 0.00 20,942 19,217 18,714 1.00 0.00
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1965 42,909 1.00 0.01 28,447 26,762 24,657 1.00 0.01
1966 43,050 1.00 0.01 29,043 27,415 25,166 1.00 0.02
1967 42,686 1.00 0.02 28,897 27,366 25,177 1.00 0.03
1968 54,105 1.00 0.04 33,526 32,524 30,124 1.00 0.05
1969 52,317 1.00 0.05 32,157 31,315 28,924 1.00 0.06
1970 53,908 1.00 0.07 32,508 31,788 29,195 1.00 0.08
1971 56,493 1.00 0.09 33,251 32,539 29,783 1.00 0.12
1972 57,035 1.00 0.12 33,081 32,409 29,472 1.00 0.16
1
Note: Father-child pairs are included in the intergenerational sample if father’s age at birth of the child is below
33.
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Table 2.2: Reform E↵ect on Educational and Income Mobility, Cohorts 1943-1955
Panel A: Education education o↵spring (# years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
education father (# years) 0.359    0.396    0.454    0.422   
(0.00383) (0.00496) (0.0233) (0.00750)
reform 1.407    0.977    0.555   
(0.0577) (0.0696) (0.0672)
reform x education father -0.0969    -0.0639    -0.0371   
(0.00632) (0.00685) (0.00722)
constant 8.331    7.770    7.298    7.306   
(0.0433) (0.0477) (0.216) (0.0683)
N 220335 220335 220335 220335
Panel B: Income log income o↵spring
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log inc. father 0.164    0.157    0.172    0.139   
(0.00265) (0.00402) (0.0194) (0.0162)
reform -0.0111 0.102 0.253  
(0.0759) (0.0936) (0.121)
reform x log inc. father 0.00510 -0.00588 -0.0196  
(0.00618) (0.00760) 0.00995)
constant 9.893    9.947    9.762    9.915   
(0.0324) (0.0487) (0.236) (0.195)
N 199340 199340 199340 199340
municipality controls x
o↵spring cohort controls x x
1
Note: Clustered (municipality level) standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Coe cient estimates from equation (2.24) (column
4) and simplified variants (columns 1-3), based on o↵spring cohorts 1943-1955 in
intergenerational sample.
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Table 2.3: Reform E↵ect on Educational and Income Mobility, Cohorts 1966-1972
Panel A: Education education o↵spring (# years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
education father (# years) 0.240    0.238    0.195    0.294   
(0.00214) (0.00298) (0.00929) (0.00411)
reform (father) -0.904    -0.923    -0.768   
(0.0894) (0.0847) (0.139)
reform x education father 0.0534    0.0727    0.0655   
(0.00893) (0.00762) (0.0128)
constant 9.741    9.813    10.07    9.763   
(0.0233) (0.0356) (0.0938) (0.0471)
N 111173 111173 111173 111173
Panel B: Income log income o↵spring
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log inc. father 0.207    0.211    0.186    0.244   
(0.00530) (0.00601) (0.0172) (0.0093)
reform (father) 0.331   -0.0949 -0.498 
(0.156) (0.164) (0.265)
reform x log inc. father -0.0286   0.00814 0.0410 
(0.0128) (0.0134) (0.0216)
constant 9.666    9.618    9.874    9.446   
(0.0650) (0.0734) (0.210) (0.118)
N 110317 110317 110317 110317
municipality controls x
father cohort controls x x
1
Note: Clustered (municipality level) standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Coe cient estimates from equation (2.28) (column
4) and simplified variants (columns 1-3), based on o↵spring cohorts 1966-1972 in
intergenerational sample.
Table 2.4: Robustness Tests
with fathers pre-reform parental cohort municip.
baseline siblings below 30 dropped max. controls time trends
Education:
1st gen. -0.0371    -0.0393    -0.0408    -0.0434    -0.0357    -0.0387    -0.0364   
(0.0072) (0.0054) (0.0089) (0.0083) (0.0064) (0.0073) (0.0074)
2nd gen. 0.0655    0.0651    0.0655    0.0710    0.0307    0.0655    0.0622   
(0.0128) (0.0122) (0.0128) (0.0139) (0.0093) (0.0126) (0.0131)
Income:
1st gen. -0.0196  -0.0078 -0.0181 -0.0195  -0.0210   -0.0233   -0.0239  
(0.0100) (0.0068) (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0088) (0.0095) (0.0097)
2nd gen. 0.0410  0.0148 0.0410  0.0492   0.0344   0.0418   0.0363 
(0.0216) (0.0165) (0.0216) (0.0238) (0.0155) (0.0212) (0.0219)
1
Note: Sensitivity analyses reporting the coe cient on the interaction between reform dummy and parental
education and income and clustered standard errors (in parentheses), * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Column 1 contains the baseline specification. For the next columns we include the sibling subsample, restrict
the sample to fathers with age at birth below 30, drop o↵spring born in the cohort preceeding the reform
implementation, use the maximum of mother’s and father’s education or income, include father (rows 1 and
3) or o↵spring cohort dummies (rows 5 and 7), or include municipality-specific linear trends.
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Figure 2.2: A Declining Impact of Parental Income and Increasing Returns to Skills
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Note: Mobility trend over generations in numerical example. In generation T the impact
of parental income   declines from  1 = 0.4 to  2 = 0.2 while the returns to endowments
and human capital ⇢ increase from ⇢1 = 0.5 to ⇢2 = 0.7 (assuming   = 0.6).
Figure 2.1: A Change in the Heritability of, or Returns to, Endowments
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Note: Mobility trend over generations in two numerical examples. Example 1a: in
generation T the heritability of endowments   decreases from  1 = 0.6 to  2 = 0.5
(assuming ⇢ = 0.7 and   = 0). Example 1b: the returns to endowments and human
capital ⇢ increase from ⇢1 = 0.7 to ⇢2 = 0.8 (assuming   = 0.6).
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Figure 2.3: A Swap in Prices
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Note: Mobility trend over generations in numerical example. In generation T the returns
to skill k increase from ⇢k,1 = 0.3 to ⇢k,2 = 0.6 and the returns to skill l decrease from
⇢l,1 = 0.6 to ⇢l,2 = 0.3 (assuming   = 0.2 and   = 0.6).
Figure 2.4: Raising the Compulsory Schooling Level
(a) Intergenerational educational coe cient
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(b) Intergenerational income elasticity
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Note: Income and educational mobility trends in numerical example, with x = 9, ↵y = 9,  y = 0,   = 0.2
(dashed line:   = 0.18), ↵h = 10,  h = 1, ✓ = 2,   = 0.6, and (uy , uh, v) normally distributed with variances
(0.1, 2.75, 0.64).
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Figure 2.5: Share of O↵spring and Fathers Subject to Reform
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Note: Share of o↵spring and fathers subject to school reform over o↵spring cohorts, in source data
(grey and black areas) and intergenerational sample (dashed line).
Figure 2.6: Mean and Variance of Years of Schooling over Cohorts
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Note: Moments of years of schooling over cohorts of o↵spring (dashed line) and their fathers (solid
line) in
intergenerational sample.
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Figure 2.7: Trends in the Intergenerational Educational Coe cient over Cohorts
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Note: Each dot represents the coe cient from a regression of years of schooling of o↵spring in the
respective birth cohort on years of schooling of their fathers. Based on intergenerational sample
(fathers aged below 33, solid line) and subsample (fathers aged below 30, dashed line). Grey bars:
95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.8: Educational Attainment and Mobility, Pre- vs. Post-Reform
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Note: We recenter the data such that the reform occurs at time zero for each municipality.
Panels (a)-(c) summarize the distribution of o↵spring educational attainment. Each dot in
panel (d) represents the coe cient from a regression of years of schooling of o↵spring on
years of schooling of their fathers. Based on intergenerational sample (fathers aged below
33). Grey bars: 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.9: Heterogeneity in the Reform E↵ect over Cohorts
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Note: Estimates of the reform e↵ect on the intergenerational educational coe cient over
cohorts (black line), and their respective weight in the pooled coe cient (grey line).
Based on intergenerational sample (fathers aged below 33), including sibling subsample.
Grey bars: 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2.10: Trends in the Intergenerational Educational Correlation over Cohorts
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Note: Each dot represents the correlation coe cient between years of schooling of
o↵spring in the respective birth cohort and years of schooling of their fathers. Based on
intergenerational sample (fathers aged below 33, solid line) and subsample (fathers aged
below 30, dashed line). Grey bars: 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.11: Placebo Test: Second Generation
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Note: Each dot represents an estimate of the reform e↵ect on the intergenerational
educational coe cient in cohorts 1966-72 under the assumption that the reform took
place at the specified period before or after the actual implementation date. Based on
intergenerational sample (fathers aged below 33). Grey bars: 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.12: Trends in Conditional Intergenerational Regression and Correlation
Coe cients
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(B) Conditional Correlations:
Father’s age < 25 30 <= Father’s age <= 32
Note: Each dot in panel (A) represents the coe cient from a regression of o↵spring years of
schooling in the respective birth cohort on father years of schooling, for fathers aged 18-24 (solid
line) or fathers aged 30-32 (dashed line) at o↵spring birth. Panel (B) presents the corresponding
correlation coe cients. Grey bars: 95% confidence intervals.
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Appendix
A.1 An Economic Model of Intergenerational Transmission
We model the optimizing behavior of parents to derive the “mechanical” transmission
equations presented in Section 2.2. For this purpose we extend the model in Solon
(2004), considering parental investments in multiple distinctive types of human capital
and statistical discrimination on the labor market.
Assume that parents allocate their lifetime after tax earnings (1   ⌧)Yt 1 between
own consumption Ct 1 and investments I1,t 1, ..., IJ,t 1 in J distinctive types of human
capital of their children. Parents do not bequeath financial assets and face the budget
constraint
(1  ⌧)Yt 1 = Ct 1 +
JX
j=1
Ij,t 1. (2.37)
Accumulation of human capital h of type j in o↵spring generation t depends on parental
investment, a Kx1 vector of inherited endowments et, and chance uj,t,
hj,t =  jlogIj,t 1 + ✓0jet + uj,t 8j 2 1, ..., J, (2.38)
where  j and elements of the vector ✓j measure the marginal product of parental in-
vestment and each endowment. Endowments represent early child attributes that may
be influenced by nature (genetic inheritance) or nurture (e.g. parental upbringing). We
assume that they are positively correlated between parents and their children, as implied
by the autoregressive process
ek,t =  kek,t 1 + vk,t 8k 2 1, ...,K, (2.39)
where vk,t is a white-noise error term and the heritability coe cient  k lies between 0 and
1. We may allow endowments to be correlated within individuals, leading to the more
general transmission equation (2.4). Finally, assume that income of o↵spring equals
logYt =
8>><>>:
 0ht + uy,t
 0E [ht|Yt 1] + uy,t
with probability p
with probability 1  p
. (2.40)
With probability p employers observe human capital of workers and pay them their
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marginal product  0ht plus a white-noise error term uy,t, which reflects market luck.
With probability 1   p employers cannot uncover true productivity, and remunerate
workers instead for their expected productivity given observed parental background. In
particular, employers observe that on average parents invest income share sj in o↵spring
human capital of type j, such that E [Ij,t 1|Yt 1] = sjYt 1, and that the o↵spring of high-
income parents tend to have more favorable endowments, such that E [ek,t|Yt 1] =  kYt 1
(with  k   0) for all k 2 1, ...,K.
Parents choose investment in the child’s human capital as to maximize the utility
function
Ut 1 = (1  ↵) logCt 1 + ↵E [logYt|Yt 1, It 1, et] , (2.41)
where the altruism parameter ↵ 2 [0, 1] measures the parent’s taste for own consumption
relative to the child’s expected income. Given equations (2.37) to (2.41), the Lagrangian
for parent’s investment decision is
L(Ct 1, It 1, µ) = (1  ↵)logCt 1 + ↵ 0 (pE [ht|Yt 1, It 1, et] + (1  p)E [ht|Yt 1])
+µ
 
(1  ⌧)Yt 1   Ct 1   10It 1
 
The first-order conditions require that
@L
@Ct 1
= 1 ↵
Ct 1   µ = 0,
@L
@Ij,t 1
= ↵(1 p) j j
Ij,t 1   µ = 0 8j 2 1, ..., J,
@L
@µ
= (1  ⌧)Yt 1   Ct 1   10It 1 = 0.
Optimal investments,
Ij,t 1 =
↵p j j
(1  ↵) +PJl=1 ↵p l l (1  ⌧)Yt 1 8j 2 1, ..., J, (2.42)
increase in parental altruism and income, and in the probability that o↵spring human
capital is observed and acted on by employers. Parents invest more into those skills
in which the marginal product of investment or the return on the labor market are
large. Plugging optimal investment into equation (2.38) yields (ignoring constants, which
are irrelevant for our analysis) equation (2.3), which if plugged in turn into eq. (2.40)
motivates equation (2.2).
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A.2 Reduced Form and Stability
The reduced form of equations (2.5) and (2.6) is
0B@ yt
et
1CA =
0B@  y,t +  0t h,t  0t⇥t⇤t
0 ⇤t
1CA
0B@ yt 1
et 1
1CA+
0B@ uy,t +  0tuh,t +  0t⇥tvt
vt
1CA ,
(2.43)
which we may shorten to
xt = Atxt 1 +wt. (2.44)
Let subscripts 1, 2 index parameter values before and after a structural shock occurs in
generation T .44 The stability condition lims!1As2 = 0 is then satisfied by assuming that
 y,2+ 02 h,2 and all eigenvalues of ⇤2 are non-negative and below one.45 These conditions
also ensure that the transitions of the first and second moments of the distribution of
xt towards their steady state values are monotonic (see Jenkins, 1982), a property that
however does not extend to the transition path of the intergenerational elasticity, as we
discuss in Sections 2.2. Normalization of the variances of yt and elements of ht and et in
the initial steady state leads to additional parameter restrictions. Take the covariance of
(2.44) and denote the covariance matrices of xt and wt by St and Wt, such that
St = AtSt 1A0t +Wt.
Denote by  , ⇢, and ⇤ the steady-state parameter values before a structural change
occurs in generation t = T . Note that in steady state St = St 1 = S, normalize all
diagonal elements of S to one, and solve for the variances of uy,t and elements of uh,t
and vt. For example, if ⇤t is diagonal then V ar(ej,t) = 1 8j i↵ V ar(vj,t) = 1  2j 8j; the
variances are non-negative i↵  jj  1 8j, as is also required for stability of the system.
A.3 Choice of Parameter Values
Our main findings do not rely on specific parameter choices, but our numerical examples
will benefit from parametrizations that are consistent with the empirical literature. One
44Conlisk (1974b) derives stability conditions in a random coe cients model with repeated shocks.
45For example, if ⇤2 is diagonal and elements of the endowment vector et are uncorrelated then the
diagonal elements of ⇤2 are required to be strictly between zero and one.
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di culty is that some variables in our model represent broad concepts (e.g., human
capital ht may include any productive characteristic of an individual), which are only
imperfectly captured by data. In addition, the parameters of the model reflect total
e↵ects from those variables. While estimates of (intergenerational) correlations and other
moments are widely reported, there exists less knowledge about the relative importance
of the various underlying causal mechanisms. Although only indicative, we can at least
choose parameter values that are consistent with the available evidence.
Lefgren et al. (2012) examine the relative importance of di↵erent mechanisms in a
transmission framework that is similar to ours. Using imperfect instruments that are
di↵erentially correlated with parental human capital and income they estimate that in
Sweden the e↵ect from parental income (captured by the parameter  ) explains about
a third of the intergenerational elasticity, while parental human capital explains the
remaining two thirds. In our model we further distinguish between a direct and indirect
(through human capital accumulation) e↵ect from parental income, as captured by the
parameters  y and  h, but the total e↵ect is su cient for the parameterization of our
examples.
The literature provides more guidance on the transmission of physical traits such as
height or cognitive and non-cognitive abilities, for which we use the term endowments.
Common to these are that genetic inheritance is expected to play a relatively important
role. From the classic work of Galton to more recent studies the evidence implies
intergenerational correlations in the order of magnitude of about 0.3-0.4 when considering
one and much higher correlations when considering both parents.46 Those estimates may
reflect to various degrees not only genetic inheritance but also correlated environmental
factors; we capture both in the heritability parameter   (estimates of genetic transmission
are then a lower bound), for which values in the range 0.5-0.8 seem reasonable. Note
that we use the term “heritability” in a broad sense, while the term refers only to genetic
inheritance in the biological literature.
Finally, a reasonable lower-bound estimate of the returns ⇢ to endowments and human
capital can be approximated by evidence on the explanatory power of earnings equations.
Studies that observe richer sets of covariates, including measures of cognitive and non-
46For estimates of correlations in measures of cognitive ability, see Bowles and Gintis (2002) and the
studies they cite; for measures of both cognitive ability and non-cognitive ability, see Gro¨nqvist et al.
(2010).
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cognitive ability, typically yield estimates of R2 in the neighborhood of 0.40.47 On the
one hand, such estimates are likely to underestimate the explanatory power of (broadly
defined) human capital as of imperfect measurement and omitted variables. On the other
hand, we want to only capture returns to the component of human capital that is not
due to parental income and investment; we capture the latter channel instead in the
parameter  h (and its contribution to o↵spring income in  ). In any case, values of ⇢ in
the range of 0.6-0.8 should be at least roughly consistent with the empirical evidence.48
These parameter ranges are consistent with recent estimates of the intergenerational
income elasticity   in the US, which are typically in the range of 0.45-0.55 (see Black
and Devereux, 2011). Given reliable elasticity estimates we can also cross-validate and
potentially narrow down the implied range for the structural parameters of the model.
We write each parameter as a function of the others in steady state,
  =   +
⇢2 
1       =
  + 1±p 2 2   2  + 4 2⇢2 + 1
2 
(2.45)
⇢ =
r
(     ) (1    )
 
  =
     
   + ⇢2    2 ,
and plug in the discussed values on the right-hand sides to impute parameter ranges that
are consistent with our reading of the empirical literature. Specifically we rule out too
high values of   and ⇢ as they cause   to approach zero, to arrive at
0.45     0.55, 0.15     0.25, 0.60  ⇢  0.70, 0.50     0.65.
These implied ranges should not be taken literally, but are su cient to provide a reason-
able illustration of the potential quantitative implications of our findings.
A.4 Correlated endowments
We revisit example 3 under the assumption that ⇤t is not diagonal, such that elements
of the endowment vector et are potentially correlated. Suppose that at generation T
the returns to human capital change from ⇢1 to ⇢2 but that the steady-state variance of
47See for example Lindqvist and Vestman (2011) for Sweden. Fixed-e↵ects models yield higher
estimates, although some of the di↵erence may be capturing persistent luck rather than unobserved
characteristics.
48In the initial steady state we standardize V ar(y) = V ar(e) = 1, such that R2 = 0.4 translates into
⇢ ⇡ 0.63.
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income remains unchanged.
By substituting equation (2.5) for yT 1 and income in previous generations we can
express the pre-shock elasticity as
 T 1 = Cov(yT 1, yT 2) =   + ⇢01Cov(eT 1, yT 2) =   + ⇢
0
1 ⇢1 (2.46)
where
  =
1X
l=1
 l 1Cov(eT 1, eT 1 l) (2.47)
is the cross-covariance between the endowment vectors of o↵spring and parents (if   = 0),
or a weighted average of the endowment vectors of parents and earlier ancestors (0 <
  < 1). These cross-covariances measure to what degree each o↵spring endowment is
correlated with the same endowment in previous generations (the diagonal elements)
and each of the other K   1 endowments (the o↵-diagonal elements). Note that   does
not depend on t if these cross-covariances are in steady state.
We can similarly derive the elasticity in the first a↵ected generation and in the new
steady state as
 T =   + ⇢
0
2 ⇢1 (2.48)
 t!1 =   + ⇢02 ⇢2. (2.49)
The conditions under which a change in skill prices leads to a non-monotonic response
in mobility can be easily summarized if the cross-covariances Cov(eT 1, eT j) 8j > 1
are symmetric. Symmetry requires the correlation between o↵spring endowment k and
parent endowment l to be as strong as the correlation between o↵spring endowment l
and parent endowment k, 8k, l. We can then note that
2 T = 2
 
  + ⇢02 ⇢1
 
=   + ⇢01 ⇢1 + (⇢
0
2   ⇢01) ⇢1 +   + ⇢02 ⇢2 + ⇢02 (⇢1   ⇢2)
=  T 1 +  t!1 + (⇢02   ⇢01) ⇢1   ⇢02 (⇢2   ⇢1)
=  T 1 +  t!1   (⇢02   ⇢01)0 (⇢2   ⇢1), (2.50)
where we expanded and subtracted ⇢01 and ⇢2, substituted equations (2.46) and (2.49),
and finally took the transpose and used the symmetry of   to collect all remaining terms
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in a quadratic form.
Let S denote the subset of prices that do not change in generation T , and denote by
 S and ⇤S the minors of   and ⇤ that are formed by deleting each row and column
that correspond to an element in S. The quadratic form (⇢02   ⇢01)0 (⇢2   ⇢1) is greater
than zero for ⇢2 6= ⇢1 if  S is positive definite. A su cient condition for  S to be
positive definite is diagonality of the heritability matrix ⇤S , with positive diagonal
elements. More generally, the matrix  S is positive definite if the respective minors
of the cross-covariances Cov(eT 1, eT j) 8j > 1 are strictly diagonally dominant. Strict
diagonal dominance requires that the correlation between o↵spring endowment k and
parent endowment k is stronger than the sum of its correlation to all other relevant
parent endowments l 6= k, l 2 S (i.e., o↵spring are similar instead of dissimilar to their
parents).
Price changes then increase intergenerational mobility temporarily ( T is below both
the previous steady state  T 1 and the new steady state  t!1) as long as the steady-state
elasticity shifts not too strongly, specifically i↵
| t!1    T 1| < (⇢02   ⇢01)⇤ (I    ⇤) 1 (⇢2   ⇢1). (2.51)
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Chapter 3
Life-Cycle Bias in
Intergenerational Mobility
Estimation
Transmission of economic status within families is often measured by the intergenerational
elasticity between parents’ and children’s lifetime income. A large and growing literature
has estimated this parameter in order to analyze the extent of intergenerational mobility
across countries, groups and time.1 Unfortunately, the estimates in the early literature
su↵ered greatly from measurement error in lifetime income, and successive methodological
improvements led to large-scale corrections.2
While the early estimates were severely attenuated from approximation of lifetime
values by noisy single-year income data for parents, Jenkins (1987) identifies systematic
deviations of current from lifetime values over the life cycle as an additional source of
inconsistency. Evidence by Haider and Solon (2006) and Grawe (2006) suggests that
the latter is empirically important. Various refined methods to address such life-cycle
bias have recently been presented. In particular, Haider and Solon proposed a tractable
generalization of the classical errors-in-variables model that, while applicable also in other
contexts, has strongly influenced how researchers make use of short-run income data in
the intergenerational mobility literature.
1See Solon (1999) for a comprehensive evaluation of the early empirical literature. Recent surveys
include Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (2009) and Black and Devereux (2011).
2For example, the intergenerational elasticity of earnings for fathers and sons in the U.S. was estimated
to be less than 0.2 among early studies (surveyed in Becker and Tomes, 1986), ranged between about
0.3 and 0.5 in the studies surveyed in Solon (1999), and is estimated to be around 0.6 or above in more
recent studies like Mazumder (2005) and Gouskova et al. (2010).
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But neither life-cycle e↵ects as such nor the strategies to address them have yet been
evaluated using actual lifetime incomes. In this paper we make use of Swedish data that
contain nearly complete income histories of both fathers and sons, allowing us to derive a
benchmark estimate and thus to directly expose the bias that results from approximation
of lifetime by annual incomes. We test if current empirical practice can reduce this bias
and examine how to improve elasticity estimates further.
First, we show that intergenerational elasticity estimates vary substantially with the
age at which sons’ incomes are observed, confirming that life-cycle e↵ects should be of
serious concern. The elasticity is below 0.20 when sons’ incomes are measured at age 30
but above 0.40 at age 50, implying a drastically di↵erent degree of mobility. Second, life-
cycle bias is smallest when incomes are observed around midlife. We thus verify a central
implication from Haider and Solon’s generalization of the classical errors-in-variables
model, which is heavily relied on in the current empirical literature. Third, while there
is indeed an age at which the bias is zero, we find that the standard methodology fails to
predict this “ideal” age. Small age deviations lead to notable shifts in elasticity estimates,
suggesting that current empirical strategies may still be subject to substantial bias.
Finally, we examine if modifications of the standard methodology can reduce life-cycle
bias further. We present an extension of the generalized model that introduces additional
covariates, and find that an explicit consideration of human capital accumulation and
low-income episodes su ces to strongly reduce the remaining bias.
Our analysis centers on Haider and Solon’s generalization of the textbook errors-in-
variables model, which adds an age-dependent slope coe cient to true lifetime incomes
but maintains the assumption that the remaining error is uncorrelated with true values.
Under this assumption, life-cycle bias is eliminated when the age-dependent slope coef-
ficient converges to one. Unfortunately, our data do not fully support this prediction
– at this age, the remaining bias from left-side measurement error alone amounts to
about 20 percent of the true elasticity (0.21 vs. 0.27). Conceptually, the prediction’s
underlying assumption fails to hold because the shape of income profiles di↵ers with
parental background even for a given level of lifetime income. Life-cycle bias thus tends to
be substantially larger than the generalized model predicts. However, the model is rarely
used for formal bias correction, and instead motivates what has become a widely applied
rule of thumb in the literature – to measure incomes around mid- instead of early or late
age. Our results confirm that this strategy strongly improves intergenerational elasticity
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estimates, and illustrates how much bias should be expected to remain in applications.
We then examine if modifications of standard practice can reduce this bias further. We
present an extension of the generalized errors-in-variables model in which the relationship
between annual and lifetime income is allowed to vary across groups. For example, highly
educated individuals are found to deviate substantially from the population-average
relationship in their early career. The inclusion of a covariate capturing college education
thus considerably improves elasticity estimates that are based on early-age income. We
show that the generalized model can be strongly a↵ected by low-income episodes, and
that their separate treatment can substantially reduce bias at mid- and old ages. This
result helps in turn to explain why life-cycle bias also can be reduced by averaging over
multiple income observations on the left-hand side (i.e. for the o↵spring), a procedure
that reduces the influence of low-income episodes.
Our results thus have both positive and negative implications. They corroborate that
incomes should be measured in midlife, and that deviating from this rule of thumb will
have detrimental consequences. But they also imply that current methods to compensate
for incomplete income data are still imperfect, and that mobility estimates are likely less
accurate than commonly assumed. Well-established findings from the literature, such
that income mobility is lower in the U.S. than in the Nordic countries, are not put
into doubt. But attempts to detect more gradual di↵erences, as in recent studies on
mobility trends, can be more easily compromised by life-cycle bias. We do find that
simple extensions of the generalized errors-in-variables model can strongly reduce the
remaining bias. However, some rely on data that may not always be available in practice.
We therefore discuss alternative ways for practitioners to make use of our findings.
Life-cycle bias stems generally from the interaction of two factors: heterogeneity in
income profiles cannot be fully accounted for, and unobserved idiosyncratic deviations
from average profiles correlate with individual and family characteristics. For example,
the o↵spring from poorer families may have higher initial incomes but flatter slopes if
credit constraints a↵ect human capital accumulation and job-search behavior in their
early career. Such patterns are also of importance for other literatures that depend on
measurement of long-run income and income dynamics. Examples include studies on
the returns to schooling and the extensive literature that relates measures of stochastic
income shocks to consumption or other outcomes.
The next section describes the methodology and identifying assumptions employed in
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the early literature. We examine the generalized errors-in-variables model theoretically
in section 2 and empirically in section 3. We present and test extensions of that model
in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
3.1 The Intergenerational Mobility Literature
The target regression model in intergenerational mobility research is
y⇤s,i =  y
⇤
f,i + ✏i, (3.1)
where y⇤s,i denotes log lifetime income of the son in family i, y⇤f,i log lifetime income
of his father, ✏i is an error term that is orthogonal to y⇤f,i, and variables are expressed
as deviations from their generational means.3 The coe cient   captures a statistical
relationship that is commonly referred to as the intergenerational income elasticity.4
Approximation of Lifetime Income
As commonly available data sets do not contain complete income histories for two
generations, a major challenge is how to approximate lifetime income.5 Let yi be some
observed proxy for unobserved log lifetime income of an individual in family i, e.g. a
single-year observation, an average of multiple annual income observations, or a more
complex estimate based on such annual incomes. Observed values are related to true
values by
ys,i = y
⇤
s,i + us,i,
3We use the terms earnings and income interchangeably (since the issues that arise are similar), and
examine fathers and sons since this has been the baseline case in the literature. A growing literature
exists on intergenerational mobility in other family dimensions (e.g mothers, daughters or siblings) and
in other income concepts (such as household income), for which our conceptual arguments are likewise
relevant.
4Equations akin to (1) may also appear as structural relationships to study causal mechanisms of
intergenerational transmission. The structural relationship relates typically not to ex-post measures of
long-run economic status but to the ex-ante concept of “permanent income”. The two concepts are not
always clearly distinguished, and some studies adopt the term “permanent income” even while focusing
on the measurement of mobility. Our analysis relates to the statistical relationship, but incomplete
measurement of long-run status impedes identification of both types.
5Note that the availability of better data would not generally solve the identification problem, since
data sets cannot contain complete income histories for contemporary populations.
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where y⇤s,i is the unobserved true log lifetime income of the son in family i and us,i is
measurement error. Similarly, for the father we observe
yf,i = y
⇤
f,i + uf,i.
The probability limit of the OLS estimator from a linear regression of ys on yf can be
decomposed into
plim  ˆapprox =
Cov(yf , ys)
V ar(yf )
=
  V ar(y⇤f ) + Cov(y
⇤
f , us) + Cov(y
⇤
s , uf ) + Cov(us, uf )
V ar(y⇤f ) + V ar(uf ) + 2 Cov(y
⇤
f , uf )
,
(3.2)
where we used eq. (3.1) to substitute for y⇤s,i and applied the covariance restriction
Cov(y⇤f,i, ✏i) = 0. It follows that the estimator can be down- or upward biased and that
the covariances between measurement errors and lifetime incomes impact on consistency.
The empirical strategies employed in the literature in the last decades can be broadly
categorized in terms of changes in identifying assumptions about these covariances.
First Two Waves of Studies
The first wave of studies, surveyed in Becker and Tomes (1986), neglected the problem of
measurement error in lifetime status. Often just single-year income measures were used
as proxies for lifetime income, thereby implicitly assuming that
Cov(y⇤f , us) = Cov(y
⇤
s , uf ) = Cov(us, uf ) = Cov(y
⇤
f , uf ) = 0,
and
V ar(uf ) = 0.
Classical measurement error in lifetime income violates the latter assumption, so
that estimates su↵ered from large attenuation bias. Estimates of the intergenerational
elasticity were therefore too low. This problem was recognized in Atkinson (1980) and
then frequently addressed in the second wave of studies (surveyed in Solon 1999). But
the assumption remained that measurement errors are random noise, independent of each
other and of true lifetime income. That life-cycle variation had to be accounted for was
recognized, but it was generally assumed that including age controls in the regression
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equation would su ce. The assumptions were therefore
Cov(y⇤f , us) = Cov(y
⇤
s , uf ) = Cov(us, uf ) = Cov(y
⇤
f , uf ) = 0,
and
V ar(uf ) 6= 0.
If these hold, then the probability limit in eq. (3.2) reduces to
plim  ˆapprox =  
V ar(y⇤f )
V ar(y⇤f ) + V ar(uf )
.
This is the classical errors-in-variables model; inconsistencies are limited to atten-
uation bias caused by measurement error in lifetime income of fathers. In contrast,
measurement error in sons’ lifetime income is assumed to not be a source of inconsistency
in this model. Researchers typically used averages of multiple income observations for
fathers to increase the signal-to-noise ratio, but gave less attention to the measurement
of sons’ income.
Recent Literature
Recently the focus has shifted towards the importance of non-classical measurement error.
An early theoretical discussion can be found in Jenkins (1987). Analyzing a simple model
of income formation, he finds that usage of current incomes in eq. (3.1) will bias  ˆ as
income growth over the life cycle varies across individuals. He concludes that the direction
of this life-cycle bias is ambiguous, that it can be large, and that it will not necessarily
be smaller if fathers’ and sons’ incomes are measured at the same age.
Haider and Solon (2006) demonstrate that life-cycle bias can explain the previously
noted pattern that intergenerational elasticity estimates increase with the age of sampled
sons.6 They show that the association between current and lifetime income varies
systematically over the life cycle, contrary to a classical errors-in-variables model with
measurement error independent of true values. Bo¨hlmark and Lindquist (2006) find
strikingly similar patterns in a replication study with Swedish data.
Haider and Solon also note that controlling for the central tendency of income growth
6For a summary, see Solon (1999). Age-dependency of elasticity estimates could also arise if the
dispersion in transitory income and thus the attenuation bias vary over the life cycle. Such variation
has been documented in Bjo¨rklund (1993) for Sweden, but Grawe (2006) finds that the observed age-
dependency can be better explained by the existence of life-cycle bias.
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in the population by including age controls in eq. (3.1) will not su ce, as variation around
the average growth rate will bias estimates. Vogel (2006) provides an illustration based on
the insight that highly educated workers experience steeper-than-average income growth.
Since available data tend to cover annual incomes of young sons and old fathers, lifetime
incomes of highly educated sons (fathers) will be understated (overstated), which is likely
to bias  ˆapprox substantially downwards if educational achievement is correlated within
families. Indeed, the probability limit of  ˆapprox can be negative in extreme cases, as our
data will confirm. Various refined estimation procedures have been proposed to address
such life-cycle bias. We proceed to examine the most popular one in detail.
3.2 Measuring Income at a Certain Age
Haider and Solon (HS) generalize the classical errors-in-variables model to allow for
variation in the association between annual and lifetime income over the life cycle,
which they document to be substantial. Their underlying intuition is that for two
individuals with di↵erent income trajectories there will nevertheless exist an age t⇤ where
the di↵erence between individuals’ log annual incomes equals the di↵erence between their
log (annuitised) lifetime incomes. The generalized model coincides with a classical errors-
in-variables model at t⇤, suggesting that lifetime incomes should be approximated by
annual incomes around this age.
The model is applicable to any analysis that relies on approximation of lifetime income
by short-term measures, but we describe it here in the context of the intergenerational
mobility literature. Assume that y⇤s,i and y⇤f,i are unobserved and proxied by ys,it and
yf,it, log annual incomes at age t. Haider and Solon’s generalization of the classical
errors-in-variables model is given by the linear projection of yf,it on y⇤f,i as
yf,it =  f,ty
⇤
f,i + uf,it, (3.3)
where  s,t is allowed to vary by age and us,it is orthogonal to y⇤s,i by construction, and
similarly the linear projection of ys,it on y⇤s,i as
ys,it =  s,ty
⇤
s,i + us,it. (3.4)
Under the generalized model, the probability limit of the OLS estimator from a linear
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regression of ys,it on yf,it becomes
plim  ˆt =
Cov(ys,t, yf,t)
V ar(yf,t)
=
  s,t f,tV ar(y⇤f ) +  f,tCov(y
⇤
f , us,t) +  s,tCov(y
⇤
s , uf,t) + Cov(us,t, uf,t)
 2f,tV ar(y
⇤
f ) + V ar(uf,t)
.
(3.5)
As HS we first focus on left-side measurement error and assume that y⇤f,i is observed (such
that  f,t = 1 and uf,it = 0 8i). Then the probability limit in equation (3.5) becomes
plim  ˆt =
Cov(ys,t, y⇤f )
V ar(y⇤f )
=   s,t +
Corr(y⇤f , us,t) us,t
 y⇤f
. (3.6)
HS note that under the assumption
Corr(y⇤f , us,t) = 0, (3.7)
left-side measurement error is innocuous for consistency of intergenerational elasticity
estimates if lifetime incomes of sons are proxied by annual incomes at an age t⇤ where
 s,t is close to one. Their empirical analysis reveals that for an American cohort born in
the early 1930s  s,t is below one for young ages, but close to one around midlife.
The model, often referred to as the generalized errors-in-variables (GEiV) model, thus
illustrates how life-cycle bias should be expected to vary with age. Apart from providing
conceptual insight, this knowledge can be very useful in applications. Researchers often
face the problem that long-run outcomes like lifetime income are of theoretical interest,
but that available data only contain short snapshots of income. The GEiV model o↵ers a
potential remedy since it implies that measurement of income at a certain age might
su ce if long-run outcomes are not directly observed. Possible applications are for
example the returns to schooling or, as emphasized by HS, the intergenerational mobility
literature.
The model has indeed become the standard reference to motivate empirical strategies
in the latter, where the implied procedure to measure income around midlife is now
common practice.7 A variation of the model that relies on the same intuition has been
7Among others, in Gouskova et al. (2010) for the US; Bjo¨rklund et al. (2006, 2009) for Sweden; Nilsen
et al. (2012) for Norway; Raaum et al. (2007) for Denmark, Finland, Norway, the UK and the US;
Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) for the UK; Piraino (2007) and Mocetti (2007) for Italy. More examples
are covered in the surveys of Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (2009) and Black and Devereux (2011).
83
CHAPTER 3. LIFE-CYCLE BIAS IN MOBILITY ESTIMATION
presented in Lee and Solon (2009).
But as the classical errors-in-variables model, the GEiV model depends critically
on assumption (3.7), as also noted by HS. The validity of this assumption has not
been examined and much of the current literature tends to assume that following the
broad recommendation of measuring incomes in midlife is enough to eliminate or nearly
eliminate life-cycle bias in applications. Yet, there are reasons to suspect that assumption
(3.7) or similar assumptions might not hold.
Note first that for more than two workers we will generally not find an age t⇤ where
annual income is an undistorted approximation of lifetime income. Figure 3.1 illustrates
this argument by plotting log income trajectories for workers 1, 2 (as in Figure 1 in
HS) and an additional worker 3. At age t⇤1 the di↵erence between the annual income
trajectories equals the di↵erence in lifetime income for workers 1 and 2, and at age t⇤2
for workers 1 and 3. There exists no age where these di↵erences are equal for all three
workers at once.8 This example illustrates that the parameter  s,t only captures how
di↵erences in annual income and di↵erences in lifetime income relate on average among
all workers. Individuals, and groups of individuals, will nevertheless deviate from this
average relationship, so that their annual incomes systematically over- or understate their
lifetime incomes compared to the rest of the population. A typical example is that highly
educated individuals tend to experience steeper income growth over the life cycle, such
that their annual incomes understate (overstate) lifetime incomes at young (old) ages
relative to individuals with less education.
For intergenerational mobility studies it is crucial that such idiosyncratic deviations
might correlate within families or with parental income. For example, sons from poorer
families may have higher initial incomes and flatter slopes if credit constraints a↵ect
human capital accumulation and job-search behavior in their early career. There are
many other reasons to suspect dependency within families: parents can transmit abilities
and preferences, or influence their o↵spring’s educational and occupational choices; all of
which may a↵ect the shape of income profiles over the life cycle.9 The individual asso-
ciation between annual and lifetime income is thus likely to exhibit an intergenerational
8This result does not depend on a high degree of complexity in income growth processes, but holds for
example also for a simple log-linear income formation model as analyzed in HS (see Nybom and Stuhler,
2011).
9For example, individual deviations from the average rate of income growth over the life-cycle may be
correlated within families, as considered by Ja¨ntti and Lindahl (2012).
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correlation itself and cannot be su ciently captured by a single population parameter
like  s,t. Assumption (3.7) is then unlikely to hold, the probability limit of  ˆt does not
equal  s,t , and knowledge of the exact life-cycle pattern of  s,t cannot eliminate life-cycle
bias.10 The basic implications of the GEiV model are not impaired by these arguments.
It may still represent a large improvement over the classical errors-in-variables model,
which we will examine empirically. Our arguments however imply that life-cycle bias
remains hard to address and that the search for an “ideal” age to measure income at
might not be an entirely satisfying path to follow.
There are various ways to probe our theoretical arguments. One can examine the
validity of assumption (3.7) formally by deriving the elements of us,it for a given income
formation model and analyzing its relation to the regressor y⇤f,i. While it can be shown
that us,it is correlated with y⇤f,i even for a simple log-linear income formation model (see
Nybom and Stuhler, 2011), such exercises will not be informative on the magnitude of
life-cycle bias that should be expected in practice. In the next section we provide instead
empirical evidence.
3.3 Empirical Evidence on Life-Cycle Bias
We use Swedish panel data containing nearly life-long income histories to provide direct
evidence on the life-cycle bias in estimates of the intergenerational elasticity that are
based on annual incomes. We then apply the GEiV model and examine the size of the
remaining bias. We evaluate both the rule of thumb to measure incomes at the predicted
“ideal age” t⇤ and the model’s ability to correct elasticity estimates at other ages.
3.3.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection
To the best of our knowledge, Swedish tax registry data o↵er the longest panel of income
data, covering annual incomes across 48 years for a large and representative share of
the population. Moreover, a multi-generational register matches children to parents,
and census data provide information on schooling and other individual characteristics.
All merged together, the data provide a unique possibility to examine life-cycle bias in
intergenerational mobility estimation using actual income histories.
10Corresponding biases arise in the case of right-side measurement error in which unobserved lifetime
income of fathers is approximated by annual income or if approximations are made for both fathers and
sons, as can be derived from eq. (3.5).
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To select our sample, we apply a number of necessary restrictions. As we mainly aim
to make a methodological point, we follow the majority of the literature and limit our
sample to sons and their biological fathers. To these we merge income data for the years
1960-2007. Since most other income measures are available only from 1968, we use total
(pre-tax) income, which is the sum of an individual’s labor (and labor-related) earnings,
early-age pensions, and net income from business and capital realizations.
Our main analysis is based on sons born 1955-1957. Earlier cohorts could be used, but
then we would observe fewer early-career incomes for fathers. Conversely, later cohorts
are not included since we want to follow the sons for as long as possible. Moreover, to
avoid large di↵erences in the birth year of fathers, we exclude pairs where the father was
older than 28 years at the son’s birth. Young fathers and first-born sons are thus over-
represented in our sample. On other sampling issues we adopt the restrictions applied
by HS and Bo¨hlmark and Lindquist (2006).11
Our data come with a couple of drawbacks. To maximize the length of the income
histories we use the measure total income, whereas e.g. HS use labor earnings. However,
total income is a highly relevant measure of economic status, approximation of lifetime
status gives rise to the same methodological challenges, and Bo¨hlmark and Lindquist
find that total income and earnings yield similar estimates of life-cycle bias. Further,
the use of tax-based data could raise concerns about missing data in the low end of
the distribution if individuals have no income to declare. The Swedish system however
provides strong incentives to declare some taxable income since doing so is a requirement
for eligibility to most social insurance programs. Hence, this concern most likely only
applies to a very small share of the population.
Our data also have many advantages. First, they are almost entirely free from
attrition. Second, they pertain to all jobs. Third, in contrast to many other studies,
our data are not right-censored. Fourth, we use registry data, which is believed to su↵er
less from reporting errors than survey data. Fifth, and most important, we have annual
data from 1960 to 2007, giving us nearly career-long series of income for both sons and
their fathers. Overall, we believe that the data are the best available for the purpose of
this study.
Our main sample consists of 3504 father-son pairs, with sons’ income measured from
11We restrict the sample to fathers and sons who report positive income in at least 10 years. We exclude
those who died before age 50, and sons who immigrated to Sweden after age 16 or migrated from Sweden
on a long-term basis (at least 10 years).
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age 22 to age 50 and fathers’ income measured from age 33 to age 65, irrespective of birth
years. We express all incomes in 2005 prices, apply an annual discount rate of 2 percent,
and divide the sums by the number of non-missing income observations to construct our
measures of annuitised lifetime income. Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics. Rows (2)
and (3) show that dispersions in lifetime income are of similar magnitudes for fathers
and sons. Rows (4) and (5) provide information on the number of positive income
observations. On average there are more than 28 observations for sons, and more than
30 for fathers, with relatively low dispersion in both cases.
3.3.2 Empirical Strategy
To assess the size of life-cycle bias we compare estimates based on annual incomes with a
benchmark estimate that is based on lifetime incomes. As in the theoretical discussion we
focus on left-side measurement error (i.e., for sons), although we provide brief evidence
on life-cycle bias due to right-side (i.e., for fathers) and measurement error on both sides
in a later subsection. We do this for two reasons. First, left-side measurement error has
until recently been neglected in the literature. Second, life-cycle bias is not confounded by
attenuation bias from classical measurement error on the left-hand side, which simplifies
the analysis.
We use our measures of log lifetime incomes y⇤f,i and y
⇤
s,i to estimate eq. (3.1) by OLS,
which yields our benchmark estimate  ˆ.12 We then approximate log lifetime income of
sons y⇤s,i by log annual income ys,it (left-side measurement error) to estimate
ys,it =  ty
⇤
f,i + ✏i,
separately for each age t, to obtain a set of estimates  ˆt. Finally, we estimate eq. (3.4),
which provides us with estimates of  s,t. None of these estimations include additional
controls.
Under the assumptions of the GEiV model, the probability limit of  ˆt equals  s,t ,
and using annual income of sons at age t* where  s,t = 1 consistently estimates  . As
12Of course, this estimate is not exactly true since we still lack some years of income. This does however
not a↵ect of our approach to use the estimate as a benchmark. The GEiV model is not restricted to
any specific population, and should therefore be applicable to our variant of the Swedish population in
which we truncate income profiles at some age. It is nevertheless advantageous that we have long income
histories. First, our benchmark estimate will be close to the true value. Second, since the income profiles
contain most of the idiosyncratic heterogeneity that leads to life-cycle bias, we expect our estimate of the
bias to be representative for a typical application. We provide evidence that our main findings are not
sensitive to the exact length of observed income histories in section 3.3.4.
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discussed in the previous section, we anticipate  ˆt to be biased even after adjustment
by  ˆs,t. The remaining life-cycle bias after adjustment by the GEiV model, denoted by
ˆb(t) =  ˆt/ ˆs,t    ˆ, is thus of central interest.13 Note that we assume that  ˆs,t is known
in order to evaluate the model’s theoretical capability to adjust for life-cycle bias under
favorable conditions. A second (known) source of inconsistency can arise in that the age
profile of  s,t will typically not be directly estimable by the researcher.
3.3.3 Empirical Results
We first present estimates of  s,t. Figure 3.2 shows that  ˆs,t rises over age and crosses one
at around age t⇤ = 33. Largely consistent with others, we find that income di↵erences
at young (old) age substantially understate (overstate) di↵erences in lifetime income.
We note that  ˆs,t is close to one only for a short time around age 33, in contrast to the
pattern found for older American and Swedish cohorts in HS and Bo¨hlmark and Lindquist
(2006) in which  ˆt remains close to one for an extended period through midlife. A general
concern is thus that measuring annual income only a few years earlier or later can cause
large di↵erences in elasticity estimates.
Our central estimates are presented in Figure 3.3, which plots  ˆ (the benchmark
elasticity),  ˆt (estimates based on annual income of sons at age t), and  ˆt/ ˆs,t (estimates
at age t adjusted by the GEiV model). Table 3.2 provides additional statistics in the most
central age range around t⇤. Note that the sample is balanced within (but not across)
each age. Zero or missing income observations that are not considered for estimation of
 s,t and  t are not used to estimate  , which is reestimated for each age. The benchmark
elasticity thus varies slightly over age. We list our key findings.
First. Our benchmark estimate of the intergenerational elasticity of lifetime income
for our Swedish cohort is about 0.27 (see also Table 3.2). This is marginally higher than
what most previous studies have found for Sweden, and should be closer to the population
parameter due to our nearly complete income profiles.
Second. We confirm that the variation of  ˆt over age resembles the pattern in  ˆs,t, as
predicted by the GEiV model. We therefore find that  ˆt increases with age and that the
life-cycle bias is negative for young and positive for old ages of sons. One of the central
predictions of the GEiV model, that current income around midlife is a better proxy for
13The arguments of HS relate to the probability limit. In a finite sample we need to consider the
distribution of ˆb(t). Reported standard errors for ˆb(t) are based on a Taylor approximation and take the
covariance structure of  ˆ,  ˆt, and  ˆs,t into account.
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lifetime income than income in young or old ages, is thus confirmed.
Third. The magnitude of life-cycle bias stemming from left-side measurement error
alone can be striking. For example, the elasticity is below 0.20 when sons’ incomes
are measured at age 30 but above 0.40 at age 50, thus resulting in drastically di↵erent
characterizations of the degree of mobility. Analysis based on income below age 26 yields
a negative elasticity. We therefore find direct evidence on the importance of life-cycle bias
in intergenerational mobility estimates that has been discussed in the recent literature.
Fourth. The life-cycle bias is larger than implied by the GEiV model. While the
adjustment of estimates according to this model leads on average to sizable improvements,
it cannot fully eliminate the bias. This holds true even under the assumption that the
central parameters  s,t are directly estimable.
Fifth. The life-cycle bias is not minimized at age t⇤, the age at which the current
empirical literature aims to measure income, but at an age t > t⇤. We report a similar
pattern for other cohorts in section 3.3.4.
Sixth. The remaining life-cycle bias ˆb(t) around age t⇤ is substantial and significantly
di↵erent from zero. Table 3.2 shows that ˆb(t) is on average around 0.05 over ages 31-35,
which corresponds to about 20 percent of our benchmark. Knowledge of age t⇤ will thus
not eliminate life-cycle bias.
Our arguments apply likewise to the extension of the GEiV model presented in Lee
and Solon (2009), which has been applied in much of the recent research on mobility
trends (see Nybom and Stuhler, 2011).
We briefly compare these empirical results with our theoretical discussion of the
determinants of ˆb(t). Table 3.3 shows the components of ˆb(t) according to eq. (3.6). Vari-
ation of ˆb(t) over age stems mostly from variation in the residual correlation Corr(y⇤f , us,t),
while the ratio  us,t/ s,t y⇤f is close to one over most of the life cycle.
14 Seemingly
small residual correlations can thus translate into substantive biases. For example, a
residual correlation of 0.03 translates into a life-cycle bias of more than 10 percent of the
benchmark elasticity.
We provided intuition why the residuals from eq. (3.4) may correlate with parental
income in the previous section. For further evidence we examine if the residuals correlate
also with various other characteristics, specifically: (i) father’s age at birth of his son,
(ii) father’s education, (iii) son’s education, (iv) son’s cognitive ability, and (v) son’s
14The previously documented increase in  s,t over age is o↵set by an increase in  us,t .
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country of birth. Table 3.4 describes how each variable is measured and presents the
results. Most estimates are significantly di↵erent from zero. The residuals correlate
particularly strongly with education, implying that the GEiV model cannot capture
some of the heterogeneity in income profiles that arises from human capital investment.
But the residuals correlate also with other variables, such as ethnic background.15 The
GEiV model should thus not be expected to eliminate life-cycle bias in other literatures,
in which interest lies on di↵erent explanatory variables. It captures changes in the
average association between annual and lifetime income in the population over age, but
applications are typically based on comparisons of specific subgroups of the population.
The model can then not fully eliminate life-cycle bias since the association between annual
and lifetime income varies not only over age, but also over groups defined by parental
income, years of schooling, gender, or other characteristics.16
These results provide guidance for applied research, but some remarks about general-
izability are warranted. Life-cycle bias will di↵er quantitatively across populations. The
bias is determined by the degree of systematic di↵erences in income profiles between sons
from poor and sons from rich families. This mechanism is likely to vary across cohorts
and countries. The question is if observed qualitative patterns over age can nevertheless
be generalized. Figure 3.3 demonstrates that income at old age provides a more reliable
base for the GEiV model than income at young age. Thus, the relationship between
current and lifetime income di↵ers with respect to family background particularly at
the beginning of the life cycle. This result is intuitive if one considers potential causal
mechanisms of intergenerational transmission. Sons from rich families might acquire
more education or face di↵erent conditions that particularly a↵ect initial job search (e.g.
regarding credit-constraints, family networks, or ex-ante information on labor market
characteristics). Such mechanisms are likely to apply to most populations. Although the
size of the life-cycle bias is bound to di↵er across populations, its pattern over age is thus
likely to hold more generally. This conclusion is supported by results for other Swedish
cohorts as well as direct evidence on the role of human capital investments, both of which
15The observation that annual incomes in early age tend to understate lifetime incomes for sons born
outside Sweden may for example relate to earnings assimilation, the tendency of immigrants to experience
lower initial earnings but faster growth than native workers.
16The observation that the residuals correlate most strongly with education indicates that the GEiV
model may perform worse in applications in which education plays a central role. Bhuller et al. (2011)
examine life-cycle bias in returns to schooling estimates, and also analyze the applicability of the GEiV
model in this context.
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will be discussed later on.
Measurement Error on the Right-Hand Side or Both Sides. For conceptual
reasons we focused on left-side measurement error, but evidence on the combined e↵ects
of life-cycle bias from both sides is also relevant for practitioners. One may ask if we find
similar life-cycle e↵ects from the right-hand side, and whether these tend to cancel out
or aggravate the e↵ects from left-side measurement error. We now base estimates of  t
on lifetime income of sons and annual income for fathers (right-side measurement error)
or annual incomes for both fathers and sons (measurement error on both sides). The
probability limit of  ˆt is then a↵ected by both attenuation and life-cycle bias. We adjust
for both according to the GEiV model. Results are shown in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.17
Figure 3.6 demonstrates the additional large attenuating e↵ects from right-side meas-
urement error. The remaining life-cycle bias after adjustment by the GEiV model follows
a (qualitatively) similar pattern over age as for the case of left-side measurement error.
Figure 3.7 shows the remaining life-cycle bias in the case of measurement error on both
sides with fathers’ and sons’ incomes measured at similar ages. The bias is overall
larger than for left-side measurement error alone, thus indicating aggravating e↵ects of
measurement error on both sides.18 Importantly, this is also the case when fathers’ and
sons’ incomes are measured at their respective t⇤. We again find that the GEiV model is
less successful in reducing the bias for early ages and around t⇤ than for later ages.
3.3.4 Robustness tests
We test various alterations of the estimation procedure to test the sensitivity of our main
results. For simplicity we focus again on left-side measurement error only.
Treatment of Outliers in the Income Data. Intergenerational elasticity estimates
can be sensitive to how one treats outliers and zero or missing incomes (Couch and Lillard,
17From equation (3.5), the probability limit of  ˆt equals ✓f,t  = ( f,t 
2
y⇤f
/( 2f,t 
2
y⇤f
+  2uf,t))  for right-
side and  s,t✓f,t  for both-side measurement error under the assumptions of the GEiV model (assuming
Cov(y⇤f , us,t) = Cov(y
⇤
s , uf,t) = Cov(us,t, uf,t) = 0). Therefore the remaining life-cycle biases equal
ˆb(t) =  ˆt/✓ˆf,t    ˆ and ˆb(t) =  ˆt/ ˆs,t✓ˆf,t    ˆ, respectively. For presentational purpose we use only one
age subscript t and display combinations of annual income for sons and fathers with equal distances to
their respective t⇤ in Figure 3.7.
18This holds true if estimates are only adjusted for attenuation bias but not for life-cycle e↵ects
according to the GEiV model (see Figure 13 in Nybom and Stuhler, 2011). These results confirm and
substantiate the theoretical predictions of Jenkins (1987) that measuring fathers’ and sons’ income at
similar ages might not necessarily reduce life-cycle bias.
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1998; Dahl and DeLeire, 2008). We test the robustness of our results by (i) balancing
the sample such that only sons with positive income in all ages 31-35 are included, (ii)
bottom-coding very low non-missing incomes, and (iii) top-coding very high incomes. We
compare the life-cycle bias at ages 31-35 for each of these samples (summarized in Table
3.5) with the results for our main sample (Table 3.2). Estimates of the remaining life-
cycle bias are on average a third lower for the balanced than for our main sample (across
ages 31-35), but still correspond to more than 10 percent of the benchmark elasticity.
Decreases in both the residual correlation and residual variance contribute to this drop.
Bottom-coding increases the bias slightly, perhaps since observations with zero income
are now always included. Finally, results for the top-coded sample are very similar to
those for the main sample, implying low sensitivity to the exact measurement of high
incomes. Zero and low incomes thus seem influential for the size of life-cycle bias, but
it is not obvious what the right sampling choice would be. We will come back to this
question in the next section.
Length of Observed Income Profiles. Although our data are the best available for
our purpose, it might be a concern that our measures of lifetime income are only based
on almost complete income histories. We thus test if our findings are sensitive to the
exclusion of short spans of income data. Age profiles of the life-cycle bias before and
after adjustment by  ˆs,t for various such tests are shown in Figure 3.4.19 Changes in
the fathers’ age span have little e↵ect on the life-cycle bias. Changes in the sons’ age
span cause noticeable shifts, although the pattern over age remains stable. This is not
unexpected since such changes are likely to alter both  y⇤s and  s,t slightly. The exact
relation between the life-cycle bias and age therefore depends on the observed age span,
but the major facts remain stable: the remaining life-cycle bias after adjustment by  ˆs,t
can be large and tends to be negative for young ages and around t⇤.
Cohort and Population Di↵erences. We repeat our analysis for two other cohort
groups (sons born 1952-54 or 1958-60), which will also illustrate if the magnitude of life-
cycle bias varies across populations. To separate cohort from age di↵erences, we limit
income profiles to the longest age span observed in all three samples (ages 22-47 for sons
19In our working paper (Nybom and Stuhler, 2011) we also consider younger cohorts — sons born
1958-60 — to study the influence of early-age income data of fathers, and older cohorts — born 1952-54
— to study the influence of late-age data of sons. The results support the findings reported here.
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and 36-65 for fathers). Table 3.6 presents the most central results around age t⇤. The
1958-60 cohort has a benchmark elasticity  ˆ that is similar to our main cohort but a
slightly larger remaining life-cycle bias ˆb(t). For the 1952-54 cohort both  ˆ and ˆb(t) are
substantially lower. Figure 3.5 plots estimates of  t for all three samples over the full age
range. While the overall patterns are relatively similar, the di↵erences between elasticity
estimates at each age are quite volatile. These di↵erences – substantial even for large
random samples and a fixed sampling procedure across cohorts within Sweden – confirm
that the degree of bias in elasticity estimates may di↵er substantially across populations
even if incomes are measured at the same age.
3.4 Extensions
We proceed to examine if alterations of the generalized error-in-variables model and
standard estimation procedures can reduce life-cycle bias further. We first o↵er an
extension of the generalized model that introduces additional covariates in equation (3.4).
Whether averaging over multiple annual income observations also on the left-hand side
can reduce bias is addressed in the following subsection.
3.4.1 Extending the Generalized Errors-in-Variables Model
The model presented by Haider and Solon (2006) captures how di↵erences in annual
and lifetime incomes relate on average in the population of interest. We showed that
knowledge of the average relationship may not be su cient to eliminate life-cycle bias
in applications, as idiosyncratic deviations from this average relate systematically to
parental background and other variables. It appears useful to condition this relationship
on additional covariates that may capture such heterogeneity.
We thus extend the generalized model by introducing heterogeneous intercepts in
equation (3.4) that vary with covariates x1,it, ..., xk¯,it, such that
ys,it =  s,ty
⇤
s,i +
k¯X
k=1
µk,txk,it + us,it. (3.8)
The coe cients µ1,t, ..., µk¯,t capture whether beyond the population-average relationship,
annual incomes systematically under- or overstate lifetime incomes for certain groups.
Maintaining the assumption Cov(us,it, y⇤s,i) = 0, the slope coe cient in a linear regression
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of log annual income ys,it on log lifetime income y⇤f,i equals
 t =
Cov(ys,t, y⇤f )
V ar(y⇤f )
=   s,t +
k¯X
k=1
µk,t k,t, (3.9)
where
 k,t =
Cov(xk,t, y⇤f )
V ar(y⇤f )
8k 2 {1, ..., k¯}
is the slope coe cient from a linear regression of covariate xk,t on father’s log lifetime
income y⇤f . The true intergenerational elasticity is then equal to
  =
Cov(y⇤s , y⇤f )
V ar(y⇤f )
=
 t  
Pk¯
k=1
µk,t k,t
 t
. (3.10)
We will examine if such extension of the generalized model performs better, both in
predicting the “ideal” age to measure incomes at and in minimizing the bias when using
income observations beyond the “ideal” age or age range.
In the previous section we found the bias to be particularly large at young age, and
noted that di↵erential human-capital investment is a potential explanation. We thus first
consider information on educational attainment. We include a single covariate es,i that
equals one if a son has attended university or college and zero otherwise in equation (3.8),
such that the annual elasticity equals  t =   s,t + µe,t e,t if Cov(us,it, y⇤s,i) = 0 holds.
Estimating all coe cients by OLS, the probability limit of ( ˆt  µˆe,t ˆe,t)/ ˆs,t then equals
the true elasticity  .
Panel (A) of Figure 3.8 shows that the life-cycle profile of  s is similar for the standard
GEiV (solid line) and our extended model (dashed line). Panel (B) presents the life-
cycle profile of µe (dashed line), illustrating that the income profile of highly educated
individuals deviate strongly from the average relationship that is captured in  s: their
annual incomes understate lifetime incomes strongly in early and overstate them in old
ages, even after the average relationship between annual and lifetime income is taken into
account.
College attendance is highly correlated with parental income (in our data  ˆe,t ⇡ 0.23
8t), such that the explicit consideration of these deviations may improve intergenerational
elasticity estimates. Figure 3.9 compares the remaining life-cycle bias in annual elasticity
estimates after adjustments based on the standard GEiV (solid line) or our extended
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model (dashed line). The extension strongly reduces life-cycle bias in early age; estimates
are in the vicinity of the true elasticity from the mid-twenties, in contrast to the standard
model. This is not surprising: early-age income is a poor signal of lifetime income par-
ticularly for college graduates, such that the approximation of lifetime by annual income
di↵erences is strongly distorted when education is not taken into account. However,
controlling for education reduces the bias only mildly around t⇤ and the intergenerational
elasticity is still underestimated at mid- and old ages.
Post-secondary education is one of various sources for low-income episodes, which
transformed to logs can be highly influential in the estimation of  s,t.20 It may be
beneficial to treat those observations separately, in particular as from about age 30 they
are exceedingly rare among sons with high lifetime income. Adding a second covariate
that equals one if ys,t is below the first percentile in equation (3.8) strongly reduces
estimates of  s,t (Figure 3.8, panel (A), short-dashed line). The e↵ect of the college
dummy is thus predominantly captured by µk,t, while the low-income dummy also has a
large influence on estimates of  s,t. Figure 3.9 shows that this model performs much better
throughout midlife. While addition of this covariate alone fails to significantly improve
estimates in early ages, the adjusted elasticity based on annual incomes is otherwise
surprisingly accurate.
But how can practitioners make use of these findings? Application of the above
procedure is straightforward if the data allow for direct estimation of equation (3.8).21
If the relationship between annual and lifetime incomes cannot be directly estimated
then external evidence can potentially be combined with own estimates. For example,
external estimates of  s,t and µe,t could be combined with own estimates of  e,t if
the intergenerational data set includes educational information. As noted by Haider
and Solon, importing estimates from other data sets can be problematic if the central
relationships di↵er across populations. But while income-education associations vary
considerably across countries we may expect similarities in the broader patterns (e.g.
education decreasing income at early but increasing at late age). Our finding that
exceptionally low incomes should be treated separately can also be adopted even when
20Other potential sources include episodes of unemployment or long-term sick leave, of voluntary leisure
or non-market work, and time spent abroad.
21For example, the intergenerational data may include educational attainment, annual and lifetime
incomes for one generation but not the other. Alternatively, an external data source that only covers one
generation of the population of interest may be exploited for this purpose.
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equation (3.8) cannot be directly estimated. One can discard low-income episodes in
the estimation of  t and for bias-correction use estimates of  s,t from samples in which
those observations have been likewise discarded. We find that it makes little di↵erence
if low-income episodes are simply dropped in both the estimation of (3.8) and (3.9) or
included but treated separately, as described above.
We conclude that simple extensions of Haider and Solon’s model can substantially
reduce life-cycle bias in applications: the average absolute deviation in adjusted annual
estimates across ages 25-45 corresponds to 23.6 percent of the true elasticity for the
standard model, but falls to 13.8 percent with education or 9.0 percent with education
and low-income controls. Moreover, the remaining deviations are centered around instead
of below zero in the extended model. The improvements are most striking in young
age, at which di↵erences in annual incomes signal di↵erences in lifetime income poorly
and the explicit consideration of human capital investments becomes essential. Note
however that we cannot reduce bias much further by using more detailed information
(on finer educational classes, cognitive ability, ethnicity, or location).22 This observation
implies that the income trajectories of sons from high- and low-income fathers remain
di↵erent even when many individual characteristics can be controlled for. However, the
consequences are much reduced, and seem quantitatively important mainly in early and
late life. In addition, only few practitioners can do these bias corrections themselves,
and our results here can then probably only provide partial improvements and prevent
the most extreme type of biases. Life-cycle bias will thus often remain a concern in
applications.
3.4.2 Multi-Year Averages of Current Income
The importance of dealing with transitory noise in short-run income measures on the
right-hand side, for example by using multi-year averages, is well recognized in the
literature (see Mazumder, 2005). But some recent studies that reference to the GEiV
model (see footnote 7) average also over multiple income observations on the left-hand
side (e.g. for sons). Yet, the theoretical motivation for doing so is not clear. One
rationale could be that researchers do not know the exact age at which  s,t equals one.
Our finding that life-cycle bias can be substantial even at this age raises the question if
22Variants of equation (3.8) that allow for the slope parameter  s,t to di↵er across groups did not
perform better than the simpler specification with heterogeneous intercepts, and are thus not presented
here.
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and how averaging can help to reduce the bias.
We therefore estimate  t using the logs of three-, five- and seven-year averages of son’s
income. These averages are also used to estimate  s,t and the remaining life-cycle bias
after adjustment by  ˆs,t. Figure 3.10 presents its size for averages that are centered around
di↵erent ages. The remaining life-cycle bias falls in the number of income observations
but is not eliminated. With seven-year averages the true elasticity is underestimated by
about 0.03 at ages 31-35 compared to about 0.05 using one-year measures. The standard
deviation of the residuals  ˆus,t , which is a central component of the bias, decreases by
about a third as we move from one- to seven-year measures, and diminishes the estimated
bias proportionally. The residual correlation falls only slightly and estimates of  s,t are
marginally lowered up until about age 40. As of the log transformation, averaging reduces
the influence of episodes with very low incomes, which in the previous section were found
to contribute to life-cycle bias in the GEiV framework.
In addition, estimates based on annual measures may su↵er from strong year-to-year
variability (see Figure 3.3). Reducing this variability is a second motive for averaging
over multiple income observations on both sides. Our results thus provide two separate
arguments in support of averaging over income observations also on the left-hand side,
when possible. Note however that these results pertain to using log of multi-year averages,
not to multi-year averages of log annual incomes. As noted by Haider and Solon (2006),
estimates based on the latter are algebraically equivalent to the simple average of the
single-year estimates, and will thus only smooth estimates.
3.5 Conclusions
Using snapshots of income over shorter periods in the estimation of intergenerational
income elasticities causes a so-called life-cycle bias if the snapshots cannot mimic lifetime
outcomes (Jenkins, 1987). We use nearly career-long income data of fathers and their
sons, allowing us to estimate a benchmark elasticity and to directly expose the large
magnitude of this bias in practice. We confirm that Haider and Solon’s (2006) gener-
alization of the classical errors-in-variables model and their widely adopted suggestion
to measure incomes around mid-age can strongly improve elasticity estimates. However,
we also show that the failure of another errors-in-variables assumption prevents correct
prediction of the ideal age of measurement and thus full elimination of life-cycle e↵ects.
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The bias that persists in our Swedish data even after application of the generalized model
is strongly negative when using annual income below age thirty and remains negative up
until the early forties. Estimates understate the true elasticity substantially also when
income is measured around the “ideal” age as predicted by the generalized model.
Comparisons of intergenerational mobility estimates across countries, groups or co-
horts may thus be of limited reliability if based on short-run income data.23 Still, some of
the major conclusions from cross-country studies are not put into question. For example,
the findings that income mobility is much lower than found by the early literature, and
that mobility di↵ers strongly across countries (e.g. being lower in the U.S. than in the
Nordic countries and Canada), would be robust even to sizable revisions in the underlying
estimates. It might however be necessary to revisit those conclusions that are based on
more marginal di↵erences. Studies on mobility trends are potentially a↵ected since even
moderate life-cycle biases may be su cient to mask gradual changes of mobility over
time. Comparisons across subgroups of a population can be compromised when the age
pattern in income profiles di↵ers, which may for example be the case when groups are
classified by education, sex or immigration status.
These results are mostly negative, but our analysis also points to potential improve-
ments. We find evidence that incomes at later ages (e.g. age 40-50) provide a more
reliable base for application of the GEiV model. Moreover, the bias can be reduced by
averaging over multiple income observations from midlife (if available) for both fathers and
sons. Using logs of multi-year averages also for sons may counteract the disproportionate
influence of occasional low-income episodes, and has the added value of reducing year-
to-year volatility from annual measures.
These simple suggestions lead to modest bias reductions, but we also propose and
test a simple extension of Haider and Solon’s generalized errors-in-variables model that
may improve elasticity estimates more substantially. The standard model captures
how di↵erences in annual and lifetime incomes relate on average in the population,
but knowledge of the average relationship is not su cient if idiosyncratic deviations
relate systematically to parental background and other factors. We show how additional
23One might hope that the bias is of similar magnitude across populations, such that the validity of
comparative studies is not a↵ected. Cross-country comparisons would for example be reliable if both the
dispersion and the intergenerational correlation in the shape of income profiles is of the same magnitude
in each country. But since the intergenerational correlation in income levels varies across countries we
suspect that it also di↵ers in other dimensions of income profiles. Our finding that the life-cycle bias
varies even across Swedish cohorts born in the same decade supports this conclusion.
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covariates can be incorporated into the model to capture some of those deviations. We
find that the large bias in early age can be reduced considerably by conditioning the
average relationship on education. This suggests that human capital investments are one
reason why early-career di↵erences in income predict lifetime di↵erences so poorly, and
that the explicit consideration of such investments can strongly increase the signaling
value of short-run income di↵erentials. Bias at later ages can be substantially reduced
by separate treatment of low-income episodes. Transformed to logs they are highly
influential in the estimation of the central parameter of the generalized model, and
may generate large life-cycle biases depending on how they relate to parental income.
However, not all of those improvements can be realized in practice, as some depend on
the availability of (external) evidence on the relationship between lifetime income and
individual characteristics, such as education.
Further refinements of empirical practice with restricted use of income observations
around a specific age can thus improve upon previous estimates, but will typically
not eliminate life-cycle bias. Development of a more structured approach that aims
to capitalize on all available income data seems desirable. Future research could in
particular benefit from a more comprehensive exploitation of partially observed income
growth patterns. Intergenerational mobility estimates are often based on multiple in-
come observations per individual, but researchers tend to disregard the idiosyncratic
income growth across these observations. Such partially observed growth patterns are
determined by both observable and unobservable characteristics of the individual and
may hence contain more information on lifetime income than what current income levels
and observable characteristics can provide.
Our results add to a general conclusion that can be drawn from the intergenerational
mobility literature: addressing heterogeneity in income profiles is an important, di cult
and recurrently underestimated task. The widespread practice of measuring annual
income at a certain age as a surrogate for unobserved lifetime income is still prone to life-
cycle bias, since the most appropriate age for measurement is hard to predict and since
estimates can be sensitive to small age changes. These issues are potentially important
for other literatures that rely on measurement of long-run income or income dynamics.
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Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics by Birth Year of Sons
All 1955 1956 1957
Father’s age at birth of son 24.68 (2.53) 24.66 (2.51) 24.77 (2.50) 24.62 (2.58)
log lifetime income (sons) 11.97 (0.43) 11.98 (0.42) 11.98 (0.42) 11.95 (0.44)
log lifetime income (fathers) 11.72 (0.42) 11.73 (0.44) 11.72 (0.43) 11.72 (0.40)
# of pos. income obs. (sons) 28.52 (1.86) 28.57 (1.71) 28.56 (1.74) 28.43 (2.11)
# of pos. income obs. (fathers) 30.32 (3.76) 29.99 (4.13) 30.36 (3.62) 30.59 (3.48)
Father-son pairs (N ) 3504 1167 1173 1164
Notes: The table reports means with standard deviations within parentheses.
Table 3.2: OLS Estimates of Elasticities and Life-Cycle Bias
t=Age  ˆs,t  ˆ  ˆt  ˆt/ ˆs,t ˆb(t) ˆb(t) in % N
31 0.897 0.266 0.191 0.213 -0.053 19.8 3478
(0.019) (0.016) (0.023) (0.029) (0.021)
32 0.909 0.267 0.246 0.271 0.003 1.3 3476
(0.018) (0.016) (0.023) (0.028) (0.021)
33 0.982 0.267 0.203 0.207 -0.061 22.7 3479
(0.020) (0.016) (0.025) (0.031) (0.024)
34 1.039 0.256 0.212 0.204 -0.051 20.1 3469
(0.019) (0.016) (0.025) (0.031) (0.023)
35 1.114 0.261 0.234 0.210 -0.052 19.7 3460
(0.021) (0.016) (0.027) (0.029) (0.022)
Notes: Cohort group 1955-1957, left-side measurement error only. The sample
and thus the benchmark estimate  ˆ are allowed to vary by age due to partially
missing data. Standard errors in parentheses, which for  ˆt/ ˆs,t and ˆb(t) are based
on Taylor approximations that take the covariance structure of  ˆs,t,  ˆ, and  ˆt into
account. Column (7) displays ˆb(t) in percent of the benchmark estimate  ˆ.
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Table 3.3: Decomposition of Life-Cycle Bias
t=Age ˆb(t) Corr(y⇤f , uˆs,t)  ˆus,t  ˆy⇤f  ˆus,t/ ˆs,t ˆy⇤f
31 -0.053 -0.044 0.455 0.424 1.198
32 0.003 0.003 0.431 0.423 1.123
33 -0.061 -0.052 0.485 0.422 1.169
34 -0.051 -0.050 0.452 0.422 1.031
35 -0.052 -0.049 0.494 0.422 1.050
Notes: The table displays the remaining bias, ˆb(t), together with its
associated components. Results are for cohort group 1955-1957, left-side
measurement error only.
Table 3.4: Correlations Between Residuals and Characteristics
Age Interval of Sons
26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50
Father’s log lifetime income -0.057* -0.050* -0.063* -0.020 -0.007
Father’s age at birth of son -0.054* 0.014 0.045* 0.017 -0.006
Father’s education -0.158* -0.061* -0.045* 0.035 0.028
Son’s education -0.278* -0.112* -0.002 0.085* 0.088*
Son’s cognitive ability -0.108* -0.073* -0.050* 0.022 -0.004
Son’s country of birth -0.040* -0.026 -0.002 -0.032 0.028
Table reports correlations between characteristics listed in the first column and
sons’ income residuals (as average in each five-year year age interval) from eq. (3.4)
for cohort group 1955-1957. The education variables are years of education
measured at about age 35, ”Son’s country of birth” is an indicator for being born
outside Sweden, and ”Son’s cognitive ability” is a standardized cognitive ability
measure from the military enlistment cognitive test at age 18. Star superscripts
indicate correlations with p-value<0.05.
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Table 3.5: Summary of Robustness Tests
Balanced Sample Bottom-Coded Incomes Top-Coded Incomes
t=Age  ˆ  ˆt ˆb(t)  ˆ  ˆt ˆb(t)  ˆ  ˆt ˆb(t)
31 0.257 0.184 -0.033 0.271 0.205 -0.046 0.251 0.191 -0.050
(0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.023) (0.020) (0.016) (0.024) (0.020)
32 0.257 0.227 0.014 0.271 0.245 -0.012 0.252 0.246 0.005
(0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.023) (0.020) (0.016) (0.023) (0.019)
33 0.257 0.185 -0.053 0.270 0.201 -0.069 0.252 0.203 -0.056
(0.015) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016) (0.024) (0.022) (0.016) (0.025) (0.023)
34 0.257 0.219 -0.029 0.270 0.247 -0.044 0.240 0.213 -0.047
(0.015) (0.022) (0.021) (0.016) (0.025) (0.020) (0.015) (0.025) (0.022)
35 0.257 0.239 -0.027 0.270 0.250 -0.053 0.246 0.234 -0.048
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020) (0.016) (0.026) (0.019) (0.015) (0.027) (0.020)
Notes: Cohort group 1955-1957, left-side measurement error only. Standard errors in parentheses. The
sample in columns (1)-(3) is balanced across ages, hence excluding individuals who have zero or missing
incomes at any age 31-35. The sample in columns (4)-(6) is with low non-missing incomes bottom-coded
as 10 000 SEK. The sample in columns (7)-(9) is with high incomes top-coded as 2 000 000 SEK.
Table 3.6: Summary of Cohort Di↵erences, Averages over Ages 31-35
Cohort Group  ˆs,t  ˆ  ˆt  ˆt/ ˆs,t ˆb(t) ˆb(t) in % N
1958-60 1.071 0.274 0.235 0.220 -0.054 19.9 3427
(0.022) (0.016) (0.028) (0.032) (0.026)
1955-57 1.066 0.246 0.216 0.204 -0.042 17.2 3444
(0.020) (0.015) (0.024) (0.028) (0.020)
1952-54 1.059 0.206 0.190 0.179 -0.027 12.8 3160
(0.021) (0.015) (0.024) (0.027) (0.019)
Notes: Left-side measurement error only. Table displays averages of estimates and
standard errors (in parentheses) across ages 31-35. ˆb(t) is significantly di↵erent from zero
(p-value<0.05) at three ages (out of five) for 1958-60, at four ages for 1955-57, and at two
ages for 1952-54. For all cohort groups, lifetime income is restricted to be measured over
identical ages: 22-47 for sons, and 36-65 for fathers. Column (7) displays ˆb(t) in percent of
our benchmark estimate  ˆ (as average over the age interval).
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Figure 3.1: Illustrative Example of Log Annual Income Trajectories
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Notes: Illustrative Example. For each worker, the upward-sloping line depicts log annual income by age,
the horizontal line depicts log annuitised lifetime income.
Figure 3.2: OLS Estimates of  s,t
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Notes: The figure shows estimates of  s,t by sons’ age for cohorts 1955-57.  s,t is the regression
coe cient in a regression of son’s log annual income on son’s log lifetime income, see eq. (3.4).
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Figure 3.3: OLS Estimates of Elasticities and Life-Cycle Bias
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
.3
5
.4
.4
5
30 35 40 45 50
t = age of sons
Benchmark Estimate
Estimates of t
Estimates of t / s,t
Notes: The figure shows the benchmark estimate of the intergenerational elasticity together with the
unadjusted and adjusted (by the GEiV model) estimates based on sons’ annual income. The estimates
are for cohort 1955-57, left-side measurement error only.
Figure 3.4: Estimates of Life-Cycle Bias for Di↵erent Age Spans (Cohort 1955-57)
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Notes: Left-side measurement error only. The age span of observed incomes of sons (fathers) varies
along the horizontal (vertical) dimension.
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Figure 3.5: OLS Estimates of Elasticities for Various Cohorts
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Notes: Left-side measurement error only.
Figure 3.6: OLS Estimates of Elasticities with Right-Side Measurement Error
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Notes: Cohort 1955-57, right-side measurement error only.
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Figure 3.7: OLS Estimates of Elasticities with Both-Side Measurement Error
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Notes: Cohort 1955-57, measurement error on both sides. For simple presentation we only display
results for annual incomes at the same distance from t* for sons and fathers. At s=0 both are measured
at their respective t*, at s=5 both are measured five years after t*, etc.
Figure 3.8: OLS Estimates of Coe cients in Standard and Extended GEiV Model
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Notes: Panel(A) shows estimates of  s,t by sons’ age for for the standard GEiV model (Haider and
Solon, 2006) and extended variants with additional covariates (see main text). Panel (B) shows
estimates of µe,t for the extended specifications. Cohort 1955-57, left-side measurement error only.
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Figure 3.9: Remaining Life-Cycle Bias in Standard and Extended GEiV Model
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Notes: The figure shows the di↵erence between the benchmark estimate of the intergenerational
elasticity and adjusted estimates based on sons’ annual income for the standard GEiV model (Haider
and Solon, 2006) and extended variants with additional covariates (see main text). Cohort 1955-57,
left-side measurement error only.
Figure 3.10: Remaining Life-Cycle Bias in GEiV Model with Multi-Year Averages
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Notes: The figure shows the di↵erence between the benchmark estimate of the intergenerational
elasticity and GEiV-adjusted estimates based on the log of three-year, five-year or seven-year averages
of sons’ annual income (see main text). Cohort 1955-57, left-side measurement error only.
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Chapter 4
Mobility Across Multiple
Generations:
The Iterated Regression Fallacy
A vast empirical literature has estimated the degree of intergenerational persistence in
socio-economic characteristics between parents and their children. There exists however
much less evidence on the degree of long-run mobility across multiple generations, such as
between grandparents and their grandchildren. In its absence we rely on extrapolations
from parent-child correlations. For example, Hertz (2006) reports an intergenerational
income elasticity of 0.47 for the United States and proceeds to note:
“To understand what these statistics mean, consider a rich and a poor
family in the United States [...] and ask how much of the di↵erence in the
parents’ incomes would be transmitted, on average, to their grandchildren. In
the United States this would be (0.47)2 or 22 percent;”
This procedure – extrapolation by exponentiation – shapes our interpretation of the
intergenerational evidence as it is common in policy reports, standard textbooks (Borjas,
2009b) and specialised survey articles (Piketty, 2000).
This interpretation matters, as the persistence of economic status across generations
is a central aspect in sociological, economic and political theory. Erikson and Goldthorpe
(1992) note that competing political theories contain strong and opposing hypotheses
about its extent in industrialised societies. Piketty (2000) observes that conflicting views
feature also prominently in economic writings. Measuring multigenerational persistence
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may help to discriminate between competing schools of thoughts, but it also matters on
a practical level. We may for example wonder if specific social policies mask inequalities
between families only temporarily or if they have lasting e↵ects on their relative fortunes.
But conflicting views about the degree of long-run mobility persist because we lack
direct empirical evidence. Our knowledge about intergenerational mobility on the other
hand has advanced greatly in the last two decades. The finding that income mobility is
much lower than previously believed, and particularly low in countries with high levels
of cross-sectional inequality in which it is more consequential (e.g. Corak, 2013), has
been received with some concern. But the standard extrapolation procedure provides
ammunition for a contrarian standpoint that disputes the significance of those findings, as
it implies high long-run mobility even when parent-child mobility is low (see for example
Mankiw, 2006).
Its prevalence may seem puzzling, as Hodge (1966) already notes that mobility may
not be well described by a first-oder Markov process1. It can perhaps be explained
by three factors. First, no comprehensive study exists on how intergenerational and
multigenerational mobility should relate. In its absence, the iteration of intergenerational
measures may be a pragmatic response. Second, this procedure appears prominently
in influential studies in the literature. Section IV of Becker and Tomes (1979) draw
attention to special theoretical cases that vindicate the iteration of intergenerational
measures, quoting the old proverb “from shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in four generations”
to illustrate its implications. Becker and Tomes (1986) go further, applying procedure
and proverb (“... in three generations”) to estimates from the empirical literature. Their
striking conclusion is that di↵erences between families and the prevalence of poverty tend
to disappear within few generations.2 Finally, the idea that regression implies iterated
regression appears quite natural in a linear regression context. Indeed, such belief turns
out to be a common statistical fallacy, arising frequently also in other economic literatures
and disciplines.3
1The early empirical literature focuses on occupational mobility and is mostly concerned with the
(related but distinct) question if grandparents have a direct causal influence on their grandchildren;
exemplary is Warren and Hauser (1997), who also summarises earlier studies.
2This conclusion seems conflicting with the observation that some groups, such as black Americans,
experience persistent economic disadvantage. Becker and Tomes (1986) interpret this observation not
as a evidence against the extrapolation procedure from intergenerational equations as such, but instead
argue that those equations could di↵er for Blacks (e.g. p. 28).
3For example, Bernard and Durlauf (1996) examine tests for the convergence hypothesis of the neo-
classical growth model, showing that a negative slope coe cient in a cross-country regression of growth
rates on initial levels of output does not suggest that poorer economies tend to fully catch up to richer
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In this note I present various simple models of intergenerational transmission to
illustrate why iteration-based procedures are unlikely to approximate the true relation
between intergenerational and multigenerational mobility. Starting from a baseline model
I discuss the role of indirect transmission and market luck; the multiplicity of skills; the
role of grandparents; and finally the causal e↵ect of parental income. This discussion
leads to a specific hypothesis: various properties of the intergenerational transmission
process imply that long-run mobility will likely be lower, possibly much lower, than the
standard extrapolation procedure implies.
I illustrate those arguments using data on three generations from Swedish registers,
but my main objective is to provide a theoretical complement to the recent wave of
recent empirical studies on the subject. Lindahl, Palme, Sandgren Massih, and Sjo¨gren
(2014) exploit survey data on the parents, children and grandchildren of a Swedish pop-
ulation, and find that multigenerational persistence in income and education is severely
understated by iterated parent-child estimates. Longitudinal data as used in this and
other forthcoming studies (Dribe and Helgertz, 2013; Boserup, Kopczuk, and Kreiner,
2013) provide an exceptional but rare opportunity to study multigenerational persistence.
Other researchers thus rely on novel methods to exploit repeated cross-sections instead:
Long and Ferrie (2013a) link individuals in British and U.S. censuses; Collado, Ortun˜o-
Ortin, and Romeu (2013) exploit socioeconomic bias in the distribution of surnames in
two Spanish regions; Clark (2013) relies on the informative content in rare surnames; and
Olivetti, Paserman, and Salisbury (2014) on information in first names.
In contrast, little theoretical work exists on the topic. Zylberberg (2013) studies the
inheritance of careers, and shows that income persistence will decay less than geometric-
ally if mobility is high within but low between distinct blocks of careers. Solon (2013) ex-
tends the classic Becker-Tomes framework to study multigenerational persistence, which
leads to a variant of the simultaneous equation system that I am considering here. He
pays particular attention on grandparent coe cients in multigenerational regressions,
showing that its signs are ambiguous if grandparents have independent causal e↵ects
on their grandchildren. I consider various other elements of the transmission process,
which together lead to a specific hypothesis on the relationship between inter- and
multigenerational persistence.
ones.
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4.1 The Iterated Regression Fallacy
I consider the iteration procedure in some detail, as it is common not only in the
intergenerational literature. The degree to which di↵erences in socio-economic outcomes
between parents remain among their children is often measured by the slope coe cient in
a linear regression of outcome y in o↵spring generation t of family i on parental outcome
in generation t  1,
yit = ↵+   1yit 1 + "it. (4.1)
If y measures log lifetime income then   1 captures the intergenerational income elasti-
city, which measures the percentage di↵erential in expected o↵spring income with respect
to a percentage di↵erential in parental income; a high elasticity represents low mobility.
For simplicity assume stationarity, such that   1 is constant over t. The arguments apply
likewise in a non-stationary environment.
How does this parent-child coe cient compare with the coe cient across three or
more generations, e.g. between grandparents and their grandchildren? The idea that the
latter equals the square of the former, so that persistence declines geometrically, may
appear as a natural consequence of regression: if   1 captures to what degree deviations
from the mean tend to be passed from parents to children then surely (  1)2 measures
their expected extent after being passed twice from parents to children? Formally,
one may believe that equation (4.1) can be used to rewrite the grandparent-grandchild
elasticity   2 as
  2 ⌘ Cov(yit, yit 2)
V ar(yit 2)
=
Cov(  1yit 1 + "it, yit 2)
V ar(yit 2)
= (  1)2. (4.2)
The error lies in the last step. While "it is by construction uncorrelated to yit 1, it is
not necessarily uncorrelated with grandparental outcome yit 2. The interpretation of
equation (4.1) itself may be the source of confusion; it has no structural interpretation,
nor does it represent an AR(1) or Markov process. Instead it captures a simple statist-
ical relationship:   1yit 1 is the best linear approximation (in a MMSE sense) to the
conditional expectation E[yit|yit 1].
The belief that regression toward the mean between two observations implies iterated
regression between multiple observations appears to be a classic fallacy. Francis Galton
himself fell fault of it (Bulmer, 2003). As noted in the introduction, iteration-based ex-
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trapolations are common in the intergenerational and other economic literatures, as well
as other disciplines: Nesselroade et al. (1980) discuss their prevalence in developmental
psychology under the caption ”expectation fallacy”.4 I use the term ”iterated regression
fallacy” here to relate to the consecutive nature of intergenerational transmission and to
other classic regression fallacies.5
But is the extrapolation error from an iteration of regression coe cients quantitat-
ively important? I provide a brief empirical application using Swedish population and
education registers, covering a 35 percent random sample of the Swedish cohorts born
between 1932 and 1967 and their biological parents and children. Educational attainment
(converted into years of schooling) for o↵spring, their parents and their grandparents can
be observed in about 150,000 cases.6
The first row of Table 4.1 reports coe cient estimates from child-father ( ˆ 1 =
0.238) and father-grandfather ( ˆ 1 = 0.406) regressions. The predicted child-grandfather
coe cient based on the iteration of intergenerational measures is 0.238 ⇥ 0.406 = 0.096
(second row), but the estimate from an actual child-grandfather regression ( ˆ 2 = 0.137,
third row) is more than 40 percent higher. The extrapolation error is even larger in
child-mother-grandmother coe cients (second panel). Educational di↵erences are not
very persistent in Sweden, but the iteration of intergenerational coe cients substantially
understates long-run persistence.7
4.2 Models of Inter- and Multigenerational Transmission
The iterated regression fallacy will become more evident in the light of a theoretical
model. Consider a simplified one-parent one-o↵spring family structure for which income
4The fallacy can be viewed as an incorrect application of the law of iterated expectations: extrapolation
by exponentiation would be reasonable if E[yit|yit 2] = E[E[yit|yit 1]|yit 2], which however only holds
if yit follows a Markov process.
5Such as the belief that regression towards the mean implies convergence to the mean, see Friedman
(1992); or the failure to account for regression to the mean in comparisons over time (Jerrim and Vignoles,
2012, discuss a recent example).
6Schooling is not observed for cohorts before 1911 and becomes increasingly right-censored in cohorts
after 1972. I thus restrict my sample to individuals born 1966-1972 and their parents and grandparents.
7These findings are consistent with Lindahl, Palme, Sandgren Massih, and Sjo¨gren (2014), who provide
more comprehensive evidence.
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and intergenerational transmission are governed by
yit = ⇢eit + uit (4.3)
eit =  eit 1 + vit, (4.4)
such that income yit depends on human capital eit (according to returns ⇢), which is par-
tially inherited within families (according to heritability  ). I use the term heritability in
a wide sense, representing not only genetic but also other causal pathways of transmission
from parents to children (e.g. parental upbringing). The noise terms uit and vit represent
market and endowment luck, and are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other and
past values. To simplify the presentation assume throughout that variables are measured
as trendless indices with mean zero and variance one, such that slope parameters can be
interpreted as correlations; and further that those indices measure favourable traits that
are not negatively correlated within families, such that all parameters are non-negative.
The parameter ⇢ then measures the fraction of income that is explained by inheritable
own characteristics, as opposed to factors or events outside of individual control; for
example, ⇢ = 1 implies that income di↵erences are fully explained by own characteristics.
The i subscript is dropped in the subsequent analysis.
Given equations (4.3) and (4.4), and the assumption that all variances are unity, the
intergenerational elasticity equals
  1 = Cov(yt, yt 1)
= ⇢2 , (4.5)
and the elasticity across three generations instead equals
  2 = Cov(yt, yt 2)
= ⇢2 2. (4.6)
The extrapolation error from exponentiation of the parent-child elasticity equals
  = (  1)2     2
= (⇢2   1)⇢2 2, (4.7)
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which is negative if 0 < ⇢ < 1 and 0 <   < 1, that is as long as income is not
perfectly determined by human capital, and human capital is not perfectly inherited
within families. The extrapolation error   will be large when ⇢ is small relative to the
degree of heritability captured by  .
4.2.1 Indirect Transmission
This simple model illustrates that multigenerational coe cients cannot be recovered by
the iteration of parent-child coe cients. Why do such extrapolations overstate mobility
here? The result stems from the interplay of causal mechanisms between and within
generations. Both the imperfect inheritability of traits between (  < 1) and the im-
perfect determination of incomes by those traits within generations (⇢ < 1) decrease
the intergenerational persistence of income. But regression beyond two generations
depends only on the heritability parameter: persistence equals   2 =   1  across three
generations,   3 =   1 2 across four generations, and so on. The intuition is simple:
traits are inherited multiple times, but they are only once transformed into income for
each generation.
The underlying assumptions should be uncontroversial. We know that at least part of
the intergenerational transmission of income occurs via indirect mechanisms, for example
through genetic inheritance or parental upbringing. And we do not expect individuals
with equivalent levels of human capital to have exactly equal incomes, perhaps because
workers trade income for non-pecuniary aspects, or because factors outside of indi-
vidual control drive a wedge between skill and income.8 The extrapolation error can
be substantial even if the role of such external factors or “market luck” is modest. For
example, exponentiation of an intergenerational elasticity of 0.5 implies {  1,  2,  3}
= {0.5, 0.25, 0.125} and thus rapid regression to the mean. But if ⇢ = 0.8 (market
luck explains about a third of the cross-sectional variance in income) then   ⇡ 0.78 and
{  1,  2,  3} = {0.5, 0.39, 0.31}, implying substantial long-run persistence of economic
status within families.
The gap between extrapolated and actual long-run mobility will tend to rise if the
transmission of income is less direct. Assume that human capital is not directly trans-
8This wedge may be sizeable – earnings regressions only explain a fraction of the variation in the
dependent variable, even when the list of regressors is large (e.g. Zax and Rees, 2002); monozygotic twins
have substantially di↵erent earnings even while their genetic and early family background are similar; and
various economic literatures show that events outside of individual control (such as occupation-, region-,
or firm-specific demand shocks) a↵ect incomes.
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mitted within families either, but that parents bequeath certain traits at (according to
heritability ⇡), which in turn a↵ect human capital et (according to transferability µ),9
and thus
yt = ⇢et + ut (4.8)
et = µat + vt (4.9)
at = ⇡at 1 + wt. (4.10)
The parent-child and grandparent-child elasticities are then equal to   1 = ⇢2µ2⇡ and
  2 = ⇢2µ2⇡2. Consider parameterizations that yield the same parent-child elasticity
as the two-layers model, which requires   = µ2⇡. The extrapolation error then equals
  = (⇢2  1µ2 )⇢2 2. Comparison to equation (4.7) reveals that this error will be larger in
the three- than in the two-layers model i↵ µ < 1.
Various implications follow. First, long-run income mobility will be smaller the more
intergenerational mobility is attributable to market luck instead of low heritability of
traits. Second, policies and institutions may mask inequality only temporarily. For
example, a track-school system that separates children by ability may increase the degree
to which di↵erences in child ability lead to di↵erences in human capital (an increase of
µ in the three-layers model) and thus decrease intergenerational mobility. But long-run
mobility may be less a↵ected if the heritability of those abilities remains unchanged.
Third, the degree to which cross-country di↵erences in parent-child mobility extend to
the long run depends on if those di↵erences are due to variation in the heritability or the
the transferability of endowments.10 Clark (2013) pushes this idea further, arguing that
long-run mobility is instead closer to a universal constant across countries and time.
4.2.2 Identification from Multigenerational Data
I focus here on the implications of di↵erent causal processes for the extent of multigen-
erational mobility. But that relationship is interesting also the opposite way, as it may
help to identify features of the underlying causal process that are otherwise di cult to
9As my main intention is to capture the idea that income transmission may occur rather indirectly
I abstain from specific interpretations for each layer (e.g. the lowest layer may be thought to represent
genetic transmission, as in Conlisk, 1974a).
10For example, Nordic countries will be characterised by exceptional long-run mobility if their high
levels of intergenerational mobility are caused by policies and institutions that decrease the heritability
of traits, less so if they are due to policies that interfere with the formation of market prices for those
traits.
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capture. For example, the heritability of ability might not be directly estimable, as at
best we can hope to observe a noisy proxy for certain types of traits. Multigenerational
data o↵ers potentially an indirect route to identification. In the three-layers model, the
slope coe cient from a regression of o↵spring on parent human capital equals   1 = µ2⇡
while the slope coe cient from a child-grandparent regression equals   2 = µ2⇡2. The
ratio   2/  1 identifies thus ⇡, while (  12/  2)1/2 identifies µ, from data on educational
attainment alone.
Empirical implementation of distributional models is not straightforward if the en-
vironment cannot be assumed to be in steady state (see Atkinson and Jenkins, 1984).
Indeed, the slope coe cient in a parent-child regression of years of schooling changes
considerably over time in Sweden (see Table 4.1), predominantly due to variation in
the cross-sectional variance. To abstract at least from this variation consider instead the
correlation coe cient r, which is considerably more stable. Dividing the child-grandfather
correlation (rˆ 2 = 0.156) by the average of the child-father (rˆ 1 = 0.323) and father-
grandfather (rˆ 1 = 0.340) correlations yields ⇡ˆ = 0.471, and thus µˆ = 0.839.
These estimates can in turn be used to extrapolate beyond three generations. Simple
iteration of the intergenerational correlation yields
{r 1, r 2, r 3, r 4} = {0.332, 0.110, 0.037, 0.012} ,
but the model-based procedure implies
{r 1, r 2, r 3, r 4} = {0.332, 0.156, 0.074, 0.035} .
This prediction is still flawed if the true causal process is not be well captured by eqs.
(4.8) to (4.10). But in contrast to the iteration of bivariate coe cients it has a conceptual
justification and is consistent with data over three instead of two generations. Its validity
can be tested if more than three generations are observed.
4.2.3 An Additional Factor
A second fundamental reason why multigenerational persistence of economic status may
decay less rapidly in the long than in the short run relates to the multiplicity of the
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transmission process. Introduce a second factor into our starting model,
yt = ⇢1e1t + ⇢2e2t + ut (4.11)
e1t =  1e1,t 1 + v1t (4.12)
e2t =  2e2,t 1 + v2t, (4.13)
assuming that two traits are inherited from parents according to heritability parameters
 1 and  2. For simplicity also assume that the endowment luck terms v1t and v2t are
uncorrelated, such that Cov(e1t, e2t) = 0 8 t. Assume further that both traits a↵ect
incomes, such that 0 < ⇢1 < 1 and 0 < ⇢2 < 1. The parent-child elasticity then equals
  1 = ⇢21 1 + ⇢
2
2 2, (4.14)
and the grandparent-grandchild elasticity equals
  2 = ⇢21 
2
1 + ⇢
2
2 
2
2. (4.15)
The extrapolation error equals
  = (⇢21   1)⇢21 21 + (⇢22   1)⇢22 22 + 2⇢21⇢22 1 2. (4.16)
Assume for a moment that incomes are indeed perfectly determined by individual traits,
such that ⇢21 + ⇢
2
2 = 1 and V ar(ut) = 0. Equation (4.16) can then be written as
  = ⇢21(⇢
2
1   1)( 1    2)2. (4.17)
This expression is negative for  1 6=  2. In contrast to the previous models, exponenti-
ated parent-child elasticities understate multigenerational persistence even when human
capital determines incomes perfectly, as long as those traits that constitute human capital
are not all equally strong inherited within families.11 This result can be understood as the
application of Jensen’s inequality: the square of the average heritability across traits is
smaller than the average of the square of those heritabilities. Inequality between families
declines therefore more slowly if intergenerational income persistence stems from multiple
11For example, Anger (2011) and Gro¨nqvist, O¨ckert, and Vlachos (2010) study if inheritance is stronger
in cognitive than in non-cognitive abilites .
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causal pathways.
Highly inheritable traits explain an increasing share of the long-run persistence in
income. In particular, multigenerational elasticities will never converge to zero if any
characteristic is perfectly transmitted. For example, physical traits such as skin colour
may be highly persistent in multi-ethnic societies if interracial marriage is rare, and
may lead to persistent disadvantage of families if groups are discriminated on the labour
market. The observation of high intergenerational mobility can therefore be consistent
with substantial long-run persistence of economic status, provided that the multiplicity
of traits is taken into account.
For the analysis of long-run mobility it is thus essential to look beyond scalar models,
even if those models have proved to be useful for other questions in the literature.
This applies in particular to the framework presented in Becker and Tomes (1979),
which underlies much of the theoretical work in the literature. It contains only a
scalar measure of human capital and does not capture implications from the existence
of multiple transmission mechanisms. Moreover, human capital is often assumed to
determine incomes perfectly in extended versions of this model, such as Solon (2013). I
find that both the imperfect relation between skills and income and the multiplicity of
those skills have important implications for long-run persistence.12
4.2.4 An Additional Generation
A question that has received much attention in multigenerational studies is if grand-
parents have a direct causal influence on their grandchildren (e.g. Warren and Hauser,
1997; Mare, 2011; Long and Ferrie, 2013a). Such higher-order e↵ects are often presented
as a potential explanation why multigenerational persistence might decline more slowly
than at a geometric rate. But the previous sections illustrated that other properties
of the transmission process lead to the same implication. From the observation that
(  1)2 <   2 we can therefore not conclude that intergenerational transmission has a
memory of more than one generation.
The intuition that such higher-order e↵ects raise long-run persistence is of course
12These findings support arguments made by Goldberger (1989), who notes that an explicit
consideration of utility maximisation behaviour of parents (as in Becker and Tomes, 1979) to motivate
“mechanical” transmission equations may provide little additional implications but distract from the
assumed properties of those equations. The Becker and Tomes model leads to transmission equations
that are simplified compared to earlier models in the literature, which did contain noise terms to capture
market luck and multiple inheritance mechanisms (e.g. Conlisk, 1969).
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correct. To see this assume that o↵spring human capital depends on both parents and
grandparents, such that equation (4.4) becomes
et =   1et 1 +   2et 2 + vt, (4.18)
with   2 > 0. Assuming stationarity the parent-child elasticity equals
  1 = ⇢2
✓
  1
1    2
◆
, (4.19)
Consider parameterizations that yield the same intergenerational elasticity as the previ-
ous model, such that   =   1/(1    2). The grandparent-grandchild elasticity,
  2 = ⇢2 2 + ⇢2  2(1   2), (4.20)
is then greater than the respective elasticity in the baseline model (assuming ⇢ > 0 and
  < 1). This simple example does not illustrate the various ways how grandparents
may influence their grandchildren, but it illustrates that such influence strengthens
multigenerational relative to intergenerational persistence.13
How can we distinguish such higher-order from other causal mechanisms? One
potential strategy is to find quasi-exogenous variation in the exposure to certain family
members in a careful research design (Adermon, 2013). But simpler methods may be
su cient to bound their magnitude. Note that given eq. (4.18), the slope coe cient in
linear regression of child on grandparent human capital equals
  2,e = Cov(et, et 2) =   2 +   1Cov(et 1, et 2). (4.21)
The coe cient in a regression of child on grandparent characteristics may have a positive
coe cient either because grandparents have a direct e↵ect on grandchildren (  2 6= 0) –
or because grandparent and parent characteristics are correlated, and children are a↵ected
by the latter. These two channels are in my simple model identified by the coe cients
in a regression of child on parent and grandparent human capital. But in practice we
cannot be sure that all relevant parent characteristics are included; we do not know if a
positive coe cient on grandparents reflects direct causal e↵ects or an omitted variable
13Mare (2011) and Solon (2013) suggest various channels via which grandparents may a↵ect their
grandchildren.
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bias.
However, we can illustrate the potential magnitude of this bias by conditioning on
exceedingly many characteristics of the parent generation. Column (1) of Table 4.2
reports estimates from a regression of o↵spring on fathers’ and (paternal) grandfathers’
years of schooling. The estimated coe cient on grandfathers’ schooling is sizeable and
statistically significant. However, already the inclusion of mothers’ years of schooling
reduces this estimate by nearly one half (colum 2); a large fraction of the grandparent
coe cient reflects that fathers with highly-educated grandfathers tend to have highly-
educated partners, and the latter have a more direct relation with child outcomes.
Controlling for parental income (column 3), allowing for a more flexible functional form
by including schooling levels as indicator variables (column 4), or including schooling for
all grandparents (column 5) reduces the grandfather coe cient to a precisely estimated
zero.
For a subset of the fathers we observe detailed information on cognitive and non-
cognitive ability from military enlistment tests. This subsample is small and quite
peculiar, as test scores are observed only for the youngest parents in my sample. It
is nevertheless interesting that their inclusion pushes the grandfather coe cient below
zero (column 6).
These results do not suggest that grandparents have no direct e↵ects on their grand-
children.14 They however suggest that a consideration of parent-child transmission
processes may often be su cient even if our objective is to understand multigenerational
persistence.15 The observed deceleration of regression to the mean beyond two gener-
ations is more plausibly explained by the multiplicity and indirectness of parent-child
transmission processes.
Parental Investment
All previous results point to “excess persistence”, to the conclusion that extrapolated
intergenerational elasticities understate long-run persistence. But we can certainly think
of circumstances in which the opposite holds, for which I will give one example.
14First, we are considering only distributional, not mean e↵ects. Second, one might expect a negative
grandparent coe cient in the absence of direct grandparental e↵ects, as explained in Solon (2013). Finally,
grandparents may play a more important role in other populations or in other outcomes, such as wealth.
15Warren and Hauser (1997), based on a smaller sample but more comprehensive analysis, come to a
similar conclusion.
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Assume that parental income or economic status have a causal e↵ect on o↵spring;
for example indirectly through parental investments in o↵spring human capital, or more
directly through reputation or networking e↵ects on the labour market. Consider the
first case, such that equations (4.3) and (4.4) change into
yt = ⇢et + ut (4.22)
et = ✓yt 1 + ⌘et 1 + vt. (4.23)
The parent-child and grandparent-grandchild elasticities then equal
  1 = ⇢✓ + ⇢2⌘
  2 = (⇢⌘ + ⇢2✓)(⇢⌘ + ✓).
Consider again parameterizations that yield the same level of   1, which requires ⌘ <  
(assuming ⇢ > 0 and ✓ > 0). The extrapolation error,
  = (⇢2   1)⌘  1, (4.24)
is smaller than the error in our first model (which equals (⇢2 1)   1), but it will still be
negative. Our previous findings still hold when parental income a↵ects o↵spring human
capital.
Now instead assume that parental income has a direct e↵ect on o↵spring income that
is independent of o↵spring characteristics, such that equations (4.3) and (4.4) change
into
yt =  yt 1 + ⌧et + ut (4.25)
et =  et 1 + vt. (4.26)
The parent-child and grandparent-grandchild elasticities then equal
  1 =  +
⌧2 
1    
  2 =  2 +
⌧2 
1    ( +  ),
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The extrapolation error equals
  =
✓
⌧2 
1    
◆2
+ (    ) ⌧
2 
1     . (4.27)
which in contrast to the previous examples may be positive, in particular if   >  . In
this model, income is a↵ected by both parental income and ability, but o↵spring ability
is a↵ected exclusively by parental ability. While parent-child persistence may be strongly
a↵ected by the direct e↵ect of income  , long-run persistence will be dominated by the
heritability of ability  . If the former is larger than the latter we have a system in which
multigenerational persistence is weaker than exponentiation of   1 implies.
We may expect that the causal e↵ect of parental income is small (Bjo¨rklund and
Ja¨ntti, 2009), and that at least part of it is indirect, for example through parental
investments in child human capital. The case   >   seems thus of less practical relevance.
Still, the model has interesting implications for cross-country di↵erences in short- and
long-run mobility.16 The direct e↵ect of parental income captured by   will tend to be
larger if credit constraints are more important. Eq. (4.27) then implies that extrapolation
from parent-child correlations understates long-run persistence more in those countries
in which credit constraints play less of a role.
These models illustrate that di↵erent beliefs about causal pathways of transmission
are consistent with di↵erent expectations about long-run mobility. The belief that
children from a✏uent families tend to fare better mainly because inherited traits and
parental investment raise their productive abilities is consistent with the expectation
that long-run mobility is lower than the iteration of intergenerational coe cients im-
plies. But some authors emphasise the importance of genetic inheritance and parental
investment while challenging the significance of low intergenerational mobility estimates
on the grounds that they nevertheless imply high long-run mobility (Mankiw, 2006).
The opposite argument applies if one believes that income persistence stems mainly
from mechanisms that are unrelated to individual productivity. If income persistence is
only due to the direct influence of parental income then its decline over generations is
indeed geometrically, and even low levels of intergenerational mobility would imply rapid
multigenerational regression to the mean.
16I thank an anonymous referee for the following observations.
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4.3 Conclusions
For lack of direct evidence, predictions on the degree of long-run mobility across multiple
generations are routinely derived by extrapolation from intergenerational evidence. But
an iteration of parent-child correlations implies high long-run mobility even when in-
tergenerational mobility is low – suggesting that the extensive literature measuring such
correlations is of little consequences for the distribution of socio-economic characteristics
beyond two generations.
In this note I studied various elements of the intergenerational transmission process
that lead to a di↵erent conclusion: the persistence of socio-economic di↵erences in status
is likely to be higher, perhaps much higher than the iteration of parent-child correlations
implies.
The idea to iterate slope coe cients appears quite natural in a linear regression
context, and this iterated regression fallacy is widespread not only in the intergener-
ational but also in other economic literatures and disciplines. I first illustrated why
iteration-based extrapolation procedures are unlikely to provide a good approximation of
multigenerational persistence. I provided empirical support for this argument using data
on educational attainment across three generations from Swedish registries. Regression
to the mean is comparatively strong in Sweden, but its rate slows indeed substantially
after two generations.
I considered then how various elements of the transmission process a↵ect the relation
between inter- and multigenerational mobility. I discussed the role of direct and and
indirect pathways of transmission; of the multiplicity of skills; of higher-order causal
e↵ects; and the role of parental income. Regression to the mean slows over generations
if factors that are orthogonal to individual characteristics explain some fraction of the
variation in socio-economic outcomes. The multiplicity of skills also matters, as highly
inheritable traits explain an increasing share of socio-economic persistence across gener-
ations. Moreover, multiplicity provides a simple explanation why groups can su↵er from
persistent economic disadvantage even when parent-child mobility is high.
The recent literature has been particularly concerned with the question if grandpar-
ents have a direct causal influence on their grandchildren. I argued that other properties
of the transmission process are more important for understanding long-run persistence
in socio-economic outcomes. I used the Swedish data for a simple illustration: while
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all coe cients in a regression of child on parent and grandparent schooling tend to be
positive, the coe cient on grandparent schooling vanishes quickly and may even turn
negative when we include a wider set of parental controls.
Questions on mobility across multiple generations are closely related to questions on
the causal pathways of transmission. This note focused on the implications that di↵erent
causal channels have for the extent of multigenerational mobility, but the relation is
interesting both ways. I illustrated how a comparison of intergenerational and three-
generation coe cients may help to identify features of the underlying causal process and
lead to better extrapolations from the available intergenerational evidence.
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Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Inter- and Multigenerational Persistence in Educational Attainment
Child Father Grandfather
two generations 0.238*** 0.406***
(0.002) (0.004)
three gen. (prediction) 0.096***
(0.001)
three gen. (actual) 0.137***
(0.003)
Child Mother Grandmother
two generations 0.267*** 0.301***
(0.002) (0.005)
three gen. (prediction) 0.080***
(0.002)
three gen. (actual) 0.152***
(0.004)
Notes: Slope coe cients from separate regressions of years of schooling of o↵spring on years of schooling
of family member in older generation. N=145,590 observations for panel A (fathers/grandfathers),
N=156,847 for panel B (mothers/grandmothers). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by family.
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Table 4.2: The Grandparent Coe cient in Educational Persistence
Years of schooling - Child
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents:
schooling father 0.222***
(0.0025)
0.159***
(0.0026)
0.135***
(0.0027)
saturated saturated saturated
schooling mother 0.182***
(0.00289)
0.169***
(0.0029)
saturated saturated saturated
income father 0.546***
(0.0171)
0.461***
(0.0169)
0.407***
(0.0245)
0.191***
(0.068)
income mother -0.0176
(0.0095)
-0.0021
(0.0094)
0.0298*
(0.0152)
0.120**
(0.055)
ability father - - - - - x
Grandparents:
schooling
grandfather
(paternal)
0.0456***
(0.0031)
0.0259***
(0.0030)
0.0183***
(0.0030)
0.0083**
(0.0030)
0.0029
(0.0047)
-0.0132
(0.0164)
schooling
grandmother
(paternal)
0.0069
(0.0060)
schooling
grandfather
(maternal)
0.0061
(0.0046)
schooling
grandmother
(maternal)
0.0069
(0.0059)
# obs. 104,904 104,904 104,904 104,904 47,797 2,789
Notes: Slope coe cients from separate regressions of years of schooling of o↵spring on characteristics of
parents and grandparents. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by family.
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5.1 Introduction
The effect of immigration on wages and employment of native workers has been studies
in numerous papers, yet there is little consensus about whether immigration has adverse
impacts, and what is the most suitable methodology that should be adopted for analysis. In this
paper we revisit the question of how an immigration induced labor supply shock affects wages
and employment of native workers.
We argue that analysis of wage effects alone or without the consideration of group-
specific labor supply responses – the type of analysis performed by most works in this area –
may lead to misleading conclusions on how immigration affects different types of workers.
This is because the labor supply responses of different groups of resident workers to an
immigration induced labor supply shock may differ across subgroups of workers.. One key
innovation of this paper is therefore to allow for different labor supply elasticities of different
groups of resident workers, and to estimate these in an analysis that investigates wage and
labor supply jointly.
A second contribution of our work is that we distinguish between different types of
labor supply responses. The overall response of any group of resident workers to a labor
supply shock will consist of individuals leaving, or not entering employment in the affected
area. These responses may in turn be due to movements into or out of employment within, or
geographic movements between local labor markets. We provide evidence on the magnitude of
each type of response, and show how the relative importance of each adjustment channel
varies across groups.
Our analysis is based on a unique experiment that took place in Germany fourteen
months after the fall of the Berlin wall, when the German government introduced a commuting
scheme that allowed workers from the neighboring Czech Republic to seek employment in
German municipalities along the German-Czech border. While these workers were allowed to
work in Germany, they were not granted residence, which forced them to commute between
their home country and their workplace in Germany. This resulted in an almost ideal labor
supply shock that affected only eligible municipalities, and which was exogenous to local
conditions on the labor market. The supply shock was unexpected, sudden and of considerable
magnitude: within two years the average share of Czech workers increased from close to zero
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to more than three percent across all eligible municipalities, and to about 10 percent in areas
close to the border. While the nature of this experiment is not dissimilar to David Card’s
Miami boat lift (Card, 1990), the requirement to commute on a daily basis provides us with
additional exogenous variation for the intensity with which different municipalities were
affected by this policy, in form of measures of distance from the border. Moreover, the policy
generated a pure labor supply shock that was less contaminated by possible demand effects, as
commuting workers did not live and consume in the affected areas. Our experiment thus
allows for a more direct test of the predictions of factor demand models that are at the core of
theoretical work in the literature (Borjas, 2009).
Our empirical investigation is based on a unique administrative data set that covers the
totality of workers subject to social security contributions in Germany. This data reports not
only on a wide range of socio-economic characteristics of workers, but contains also
citizenship information, which allows us to identify Czech workers who entered Germany in
response to the policy. Moreover, as we have longitudinal information on each worker, we are
able to precisely investigate the various channels of employment responses of individual
workers. The continuous updates on employment status, and at least yearly updates on wages,
also allow us to study in far more detail the timing of wage and employment responses. Thus,
the combination of a unique policy, a clean identification strategy, and unique individual and
longitudinal data on each worker who was potentially affected allows us to extend the existing
literature into various new directions, and to reconcile some of the apparently contradictory
findings that have puzzled researchers in the past. Moreover, the longitudinal nature of our
data and the sudden onset of the experiment allow us to perform very targeted falsification
tests and thus to carefully probe the robustness of our identification strategy.
We find that the large inflow of Czech workers over a two years period had a negative
effect on overall wages and led to large employment responses among native workers. Both
responses were remarkably rapid, with the wage response preceding the full employment
response. As expected, the inflow of predominantly unskilled Czech workers led to larger
employment and wage losses among unskilled native workers. We further demonstrate that an
analysis based on repeated cross-sectional data, even if comparing wages just before and
shortly (i.e. one year) after the labor supply shock, fails to pick up much of the wage effects,
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due to low-productivity workers being those that leave the affected area (or do not enter it in
the first place) in response to the shock.
We further show that labor supply responses differ strongly between different skill
groups and between workers of different age, implying heterogeneity in the response to wage
changes across skill and demographic groups that are explained by different labor supply
elasticities. We demonstrate that approaches that focus on responses in relative wages, induced
by relative labor supply shocks between skill groups, may lead to misleading conclusions
when heterogeneity in resident workers’ labor supply responses is ignored.
We then investigate in detail the relative importance of various types of employment
adjustment. We show that the employment responses of native workers in municipalities
affected by an inflow of Czech workers decreases predominantly through reductions in inflows
into local employment, while outflows from the existing native workforce are much smaller in
magnitude. We also find that inflows adjust faster than outflows, which may explain why
employment levels adjust so rapidly. This provides an entirely new interpretation of labor
supply shock-induced employment responses, not only for such shocks being induced through
migration, but more generally.
We further investigate the margins of adjustment along another dimension,
distinguishing between geographic movements of native workers between areas and
employment and non-employment. Native employment adjusts mostly through reduced
inflows from and increased outflows into non-employment. Interesting is further that we find
the importance of those channels to vary across subgroups of workers, with for instance older
workers reacting strongly through outflows into non-employment, while the response of
younger workers is predominantly driven by reductions in inflows from both non-employment
and other areas.
To structure our empirical analysis and to better understand our estimates, we
commence with a simple model of production as is standard in the migration literature. We
extend that model, by allowing different skill groups to exhibit different labor supply
elasticities, and we allow for additional heterogeneity between demographic groups within the
same skill group. Based on that model, we show that heterogeneity in responses may lead to
“perverse” wage effects, with relative wages of that skill group increasing that experiences the
larger labor supply shock, if only the labor supply elasticity of this group is large enough.
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Moreover, if different groups of workers who compete in the same labor market segment
respond differently to a wage changes, then any skill group specific labor supply elasticity will
be determined by the labor supply response of those workers who respond most elastically,
muting wage effects of all other workers in that skill group
Our work relates to different literatures. We contribute to the literature on wage
impacts of immigration (Borjas 1999, Card 2009, Aydemir and Borjas 2011, Dustmann et al.
2013) by showing that a pure wage analysis may not capture the full impact of immigration
even if wages are measured shortly after the immigration-induced supply shock, as
employment responses of natives are too rapid. We further show how approaches that rely on
the classification of immigrants into skill and demographic cells (Borjas et al. 1997, Borjas
2003, Borjas et al. 2010, Manacorda et al. 2012, Ottaviano and Peri 2012) are susceptible to
response heterogeneity among natives across those cells.
Our paper is also related to the literature that discusses possible geographic outflows
of natives as a response to immigration induced labor supply shocks (see e.g. Borjas et al. 1997,
Card 2001, Card and DiNardo 2000), which may dissipate any wage effects across the
economy. While that literature assesses in particular if native workers leave areas in response
to migration, we consider here that individuals may instead not enter employment in that
market. We find that compared to within-labor market adjustments, movements across
individual labor markets are small, even for the fine geographical definitions we use in this
study. More importantly, we also find that both responses, rather than through outflows, are
through reducing potential inflows into employment in an affected area.
The idea that workers may differ in their labor supply elasticities suggests that
different groups of workers may be differently affected by labor supply shocks, where those
workers who react most elastically contribute more strongly to wage effects being muted, thus
“shielding” other resident workers from the impact of immigration-induced supply shocks.
This idea is in spirit similar to findings in a recent paper by Cadena and Kovak (2013), who
find that unskilled immigrants react most strongly to labor demand shocks during the great
recession, leading to native workers being insulated from such shocks in cities with large
Mexican born populations. It also relates to findings in a recent paper by Smith (2012), who
shows that unskilled immigration leads to different employment outcomes across different
demographic groups, which he interprets as being partly due to differences in responsiveness
CHAPTER 5. THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON LOCAL LABOR MARKETS
132
across groups to wage changes. We contribute to this literature by providing a theoretical
structure, and investigating such response heterogeneity in a setting where we are able to
precisely identify wage and employment effects, and the various channels via which
employment adjust, across groups of workers.
5.2 An Equilibrium Model with Heterogeneous Labor Supply
We first set out a simple model which links immigration-induced labor supply shifts to
employment and wage responses of natives in that labor market, and develops the key
implications for the empirical analysis. One distinguishing feature of our model compared to
existing models is that we allow local labor supply elasticities to vary across skill groups.
2.1 Baseline Model
Production: Suppose that output Q in a specific area is produced by combining labor ܮand
capital ܭ according to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
ܳ = ܣܭఈܮଵିఈ. (1)
Labor ܮ is a CES aggregate of unskilled (U) and skilled (S) labor ܮ௚, ݃ = ܷ, ܵ:
ܮ = ቂߠ௎ܮ௎ఉ + ߠௌܮௌఉቃభഁ, (2)
where ߠ௎ + ߠௌ = 1, and the elasticity of substitution between the two skill groups equals
ߪ = ଵଵିఉ ,with ߚ ൑ ͳǤ
Labor supply: In each skill group g, total labor supply in the area is the sum of labor supply of
natives (or incumbents), ܮ௚ே, and immigrants (or entrants), ܮ௚ூ . Suppose that immigrants and
natives are perfect substitutes in production and that there are no immigrants in the base period
(which corresponds to our empirical setting), so that ܮ௚ = ܮ௚ே . Denote by ௚ܰ the (fixed)
number of natives who could potentially supply labor to the local labor market. The local labor
supply function for skill group g is then
ܮ௚ = ܮ௚ூ + ܮ௚ே = ܮ௚ூ + ௚ܰ ௚݂(ݓ௚,࢝ࢍᇱ ), (3)
where we assume that immigrants (i.e., new entrants) supply their labor inelastically, whereas
the local labor supply of natives (i.e., incumbents) depends on skill-specific wages in the
market under consideration (ݓ௚) and other local labor markets (࢝ࢍᇱ ).
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The local labor market elasticity for natives, which we allow to vary across skill groups,
is given by ߟ௚ = డே೒ ௙೒(.)డ௪೒ ௪೒ே೒ ௙೒(.) . It summarizes various potential adjustment mechanisms,
such as the internal migration of workers between areas, or entries into and exits from the labor
force. We comment on both these dimensions, as well as why the elasticity may vary across
groups, below and in Section 5.
Assume that (as it is the case in our empirical application) the local labor market under
consideration is small relative to the national labor market. In consequence, the change in
equilibrium wages (and native employment) in other areas is negligible. Hence, totally
differentiating the expression in (3), and dividing both sides by equilibrium employment in the
base period (recall that in the base period, ܮ௚ = ܮ௚ே) results in
݀ ݋݃ܮ௚ = ௗ௅೒಺௅೒ಿ + ߟ௚݈݀݋݃ݓ௚ (4a)
This expression decomposes the percentage increase in the labor supplied to the local labor
market into an exogenous increase caused by the inflow of immigrants, ௗ௅೒
಺
௅೒ಿ
, and an
endogenous response of natives, ߟ௚݈݀݋݃ݓ௚ – which is stronger the larger their local elasticity
of labor supply. Let ߨ௚ே = ௅೒ಿ௅ೆಿା௅ೄಿ and ߨ௚ூ= ௅೒಺௅ೆ಺ ା௅ೄ಺ denote the employment shares of natives and
immigrants of skill group ݃(in head counts), to rewrite the expression above as
݈݀݋݃ܮ௚ = గ೒಺గ೒ಿ ݀ܫ + ߟ௚݈݀݋݃ݓ௚ (4b)
where ݀ܫ = ௗ(௅ೆ಺ ା௅ೄ಺ )(௅ೆಿା௅ೄಿ) = ௗ௅಺௅ಿ is the total labor supply shock to the local labor market induced by
migration relative to native equilibrium employment in the base period (in head counts).
Differentiating the expression in (2) and substituting expression (4b) for ݈݀݋݃ܮ௚ yields1
݈݀݋݃ܮ ൌ ȫ݀ܫ + ݏ௎ߟ௎ ݈݀݋݃ݓ௎ + ݏௌߟௌ ݈݀݋݃ݓௌ (5)
where ȫ = ݏ௎ గೆ಺గೆಿ + ݏௌ గೄ಺గೄಿ is the weighted average of the relative density of immigrants across
skill groups, and where weights ݏ௎ and ݏௌ are the contribution of labor type ݃to the total labor
aggregate.
1 It follows from (2) that ݀ log ܮ = ఏೆ௅ೆഁ
ቂఏೆ௅ೆ
ഁାఏೄ௅ೄ
ഁቃ
݈݀݋݃ ܮ௎ + ఏೄ௅ೄഁቂఏೆ௅ೆഁାఏೄ௅ೄഁቃ ݈݀݋݃ ܮௌ , so that ݏ௚ =
ߠ݃ܮ݃
ߚ
ቂߠܷܮܷ
ߚ+ߠܵܮܵߚቃ.
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Labor demand: Assuming that markets are competitive and normalizing the price of the output
good to 1, the first order conditions for the cost-minimizing input choice give the equilibrium
input prices as:
݈݋݃ݓ௚ = ݈݋݃[(ͳ െ ߙ)ܣ] + ߙ[݈݋݃ܭ െ ݈݋݃ ܮ]+ ݈݋݃ ߠ௚ + (ߚ െ ͳ)ൣ݈݋݃ ܮ௚ െ ݈݋݃ ܮ൧ (6a)
݈݋݃ ݎ = ݈݋݃ ߙܣ + (ߙ െ ͳ)[݈݋݃ܭ െ ݈݋݃ ܮ] (6b)
Assume that the supply of capital is given by
݈݋݃ܭ = ଵఒ ݈݋݃ ݎ ; ɉ ൒ Ͳ (7)
where ɉ ൒ Ͳ is the inverse of the elasticity of capital with respect to its price ݎ . Equate
equations (5b) and (6) and solve for l݋݃ܭ to obtain ݈݋݃ܭ = ௟௢௚ఈ஺ଵିఈା஛െ ఈିଵଵିఈା஛ ݈݋݃ܮ. Substituting
for ݈݋݃ܭ in (5a) using the expression above yields
݈݋݃ݓ௚ ൌ Ȟ ൅ (ߚ െ ͳ) ݈݋݃ ቀ௅೒௅ ቁ+݈߮݋݃ܮ (8)
where Ȟ ൌ ݈݋݃[(ͳ െ ߙ)ܣ] + ߙ ௟௢௚ఈ஺ଵିఈା஛+ logߠ௚ and where ߮ ൌ െ ఈ஛ଵିఈା஛ is the slope of the
aggregate labor demand curve. Totally differentiating the expression in (8) results in
݈݀݋݃ݓ௚ = ݈߮݀݋݃ܮ + (ߚ െ ͳ)൫݈݀݋݃ܮ௚ െ ݈݀݋݃ܮ൯ (9)
In equilibrium, supply must equal demand, and the supply curves given by equation (4b) and
the demand curves given by equation (9) determine the skill-specific and aggregate wages and
employment in the local labor market.
The Impact of labor supply shocks on wages and employment: Plugging in the expressions in
(4b) and (5) for ݈݀݋݃ܮ௚and ݈݀݋݃ܮ into equation (9) and solving for ݈݀݋݃ݓ௚, we obtain the
change in equilibrium wages of skill group ݃ as a response to a labor supply shock induced by
immigration (see Appendix A for a derivation):
݈݀݋݃ݓ௚
= (ߚ െ ͳ) ൤గ೒಺గ೒ಿ ൫ͳ െ ߮ߟ௚ᇲ൯െ ȫሺͳ െ ఝఉିଵ)൨1െ (ߚ െ 1)ൣߟ௚൫1 + ݏ௚߶൯+ ߟ௚ᇲ൫1 + ݏ௚ᇲ߶൯െ ߟ௚ߟ௚ᇲ(1 + ߶)(ߚ െ 1)൧ ݀ܫ (10)
where ߟ௚ᇲ is the local labor market elasticity of the other skill group, and ߶ = ఝఉିଵെ ͳ. Local
employment responses of natives in the area follow straightforwardly from the labor supply
function:
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݈݀݋݃ܮ௚ே = ߟ௚݈݀݋݃ݓ௚ (11)
As ߚ ൑ ͳ, the denominator in (10) will always be positive. The numerator is the difference in
the relative density of immigrants to natives in skill group ݃, గ೒
಺
గ೒ಿ
, and the (weighted) average of
these densities in the different skill groups, ȫ, both weighted by expressions that depend on the
elasticity of capital supply (ɔሻ, and the supply elasticity of the other labor type (ߟ௚ᇲ). Thus, the
impact of a supply shock on native wages will be negative for skill group ݃ if the weighted
intensity of immigration in that skill group (first term in brackets) exceeds an appropriately
weighted average of immigration intensity across all skill groups (second term in brackets).
In the standard case of a homogenous local labor supply elasticity (i.e., ߟ௎ = ߟௌ = ߟ),
equations (10) and (11) imply that wages and employment of the skill group which
experiences the larger migration-induced supply shock (i.e. the group for which ߨ௚ூ /ߨ௚ே >
ȫሻ decline relative to wages and employment of the other group. Wage effects will be the
smaller, and employment effects the larger, the larger the labor supply elasticity. Moreover,
wages and local employment of both skill groups may decline if capital is not fully elastic
(߮ ് Ͳሻ.2
If, in contrast, the local labor supply elasticity varies across groups, then it is possible
that wages of the skill group for which immigration is relatively intensive increase relative to
the other skill group. To see this, consider the relative wage effects:
݈݀݋݃wௌ െ ݈݀݋݃w௎ = (ߚ െ ͳ) ൤గೄ಺గೄಿ (ͳ െ ߮Ʉ୙)െ గೆ಺గೆಿ (ͳ െ ߮Ʉୗ)൨ͳ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)[ߟௌ(1 + ݏௌ߶) + ߟ௎(1 + ݏ௎߶)െ ߟ௎ߟௌ(1 + ߶)(ߚ െ ͳ)]݀ܫ
Suppose that migration is predominantly unskilled (i.e., గೄ
಺
గೄಿ
< గೆ಺గೆಿ) and that local labor supply
of the unskilled is elastic relative to labor supply of the skilled (i.e., ߟ௎ is large relative to ߟௌ).
In this case, the relative employment effect is amplified, whereas the relative wage effect is
muted, compared to the case of a homogenous local labor supply elasticity. Provided that
2 In the case of homogenous labor supply elasticities, expression (8) simplifies to
݈݀݋݃ݓ௚ = ߮ߨͳ െ ߮ߟ ݀ܫ + (ߚ െ ͳ)ͳ െ ߟ(ߚ െ ͳ) ቆߨ௚ெߨ௚ே െ ߨቇ݀ܫ.
This expression does not only highlight that wages of the skill-group for which ߨ௚ூ /ߨ௚ே > ߨ) decline
relative to the other skill group, but also shows that wages of both the unskilled and skilled may decline
if capital is not fully elastic – see the first term in the expression above, which pulls down wages for
both skill groups by the same amount, the more so the less elastic capital supply. If ߟ = 0 , the
expression reduces to the case discussed in Dustmann et al. (2013).
CHAPTER 5. THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON LOCAL LABOR MARKETS
136
capital is not fully elastic (߮ < 0) and some skilled migrants enter the local labor market
(ߨௌூ > 0), it is possible that wages of unskilled increase relative to wages of skilled.
If on the other hand the local labor supply elasticity of the unskilled is small relative to
that of the skilled, the difference in wage adjustments between the unskilled and skilled will be
amplified, and the differences in employment adjustments muted, compared to the case of a
homogenous local labor supply elasticity. It is now possible that employment of the unskilled
increases relative to the skilled, even though more unskilled than skilled immigrants entered
the labor market.3
Note that in these “perverse” cases, relative wage and employment effects have the
opposite signs; for example, if wages of the unskilled (moderately) increase relative to wages
of the skilled although migration was relatively unskilled, then it must be the case that
employment of the unskilled (strongly) declines relative to the skilled. This emphasizes the
need to investigate wage and employment responses due to immigration jointly, as
investigating the two outcomes in isolation may paint a very misleading picture of the overall
labor market effects of immigration.4
Finally note that – in the case of two factors of production – such “perverse” effect will
only be observable when capital is not perfectly elastic, i.e. ߮ < 0. This is because in the case
of perfectly elastic capital supply, the aggregate wage effect of a migration-induced supply
shock is zero, and wage decreases for the skill group that receives a higher share of migrants
and increases for the other skill group – regardless of the relative magnitude of the group-
specific local labor supply elasticities. However, if we add a further skill group, then again
such “perverse” effects are possible even if the capital supply is fully elastic (see Appendix B).
5.2.2 Heterogeneous Labor Supply by Subgroups
It is straightforward to extend the model to allow for heterogeneous labor supply
responses across subgroups s (like for instance groups with different labor market experience)
3 The relative employment effect equals
݀ܮௌே െ ݀ܮ௎ே = (ఎೄିఎೆ)(ఉିଵ)ஈቀଵି കಊషభቁା(ఉିଵ)ቈఎೄഏೄ಺ഏೄಿ (ଵିఝఎೆ)ିఎೆഏೆ಺ഏೆಿ (ଵିఝఎೄ)቉ଵି(ఉିଵ)[ఎೄ(ଵା௦ೄథ)ାఎೆ(ଵା௦ೆథ)ିఎೆఎೄ(ଵାథ)(ఉିଵ)] ݀ܫ . If ߟௌ is large relative to ߟ௎,
employment of the skilled may decline relative to employment of the unskilled even if immigration is
relatively unskilled.
4 Borjas (1999) also emphasizes that changes in the wage structure and in native employment
need to be jointly considered to capture the full labor market impact of immigration. Our model implies
that isolated estimates of wage or employment effects may not only understate the overall impact of
immigration but also misrepresent its distributionary effects.
CHAPTER 5. THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON LOCAL LABOR MARKETS
137
within a skill group g, so long as these are perfect substitutes in production.5 Assume that the
local native supply response in group g in subgroup s, depends on local wage changes
according to the subgroup-specific labor supply elasticity ߟ௚௦, such that
݈݀݋݃ܮ௚ே = σ ߟ௚௦ ௅೒ೞಿ௅೒ಿ ݈݀݋݃ݓ௚௦ (12)
The group-specific local labor market elasticity ߟ௚ may now be thought of as a weighted
average of the subgroup-specific elasticities, where the weights equal the employment shares
of each subgroup within a group. Since different types of workers within a skill group are
perfect substitutes in production, the impact of an overall immigration shock on their wages is
the same, and is given by equation (8). However, employment decreases most for the subgroup
with the largest labor supply elasticity:
݈݀݋݃ܮ௚௦ே
= ߟ௚௦ (ߚ െ ͳ) ൤గ೒಺గ೒ಿ ൫ͳ െ ߮ߟ௚ᇲ൯ െ ȫሺͳ െ ఝఉିଵ)൨1 െ (ߚ െ 1)ൣߟ௚൫1 + ݏ௚߶൯+ ߟ௚ᇲ൫1 + ݏ௚ᇲ߶൯െ ߟ௚ߟ௚ᇲ(1 + ߶)(ߚ െ 1)൧ ݀ܫ (13)
In the empirical analysis, we therefore investigate employment (and wage) responses
across subgroups. The arguments here also highlight that the group-specific local labor supply
elasticity ߟ௚ may be large even if some workers do not respond at all to local wage changes –
so long as there are other workers who respond very strongly to such changes. Moreover,
inelastic subgroups benefit from the presence of elastic subgroups, as the latter reduce, due to
their strong employment response, the pressure on group-specific wages. This illustrates the
way in which highly elastic subgroups “shield” less elastic subgroups from the impact of a
labour supply shock.
5.2.3 Margins of Adjustment and the Local Labor Supply Elasticity
The analysis so far illustrates how the local labor supply elasticity and the variation of
that elasticity across groups of workers are central determinants of the effects of immigration
on local labor markets. We now illustrate that the overall response in local employment levels
may stem from different margins of adjustment, which affect different type of workers and
have disparate implications for the overall effect of immigration on the economy. The
5 Allowing for more than two groups with varying labor supply elasticities which are imperfect
substitutes in production severely complicates the expressions for equilibrium wage and employment
responses without leading to novel insights.
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discussion sheds light on the determinants of the local labor supply elasticity, and why this
elasticity may vary across subgroups.
The local labor supply of natives in skill group g in some time period t (ܮ௚௧ே ) can be
expressed as a function of the native supply in the previous period (ܮ௚௧ିଵே ), inflows into local
employment of natives who previously were not employed in the area (ܮ௚௧ூ ), and outflows from
employment of natives who were locally employed (ܮ௚௧ை ),
ܮ௚௧ே = ܮ௚௧ିଵே + ܮ௚௧ூ െ ܮ௚௧ை (14)
Native employment in an affected area may fall either because native workers leave local
employment (outflows), or because less native workers enter local employment (inflows) in
response to immigration. Its impact may thus fall on incumbent workers who are employed in
an affected area – or on outsiders, who may want to enter the local workforce.
Within each of these categories we can further distinguish between movements from
or into employment in other areas (geographical inflows ܮ௚௧ூ,ா and outflows ܮ௚௧ை,ா ), and
movements out or into the labor force (inflows ܮ௚௧ூ,ோ from and outflows ܮ௚௧ை,ோ into non-
employment). The percentage growth in employment between the two time periods can thus be
decomposed as
ܮ௚௧ே െ ܮ௚௧ିଵே
ܮ௚௧ିଵே
= ܮ௚௧ூ,ாܮ௚௧ିଵே െ ܮ௚௧ை,ாܮ௚௧ିଵேᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ୣ୫୮୪୭୷୫ୣ୬୲
+ ܮ௚௧ூ,ோܮ௚௧ିଵே െ ܮ௚௧ை,ோܮ௚௧ିଵேᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
୬୭୬ିୣ୫୮୪୭୷୫ୣ୬୲
. (16)
The relative magnitude of these four margins is particularly important for the spatial
approach, which exploits variation across areas to identify the effect of migration on native
outcomes. The displacement of workers in affected areas may affect geographical flows and in
turn employment in non-affected areas, thus contaminating counterfactual observations.
Moreover, the various channels of adjustment have different implications for the effect
of immigration on the overall economy. Movements in and from employment in other areas
affects the spatial distribution but not the level of employment in the national labor market,
while movements in and out of the labor force have potentially implications for the overall
level of economic activity.
Finally, each of the four margins affects different types of workers, potentially leading
to disparate welfare implications, but also explaining why some groups may respond more
elastically to wage changes than others. For example, older workers may be geographically
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less mobile but also have access to better social security and unemployment benefits than
young workers, and may thus be more likely to leave the labor force in response to adverse
shocks. Skilled workers may be geographically more mobile than unskilled workers, and may
be more likely to avoid localized shocks through spatial movement across labor markets.
To understand the consequences of immigration not only for aggregate outcomes in the
affected area, but also for different types of workers and for the national economy, it is thus
important to identify each of the four margins in equation (16). The nature of our data allows
us to follow each worker over time, and across labor markets, and thus to estimate the relative
importance of each type of employment adjustment.
5.3 Background and Data
5.3.1 The Policy
Our analysis makes use of a unique experiment that took place in a part of Germany that
bordered the Czech Republic.6 In 1991, due to a sudden and unexpected policy change, Czech
citizens were allowed access to the German labor market in a specific region along the Czech-
German border. The policy, enabled only by the fall of the iron curtain in the preceding year,
was part of a larger scheme for legal employment of foreign nationals in Germany. Introduced
with effect to January 1st, 1991, the intention of the scheme’s various provisions were to
facilitate the recruitment of foreign workers, in a time of increased labor demand after German
reunification. 7 The particular provision we investigate is a commuting scheme
("Grenzgängerregelung"), which granted Czech nationals the right to work in dependent
employment in German border regions, but did not grant residency, so that Czech workers
were required to commute each day. The policy was otherwise non-restrictive, and was not
constrained to specific industries or applicants with specific qualifications. Appendix C
provides additional details.
The scheme applied also to Germany’s second Eastern neighbor, Poland. However, as
social security records in former East Germany are fully available only from 1992, and since
its formerly state-directed economy was subject to strong structural change after German
6 The territory of the Czech Republic was part of Czechoslovakia until dissolved peacefully with
effect to January 1st, 1993. For simplicity we use the term Czech Republic even when referring to the
period before the seperation.
7 See "Anwerbestoppausnahme-Verordnung", Bundesgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1990, Teil I.
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reunification, we focus on the scheme’s consequences along the Czech border with West
Germany. Figure 1 maps the region that was affected by the scheme, comprising 21 districts
that lie within an approximate eighty kilometers band from the Czech-German border.
However, some of these districts are close to the former inner-German border and were thus
after reunification in 1990 affected by commuters from East Germany, where wages were
much lower than in West Germany. To avoid any contamination of our experiment, we
exclude districts located within approximately 80 kilometers (our results remain robust to less
conservative choices) of the inner-German border. As shown in Figure 1, this leaves us with a
region that comprises 13 districts, or 291 municipalities. We refer to it below as the “border
region”. The region is rural and contains various small, but no large cities. The first column of
Table 1 illustrates that the local labor market had a comparatively small share of high-skilled
workers with university degree, a young workforce, low wages, and a particularly low share of
pre-existing immigrants.8
The introduction of the commuting scheme in January 1991 led to a substantial and
rapid inflow of Czech workers into the border region. After 18 months into the scheme, a total
of 9,996 workers from the Czech Republic were employed in the eligible districts. While
negligible for the national economy, the inflow was large compared to existing employment in
the border region. In Figure 2 we plot the employment shares of Czech nationals in border and
selected inland districts (which we define precisely in the next section). By June 1992 the
share of Czech nationals in the border region had increased from close to zero to about three
percent, and on average to about 10 percent in municipalities that were closest to the border. In
contrast, the employment share of Czech nationals in the inland, which was not affected by the
commuting scheme, remained negligible.
The stark inflow was related to the large wage differentials along the border, as in the
mid-1990s wages in Germany were multiple times higher than in the Czech Republic.9 The
resulting labor supply shock was, at least prior to 1990, unexpected. It was also exogenous to
the economic situation in the border region, as follows from the setup of the policy, which
8 See also Moritz (2011). This study differs from ours in that it is based on a 2 percent sample, in
that areas with a high share of commuters from former East Germany are included in the analysis, and in
that variation within the border region is not directly exploited.
9 See OECD data on average annual wages,
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AV_AN_WAGE#
CHAPTER 5. THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON LOCAL LABOR MARKETS
141
applied non-discriminatorily along the border along all of the German borders with both
Poland and the Czech Republic.
Figure 2 illustrates that the share of Czech workers remained stable in 1993 and
decreased thereafter. Various reasons may have contributed to this decrease. First, Germany
entered a recession in 1993, and the difference between German and Czech wage levels
decreased steadily in the early 1990s. Both factors may have decreased the returns of
commuting for Czech workers. Second, the large inflow of foreign workers caused a political
backlash from late 1992. Allegations that foreign workers led to a worsening of conditions for
native workers, while not leading to formal changes to the commuting policy, led to stricter
local implementation of general restrictions regarding foreign employment in Germany.10
The fall of the iron curtain may have affected the border region also via other
mechanisms, for example through cross-border demand for consumer goods, services and
trade. While we find evidence for systematic structural changes in certain local industries,
those responses are spread over a long time interval, in contrast to the sudden effects from the
labor supply shock.11 Their magnitude in the short run thus appear negligible compared to the
extraordinary size of the supply-shock caused by Czech commuters. We further observe that
the employment share in the retail sector remains relatively stable, and that employment and
wage responses are clustered in those industries that received a larger share of Czech workers.
In the empirical analysis we focus on the immediate wage and employment effects of
the labor supply shock up until 1993. The “reverse experiment” of the subsequent decline in
the share of Czech nationals in 1994 and 1995 is interesting, but potentially endogenous to
local labor market conditions. We abstain from the analysis of long-run outcomes as the spatial
distribution of economic activity in Germany may shift in the process of further European
integration.12
5.3.2 The Data
10 See Nürnberger Nachrichten, 1.7.1992, “Konkurrenz auf Nordbayerns Arbeitsmarkt verschärft
sich”.
11 An interesting case is the glass and ceramic industry, which for historical reasons was strongly
concentrated on both the German and Czech side (Bohemian glass is the region’s famous export product
since the Renaissance) of the border. After its opening we observe a sharp trend break in industry
growth on the German side, but also find the subsequent decline of employment to be gradual, spread
out over a full decade.
12 For example, Redding and Sturm (2008) provide evidence that changes in market access
caused by German division and reunification had a long-run impact on local population growth along
the border.
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The data used in our analysis come from German Social Security Records covering
more than two decades, from 1980 to 2001. They comprise the population of all men and
women covered by the social security system; not included are civil servants, the self-
employed, and military personnel.13 These data are uniquely suited for our analysis. First, the
large sample size allows us to obtain fairly precise estimates of immigration on wages and
employment even for detailed subgroups, although only a relatively small local area is affected
by the inflow of immigrants. Second, the longitudinal nature of our data allows us to
investigate whether the employment effects are driven by an increased outflow of workers into
other area or into non- or unemployment, or by a decreased inflow of workers into the local
labor market – a dynamic so far unexplored in the literature. Third, measurement error in the
migration-induced supply shock, which, as illustrated by Aydemir and Borjas (2011),
attenuates the impact of immigration on native labor market outcomes, is close to zero in our
data. Finally, besides information on education, age and other individual characteristics, we
also observe the citizenship of every individual that is in employment, which allows us to
identify Czech workers that work in Germany (but live in the Czech Republic).
Our data is constructed so that we observe each individual as of June 30th of each year.
Thus, the employment status of each individual refers to this date. In contrast, the wage
variable records the average daily wage in the employment spell that contains the reference
date.14 As it is typically the case with social security data, our wage variable is right-censored
at the social security limit. In our sample, this affects about 3% of all observations. Following
Dustmann et al. (2009), we have imputed censored wages under the assumption that the error
term is normally distributed, and allowing for a different residual variance by age and
education group as well as by district.
We distinguish two skill groups, which we label unskilled and skilled. The unskilled are
workers who enter the labor market without postsecondary education. The skilled comprise
workers who hold a high school degree, completed an apprenticeship scheme or equivalent, or
graduated from a university or college.15 This classification of skill groups is meaningful in the
13 In 2001, 77.2 percent of all workers in the German economy were covered by social security
and are hence recorded in the data (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2004).
14 As employers are required to update records only at the end of each year, the variable may
capture wage changes that occurred after June 30th, up to December of the same year.
15 To improve the consistency of the education variable in our data, we impute missing values
using the procedure proposed by Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Völter (2006), using past and future
values of the education variable. The imputed education variable is missing for 3.9% of observations in
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German context, where many apprenticeship jobs educate for professions that require college
degrees in Anglo-Saxon countries (such as medical assistant or bank clerk). We do not report
separate results for university or college graduates, as their share in the border region in 1990
is less than 5%. Within each of these skill groups, we also distinguish three age groups:
younger than 30, 30 to 49, and 50 and older.
We restrict the analysis to individuals aged between 18 and 65 and we exclude irregular,
marginal and seasonal employment as well as individuals in apprenticeship training. Our
analysis of employment effects is based on workers in regular full- and part-time employment,
where we down-weight those in part-time employment into full-time equivalent units by 0.67
(“long” part-time) or 0.5 (“short” part-time). Our wage analysis is based on full-time employed
workers only.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on both the existing stock of workers in the border
region in 1989 (before workers from the Czech Republic entered), and of Czech nationals,
whose characteristics we measure in 1992. Czech workers are far more likely to be unskilled
than the existing workforce (50.5% vs 27.6%).16 As the education information stems from
German employers, our classification is less likely to reflect their formal level of qualification
in their home country but their perceived level on the German labor market. Imperfect
transferability of country-specific qualifications are thus less likely to bias classification than
in studies that rely on individual surveys. Moreover, Czechs commuting into the border region
are more likely to fall into the age group 30 to 49 than natives (61.9% vs 40.8%), whilst the
shares of workers older than 50 are much lower among Czechs (3.7% vs 15.7%). Czech
nationals are predominantly male, often speak German, and on average earn much lower
wages than natives. 17 They are over-represented in construction, the hotel and restaurant
industry, wood processing and manufacturing, and under-represented in the public sector.
the overall sample, and 2% of observations in the border region. We classify these individuals as
unskilled, but this choice has little impact on our findings.
16 In Czechoslovakia, about 15 per cent of the age group entered gymnasia in 1989 (mostly as a
preparation for university studies); about 25 per cent attended technical (occupationally specialized)
education; and 60 per cent entered apprenticeships (often with subsequent entry into employment in the
enterprise where the training had been conducted). Source: OECD Country Note on the Czech Republic,
November 1997.
17Our data does not contain information on language proficiency, but a high proficiency of
German is suggested by the geographic proximity and confirmed by reports in the press (see for
example Nürnberger Nachrichten, 1.7.1992).
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5.4 Empirical Strategy
In this section we discuss our empirical strategy in details. Section 4.1 explains how our
main regression equations relate to the theoretical model that we presented in Section 2. In the
following three sections we provide details on conceptual issues that are either not modelled
within our theoretical framework or that are specific to our empirical implementation, such as
the spatial distribution of Czech inflows (section 4.2), the choice of control units (section 4.3),
the timing of native responses, and the potential for specification or falsification tests that are
possible in our data (section 4.4).
5.4.1 The Effect of Immigration on Wages and Employment
Our basic estimation equation regresses the change in log wages of German nationals
(natives) in skill group ݃ݏ and area ݆between two periods (ȟ݈݊ݓ௚௦,௝), or their percentage
change in employment (ȟ ௚ܰ௦,௝), on the total inflow of Czech workers between 1990 and 1992
as a share of total employment in that area in 1990 (ȟܥ௝),18
ȟ݈݊ݓ௚௦,௝ = ߙ௚௦ + ߚ௚௦߂ܥ௝ + ݑ௚௦,௝ (17)
and
߂ ௚ܰ௦,௝ = ߛ௚௦ + ߜ௚௦߂ܥ௝ + ݒ௚௦,௝ (18)
The parameters ߙ௚௦ and ߛ௚௦ measure skill group-specific growth rates in wages and
employment. The parameter ߚ௚௦ measures the impact of an inflow of Czech workers between
1990 and 1992 on the (change in) wages of native workers in skill group ݃ݏ between two time
periods, whose choice we discuss in section 4.3 below. This parameter corresponds to the
expression we have derived in equation (10) above. Hence, its sign and magnitude depend on
the relative density of immigrants to natives in the skill cell ݃, as well as on the elasticities of
capital supply, and the own and the other groups labor supply elasticities. The parameter ߜ௚௦ in
equation (18) corresponds to the expression in equation (13). It follows that the ratio ߜ௚௦/ߚ௚௦
identifies the labor supply elasticity of skill group ݃ݏ, ߟ௚௦.19
18 As we point out above, the main inflow of Czechs happens in 1991 and 1992; since the share
of Czech workers in 1993 is almost the same as in 1992, adding an additional year would hardly affect
our regressor.
19 Note that even if, within education groups, age groups are imperfect substitutes in production,
dividing the subgroup-specific employment effect by the corresponding wage effect identifies the
subgroup-specific local labor supply elasticity.
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Note that this specification does not require us to pre-allocate immigrants to particular
skill cells. For each skill cell that we consider for natives, the regressor will always be the
overall inflow of immigrants; the size and sign of the estimated parameter will depend on the
(elasticity-weighted) relative density of immigrants in the particular native skill group that we
consider (see Section 2). The estimated parameter has thus a clear interpretation. This
specification avoids not only the problem of misclassification, which arises if immigrants are
assigned based on their observed characteristics into skill groups within which they do not
compete with natives.20 It is also consistent with our experiment, as only the total inflow of
Czechs into the border region can be considered as quasi-random. In contrast, how many
Czechs from a particular education or age group enter may well be endogenous, and could be
driven by the specific conditions in the region. Finally, the estimated parameter is policy
relevant, as it captures the total effect of the aggregate supply shock, for specific groups of
natives. In contrast, parts of the literature identify only relative or distributionary effects
between groups, or relate their responses only to skill-specific shocks.
5.4.2 Exploiting Distance to Border
As described in section 3.1, the sudden and unexpected introduction of the commuting
policy can be seen as a quasi-natural experiment. A comparison of the border region that was
affected by the policy with non-eligible control areas can thus solve the endogeneity problem
that immigrants may self-select into areas in which the economy is growing.
However, the unique commuting-nature of the experiment provides additional variation
in the exposure of different areas to Czech inflows that can be exploited. Czech workers were
not allowed to live in the border region but instead had to commute on a daily basis.21 As
commuting is increasingly costly the farther away an area is located, municipalities close to the
border were more attractive and potentially more exposed to the policy.
Figure 3 illustrates that distance to border is indeed a key determinant of where Czech
nationals locate within the border region. In the figure we plot, for municipalities within the
20 Dustmann and Preston (2012) illustrate that assignment of immigrants to skill groups due to
observed characteristics may lead to serious misclassification, as immigrants often downgrade upon
arrival.
21 The requirement to commute was enforced via various channels. First, workers that entered
employment under the commuting scheme had to apply for a special type of permit, the
“Grenzgängerkarte”, revealing the worker’s conditional residence status. Second, in Germany it is
compulsory for residents to register with the local registry office. Importantly, double registration was
required, as both tenants and landlords were obliged to submit information.
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border region, Czech employment growth from 1990 to 1992, ȟܥ௝, against the municipality's
distance to the closest border crossing, Z୨, where we weight municipalities according to their
employment in 1990. The figure shows that municipalities next to the border received the
largest inflow of Czech workers, corresponding on average to almost 10% of employment in
1990. In contrast, municipalities located more than 50 kilometers away from the border
experienced hardly any inflow. We exploit this spatial variation for identification by using
distance to border as an instrumental variable (IV).
We report the corresponding regression results (the first stage) in Table 3, where we
approximate the relationship between the inflow of Czech nationals and distance to border as a
quadratic function. The coefficients on distance and on distance squared are jointly highly
significant, and together explain 38.7% of the variation in the Czech employment share across
municipalities within the eligible border region, or 54.4% of the variation across border and
matched inland municipalities (see below). The rank condition is thus satisfied. The exclusion
restriction requires that distance to the border affects group-specific labor market outcomes
only through its relation to the inflow of Czech commuters. This assumption may be violated if
areas closer to the border experience different economic trends, or if the causal effect of Czech
commuters on heavily exposed areas lead to spatial spillover to adjacent areas. Below we
address both, by estimating placebo tests in pre-experiment periods, by directly estimating the
magnitude of spillovers between adjacent areas, and by comparing our baseline results to other
specifications that rely on a different source of variation.
5.4.3 Selecting Control Units
From the previous section it follows that we can estimate equations (17) and (18) in
three different ways. First, by comparing the region that was eligible under the commuting
policy against suitable control areas that were similar in observable characteristics, but not
eligible. We describe below how such areas can be selected. Second, by exploiting only
(instrumented) variation in the exposure to Czech inflows across municipalities within the
affected border region. Third, we can combine the two approaches, pooling municipalities
within the border region with inland areas that were not exposed. We choose this last approach
as it exploits the available variation more thoroughly, leading to more precise estimates and
allowing us to analyze the response among natives in more details.
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However, as a robustness test we also report separate results based on the first and
second approach. Using only variation across areas within the border region has the advantage
that those areas are very similar in terms of spatial location, education, age, and industry
composition, and are thus likely to experience similar economic time trends. However, areas
that are less affected by immigration may nevertheless be subject to spillover effects from
areas that are more affected, thus contaminating counterfactual observations. For instance, if
natives from areas close to the border search for jobs in adjacent areas in response to the labor
supply shock we may overstate the employment response to migration. We assess the
importance of such “spillovers” directly below and find that they are small. Alternatively, the
problem can be addressed by comparing the inner border region with a set of control areas
from the inland, which are located sufficiently far away from the German-Czech border. These
areas are not affected by spillover or general equilibrium effects, as the regional supply shock
was small in national terms. We implement such comparison also by using a synthetic cohort
method, following Abadie et al. (2010). We find that all three approaches lead to very similar
results.
For the matching of inland control units we consider only West-German districts of
similar urban density (rural areas or areas with intermediate agglomerations). We also exclude
districts that are within eighty kilometers from the former inner-German border, to avoid
contamination from German reunification. We match then on variance-weighted differences in
the employment share of three education groups, the employment share of foreign nationals,
mean log wages, the share of right-censored wage observations, local employment levels, and
the employment shares of four age groups in June 1989 (the last observation before
reunification and the fall of the iron curtain). To account for differences in the size of districts
we match, for each treated district, one or multiple control unit(s), until their employment
levels sum to at least proportion x of employment in the treated unit. The choice of x is subject
to a trade-off between bias and precision; choosing a higher value results in the matching of
more but potentially less suitable control areas. We choose ݔ = 1.5 in our baseline. To ensure
that our findings are not driven by the particular choice of control units we repeated our
analysis for alternative sets of match characteristics and other values of x.
Figure 1 shows the 24 matched inland districts. In the three columns of Table 1 we
compare border districts, all other areas, and matched inland districts in terms of observable
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characteristics in June 1989. Compared to all other inland districts, border districts have a
somewhat less educated and younger workforce. Median wages are considerably lower in the
border region (about 15%), as is the share of foreign nationals. As expected, matched inland
districts are more similar to border districts, including in their industry structure. 22
Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that matched control areas tend to be likewise located along
Germany’s borders, reflecting the observation that remote and border areas tend to be
characterized by lower economic activity, smaller firms, and lower wages.
5.4.4 Timing and Placebo Tests
At this stage it is unclear over what time period the dependent variable should be
observed, as our model – as is the case for most theoretical work in the literature – does not
provide implications about the precise timing of evens. The choice of period in empirical work
is instead often predetermined by data constraints (e.g. 5 or 10 year time intervals), or the
dependent variable is simply defined over the same period as the immigrant inflow. However,
the response of wages and employment to immigration-induced supply shocks may not be
instantaneous, and very little is known about its respective evolution over time.
We adapt instead a flexible specification that allows us to assess the timing of events.
Our regressor ߂ܥ௝ is always defined as the inflow of Czech workers between 1990 and 1992
into area ݆ as a share of local employment, but we specify the dependent variable over different
time windows. In particular we obtain coefficients from annual regressions – regressing wage
or employment changes between the years t and t-1 on ߂ܥ௝. We weight each regression by the
employment of (sub)group gs in area j in year t-1. To obtain the overall impact of the labor
supply shock over longer periods we then add up the respective coefficient estimates.
As a placebo test, we estimate equations (17) and (18) also for years before 1990.
Obviously, the inflow of Czech nationals into an area between 1990 and 1992 should have no
impact on native employment changes prior to 1990. Hence, the hypothess ܪ଴:ߚ௚௦ = 0 and
ܪ଴:ߜ௚௦ = 0 for ݐ ൑ ͳͻͻͲ provide us with interesting falsification or placebo tests, against
which we can test the identifying assumption that areas that are located close to the border
22 The exception is the glass and ceramic industry, which for historical reasons is heavily
concentrated in the border region.
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experienced the same time trends prior to 1990 as areas located further away.23 Coefficients for
ݐ > 1990, in contrast, identify the causal impact of immigration, and are informative about
how fast employment and wages respond to the inflow of Czech workers.
Running yearly instead of “long” difference regressions also allows us to address
potential selectivity bias in wage estimates. Empirical studies typically compare the average
wage of all workers employed in a given area and time period to the average wage of all
workers who are employed in another period. However, as pointed out by Bratsberg et al.
(2012), such estimates of the wage effect can be severely affected by worker selection, i.e., by
high or low ability workers selectively moving into and out of the area (or the labor market) in
response to migration. To address this issue we assess wage effects only for those “incumbent”
workers who were employed in the same area in both t and t-1.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Main Results
Figures 4a and 4b show the cumulative effect of the inflow of Czech commuters on the
overall employment and wages of native workers over the period between 1985 and 1995. The
figures are based on the estimation of equations (17) and (18), where we regress the change in
native wages or employment between two consecutive years on the inflow of Czech workers
between 1990 and 1992, instrumented by the area’s distance to the border.24 We then plot the
cumulative effects, starting in 1990, by adding up estimated coefficients backwards and
forwards.25 Thus, the figures represent the cumulative wage (or employment) effects of an
inflow of Czech workers between 1990 and 1992 for each year between 1985 and 1995.
As we should expect the Czech inflows between 1990 and 1992 to affect neither wages
nor employment in the years before 1990, the figure entries before that date serve as a placebo
or “falsification tests” for the comparability of our treatment and control areas. The estimated
23 Falsification tests have been used in various literatures, see Abadie et al. (2010). Within the
migration literature, Angrist and Krueger (1999) perform such test to show that the estimated effect of
the famous Mariel Boatlift on the Miami labor market is sensitive to differences in trend between
treatment and control units.
24 We pool municipalities from the border and inland regions and weight by the number of native
workers employed in that particular municipality (see Section 4). We instrument the inflow of Czech
nationals with an indicator variable equal to 1 if the area is part of the border region (and 0 if it belongs
to the inland), and add an interaction of this indicator variable with distance to border crossings and
distance to border crossings squared. The inflow of Czech immigrants to inland areas is basically zero.
25 Standard errors are computed by the bootstrap method and take the covariance of year-specific
coefficient estimates into account.
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coefficients are indeed small and statistically not significant. The employment coefficients are
clustered closely around zero, illustrating that native employment grew by a very similar
magnitude in treatment and control areas. The wage development was slightly more positive in
areas close to the border. Below we also present results that control for such differences in pre-
treatment trajectories.26
After 1990, however, the figures show that wages and in particular employment of
native workers drop significantly. For instance, Figures 4a and 4b suggest that by June 1992, a
one percent inflow of Czech workers has lead to a wage decrease of natives in the border
region by about 0.12 percent, and a decrease in employment by about 0.6 percent (relative to
1990). Given that the average share of Czech workers in the affected border region in 1992 is
about three percent (see Figure 2), average wages have decreased by about 0.36 percent in the
region (3*0.12), and native employment by about 1.8 percent (0.6*3). The average share of
Czech workers is about ten percent in municipalities closest to the border, in which average
wages and employment decreased thus by 1.2 and 6 percent, respectively.
While the average wage effect is relatively modest, the employment effect is quite
substantial. Below we investigate in more detail the composition of this effect, across groups
of workers and different margins of adjustment. Here we would like to note that average wage
effects – within the simple model we have pointed out above – imply that the supply of capital
is not fully elastic in the short run.
Figures 4a and 5b further suggest that the growing number of Czech commuters, which
reached its peak level in mid-1992, continued to have adverse effects and depressed native
wage and employment growth until mid-1993. In Table 4, we provide cumulative estimates
within this time period that are broken down by skill group. In row (i) we present the effect on
wage growth between 1990 and 1991 of an inflow of Czech workers for the same period.
Rows (ii) and (iii) present estimates for the cumulative effect on wage growth between 1990
and 1992 or 1993 of an inflow of Czech workers between 1990 and 1992. Finally, row (iv)
presents the same specification as row (iii), but reports the OLS coefficient instead. Note that
the skill group-specific specifications in Panels B and C only differ in the dependent variables,
but the regressor is always the overall inflow of Czech workers between 1990 and 1992
26 Note that we selected control units based on the level of wages and employment in 1989, not
on their pre-treatment trajectories. The finding that those trajectories are nevertheless similar in
treatment and control areas is thus important.
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(except for row (i), where it is the inflow between 1990 and 1991). The estimates correspond
therefore to the expression in equation (10), and measure the overall impact of Czech workers
on wage or employment growth of native workers in the respective skill group. In the last
column, we report the labor supply elasticities, which we obtain by dividing the coefficient
estimates in the second column by estimates in the third column.
Results in Panel A suggest that the inflow of Czech workers had a sizeable and rapid
impact on both wages and employment of native workers. The wage effect has been quite
immediate and relatively constant, while native employment responds also in 1991, but more
than doubles until 1993. The comparatively slower response in employment leads to an
increase in the estimated labor supply elasticities, from 2.6 to nearly 7 between 1991 and 1993.
These results illustrate that the degree to which the effect of a local supply shock is felt in
either wages or employment depends crucially on the time frame under consideration. While
wages respond more quickly, we find that the immigration-induced supply shock has also
immediate effects on native employment, which has important implications for studies that
examine the wage effects of immigration.27 We explore the mechanisms that permit such rapid
adjustments of aggregate employment below.
Inspection of Panels B and C shows that the response of unskilled workers to the inflow
of Czech commuters has been larger than the response of skilled workers, both in terms of
wage and employment responses. For instance, and considering the overall impact over the
period between 1990 and 1993, a one percent point increase in Czech workers has decreased
wages and employment for unskilled natives by 0.2 and 1.4 percent, while it has decreased
wages and employment of skilled natives by 0.1 and 0.5 percent, respectively. Given that some
areas experienced an inflow of Czech workers corresponding to 10 or more of percent local
employment, in particular the employment effects are substantial. The stronger decline of
wages and employment among unskilled natives is expected from our theoretical model, as
Czech commuters were mostly unskilled (see Table 2). However, our results suggest that the
supply shock had adverse effects in both native skill groups. This is important, as parts of the
literature consider only distributionary effects between skill groups, assuming that the overall
effect of immigration on native outcomes is zero. Rows (iv) reports estimates when we do not
27 For example, Borjas (1999) notes that wage changes in isolation are informative about
structural parameters only if measured before responses in native employment occur. Our results suggest
that the observation of wage changes are unlikely to suffice even if measured right after an immigrant-
induced supply shock occurs, since native employment responds too rapidly.
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instrument the share of Czech workers by distance to the border, using the specifications in
row (iii). The Table entries show that the estimated wage- and employment effects are
substantially smaller than the IV estimates, which is to be expected if Czech workers entered
predominantly those municipalities that experienced higher wage growth. Interestingly, the
difference between OLS and IV estimates is more striking among the skilled, suggesting that
selection is a larger problem for skilled than for unskilled workers.
Panels B and C show that not only the magnitude, but also the speed by which skilled
and unskilled natives are affected differs strongly. The employment response among unskilled
natives is nearly immediate, while it evolves more gradually among the skilled. As a
consequence, the estimated labor supply elasticity is nearly constant among unskilled but
increases for skilled natives.
5.5.2 Robustness Checks
In Table 5, we provide different sets of robustness checks. The first column in the Table
reports, as a reference point, the estimates from row (iii) in Table 4. In column 2, we report
trend-adjusted estimates, where we identify the municipality-specific trend in wage growth in
each municipality from information for the years 1987-1989. Estimates are quite similar as
those we report in column 1. In column 3 we report long differences. These estimates are
obtained by regressing wage or employment differences between 1990 and 1993 on the inflow
of Czech workers between 1990 and 1992, but (log) wages are averaged over all workers who
are in employment in each those two years. Note that this is what is usually done in studies that
are based on (repeated) cross-sectional data. It differs from our estimates in the other columns,
where we add up yearly wage effects that are averaged only for those workers who remain
employed in two consecutive years. The key difference is that long difference estimation does
not consider that the composition of the workforce may change as a result of immigration.
Given the magnitude of our employment effects, this is likely to induce some serious selection.
As it is lower productivity workers who are most likely to be affected by immigration, this will
lead to a bias towards zero in the wage effects.
Estimates of employment effects are hardly affected and very similar to those in the first
column. This illustrates that for employment effects, our strategy to aggregate year-specific
regression coefficients, while more flexible, does not lead to distortions in comparison to the
CHAPTER 5. THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON LOCAL LABOR MARKETS
153
direct estimation of long differences. However, the way wages are measured is very important.
Based on long difference estimations, the results point at no overall wage effects of the inflow
of Czech workers. The group-specific estimates for skilled and unskilled workers are still
negative but smaller in magnitude than in our baseline, more so for the unskilled. These results
are due to compositional changes within and between skill groups; within each skill group,
workers with low wages are more likely to leave or to not enter the workforce in response to
migration. A simple comparison of average wages before and after the migration-induced
supply shock thus underestimates the wage effect on the remaining workers. Since the loss of
native employment is larger among the unskilled, who tend to have lower wages, the overall
wage estimates are more biased than the skill-specific wage effects.
Thus, comparison of results in column 1 and column 3 suggest that, if immigration leads
to selective employment effects – as is expected from a theoretical model as described in
Section 2 – estimation based on repeated cross sections that are some years apart may not be
able to pick up wage effects. Based on the estimates in column 5 only, we would probably
have wrongly concluded that overall wage effects are close to zero, and skill-group specific
wage effects are very small and not precisely estimated.
In columns 4 and 5 we use alternative sets of control units in the regressions. In column
4 we compare only the highly affected Eastern (“inner”) part of the border region, which due
to its shorter distance to the border received the vast majority of Czech inflows, to unaffected
areas from the inland.28 In column 5 we compare only differentially exposed areas within the
border region, dropping all control areas from the inland. As discussed in Section 4.3, these
different set of controls have distinctive advantages and disadvantages. The results are
nevertheless very similar to our baseline estimates in both cases, which is re-assuring.
Finally, we follow an alternative estimation strategy that exploits the commuting policy
directly and does not make use of the variation in exposure across areas that was due to their
different distance to the Czech-German border. We apply the synthetic control method
proposed by Abadie et al. (2010), which compares a single treatment to a weighted average of
available control units. We define our treatment unit as the heavily exposed inner border
region, and construct a comparison unit from the matched inland districts according to the
28 We split municipalities within the border region according to their fitted values from the first
stage regression. The inner border region is comprised of 145 municipalities in which the predicted
inflow of Czech was above the median, averaging to about 5.8 percent of total employment.
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following procedure. First, we define the pre-intervention period as the years 1983 to 1990.
Second, we define a vector ࢄ૚ of pre-intervention characteristics for the exposed region that
consists of the value of the outcome variable 1985 to 1989 and the average over the entire pre-
intervention periods of employment growth, wage growth, the share of unskilled, the foreign
share, and the share of four age groups. Similarly, define ࢄ૙ to be a matrix that contains the
same variables for the unaffected areas. Third, a weighting vectorࢃכ is chosen to minimize
the distance צ ࢄ૚ െ ࢄ૙ࢃ צࢂ = ඥ(ࢄ૚ െ ࢄ૙ࢃ)ᇱࢂ(ࢄ૚ െ ࢄ૙ࢃ) , where ࢂ is chosen among
positive definite and diagonal matrices such that the mean squared prediction error of the
outcome variable is minimized for the pre-intervention periods. 29 The synthetic control
method thus sets both a weight for each predictor (via ࢂ); and a weight for each available
control district (viaࢃ).
As in our main analysis we consider the percentage growth in native employment and
the difference in log mean wages of native incumbents as main outcomes, and consider
accumulative growth, relative to the final pre-treatment year 1990. Figures 5a and 5b compares
the evolution of aggregate native employment and wages in the treatment and synthetic control
units. Pre-treatment trends are more similar than in our baseline specification since the choice
of control units is now directly dependent on those trends. Native wages and employment in
the treatment unit decrease substantially between 1990 and 1993 in comparison to the synthetic
control. For comparison to our baseline specification, those differences in employment growth
(-0.057 by 1993) and wages (-0.008) need to be scaled by the share of Czech workers that
entered the treatment region (5.8 percent). The results, -0.057/0.058=-0.978 for employment
and –0.008/0.058=-0.136 for wages are very close to our baseline coefficients. Differences
between skill groups are likewise reproduced, with substantially larger employment and wage
responses among unskilled natives.
5.5.3 Age-Group specific Responses
As we explain in Section 2, within the same skill group, overall labor supply elasticities
may be large even if some workers do not react at all to a change in wages, as long as other
29 See Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003, Appendix B. For implementation we use the software
package “Synth”, which is provided by Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller at
http://www.stanford.edu/~jhain/synthpage.html.
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workers react strongly. The presence of highly elastic subgroups within the same skill groups
“shields” other workers from a labor supply shock.
To investigate this further, we consider one individual characteristic that may relate to
the elasticity of labor supply, which is age. Different age groups may react quite differently to
a supply shock-induced change in wages, due to differences in their outside options, which
generates different labor supply elasticities. More particularly, older workers may have more
opportunities to withdraw from the labor market, for instance through early retirement, or by
using an unemployment or disability spell to bridge the time to retirement.30 On the other hand,
such withdrawal may be much more costly for young workers, or workers at the peak of their
career, who may not only lose earnings opportunities, but also experience a damaging loss of
human capital.
In Table 7 we report results by age groups. Panel A reports estimates for all workers,
while Panels B and C report results for unskilled and skilled workers. The first three columns
report estimates where we do not adjust for pre-trends, while the last three columns report
trend-adjusted estimates.
The estimates in Panel A suggest that the wage responses are largest for young and
small for older workers, consistent with the hypothesis that workers of different age groups are
imperfect substitutes and the relative density of Czech workers across age groups (Table 2).
However, employment responses are largest for native workers in the oldest age group, even
though only few Czech workers entered employment in the border region. Focusing on the
trend adjusted results in the second set of columns, an immigration-induced labor supply shock
by 3 percent as a share of total employment decreases employment among older workers by
about 4.5 percentage points. In contrast, the employment response among younger workers,
whose wages were substantially stronger affected, is less than half as large.
These results suggest that the elasticity of employment with response to wage changes
varies substantially with age. We allowed for this possibility in our theoretical model in
Section 2, and explained that such heterogeneity has important implications for the skill-cell
approach in the immigration literature. The approach assumes that employment responses are
proportional to wage responses across finely defined skill groups, such that differences in the
30 Regulations with regard to early retirement and the prolonged provision of unemployment
benefits were comparatively generous in Germany in the early 1990s. For example, the so-called “58er-
Regelung” permitted workers who were at least 58 years old to leave the labor force while continuing to
receive unemployment benefits until retirement.
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density of immigrants across those groups can be used for identification. Our findings show
that this assumption may not always hold, as native responses can be largest in groups that
receive a comparatively small share of immigrants.
Inspection of the labor supply elasticities shows a clear pattern, where elasticities are
largest for the oldest age group (columns 4 and 7). These differences are also statistically
significant: the final two rows in each panel shows test statistics for the hypothesis that the
elasticity of older workers is greater than elasticity in the youngest age group, presenting the
share of bootstrap samples (clustered on municipality level) for which this is the case.
Distinguishing workers by skill group leads to a similar pattern for skilled workers,
while employment responses for the unskilled seem to be more uniform across the different
age groups. Skill matters particularly for young workers – across all skill-age groups, the
employment response was strongest among young unskilled, and particularly weak among
young skilled workers. Estimates of the elasticity of native employment with respect to wage
changes differ substantially with age also within skill groups.
5.5.4 Outflows versus Inflows
As discussed in Section 2.3, the total change in employment that we report consists of
two key components: workers who leave employment in a particular area (“outflows”), and
workers who do not enter employment, but who would have done so in the absence of a labor
supply shock (“inflows”). These two movements together determine the employment effects
that are usually estimated in the literature. Outflows and Inflows can then be further
decomposed into outflows (inflows) into (out of) non-employment, and outflows (inflows) into
(out of) other areas. The relative magnitudes of these different sources of aggregate
employment changes are important to better understand the effects immigration-induced labor
supply shocks have on the native workforce, and to gain further insight into the nature of
variation in labor supply elasticities that we have discussed.
So far however very little is known about these underlying dynamics. We are in the
fortunate position, due to the unique data that we are able to draw on that follows individual
workers over time, and the nature of our underlying experiment, to assess the magnitude of
these different channels of adjustment.
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Figure 5 provides a first illustration. The figure decomposes the overall (accumulated)
change in native labor supply into responses due to changes in inflows (panel A) and outflows
(panel B). Other than Figure 4, the graphs do not represent cumulative but yearly responses,
which are estimated based on the same regressions than those used in Figure 4.31 An unusually
high share of workers disappear from social security records in 1988 in various areas within
the border region, many of whom reappear in 1989. A detailed analysis of these outliers
suggests that the disappearance was likely triggered by a large military maneuver that took
place in those areas at the time.32
The figures indicate that overall yearly employment effects are mainly driven by a
reduction in the inflow of new entrants in affected areas in the border region, and to a far lesser
extent by an increase in outflows. Furthermore, while the inflow response is almost immediate,
the outflow response is slightly delayed. This is not unexpected, as decisions not to enter a
particular labor market are likely to be more responsive to local wage changes than decisions
to leave that market. The immediate response of inflows can in turn explain why we find
native employment levels to respond so rapidly to local shocks.
As we discuss earlier, inflows in and outflows out of employment can in turn consist of
movements out of (and into) other regional labor markets, and movements out of (into)
employment. Spatial movements are the reason why some have been critical about the area
approach to identify the impact of immigration on wages (Borjas et al. 1996, Borjas et al.
1997) – as such movements dissipate its impact across areas, biasing the estimated effect
towards zero. However, others have suggested that there is little evidence for spatial
movements as a response to labor supply shocks (Card and DiNardo 2000, Card 2007). To
investigate this in more detail, we cut our employment effects along various dimensions,
distinguishing between movements from and to other areas, and movements from and to
employment.
31 Inflows in group g are defined as ܮ௝,௚௧ூ /ܮ௝,௚௧ே , where ܮ௝,௚௧ூ is the number of native workers who
are employed in municipality j in year t, but who were not employed in this municipality in the previous
year. The definition of outflows is accordingly.
32 About 3000 members of the armed forces and many workers in potentially related
establishments disappear temporarily in 1988. This observation is likely related to the annual “Return of
forces to Germany” series of NATO military exercises, which took place in the Bavarian border region
in this year. “REFORGER 88: Certain Challenge” was the largest European ground maneuver since the
end of World War II (125,000 troops were deployed; see The Stars and Stripes (1988), Vol. 47, No.
147).
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In Table 7, we report these decompositions for overall employment effects (Panel A),
and separately by skill (Panel B) and age groups (Panel C). As in such fine categories the pre-
treatment trends tend to differ across areas we report estimates that control for those
differences using data from the years 1989 and 1990. As such, the overall employment
estimates reported in the first column differ slightly from those reported in Tables 4 and 6.
Entries in columns 2 and 3 are decompositions into geographic movements from and to
employment in other areas, and movements from and to non-employment.33 In column 4 we
widen our definition of geographic movements by tracking individuals over longer time
periods, counting also those individuals who come from (leave into) non-employment as
geographic movers who, within a 3-year window, were employed in a different area before
(after) their non-employment spell. Within that broader definition of geographic movements
we distinguish between those who moved only short distances (into or from a different
municipality within the same district) and those who moved further away. We report estimates
of the immigration-induced supply shock on the latter category in column 5. Finally, in column
6 we report estimates on the response in population levels. 34 Population counts across
municipalities and years come from the Federal Statistical Office in Germany, and constitute
an alternative data source to assess the magnitude of geographic movements that occur in
response to the inflow of Czech commuters. However, these counts are not separated by age or
education.
The figures in columns 2 and 3 show that both channels, movements from and to
employment in other areas, and movements from and to non-employment within the affected
area, are important in explaining the overall employment effect. However, movements from
and to non-employment are far more relevant in terms of magnitude than movements across
area. Focusing on the overall impact on employment, numbers in Panel A suggest that, while
an increase in the share of Czech workers between 1990 and 1993 by 1 percent decreases
employment by native workers by nearly as much overall, about 17 percent of this adjustment
33 Geographic inflows from employment in other areas in group g are defined as ܮ௝,௚௧ூ,ா /ܮ௝,௚௧ே ,
where ܮ௝,௚௧ூ,ா is the number of native workers employed in municipality j in year t who were employed in
another municipality in the previous year. Inflows from non-employment are defined as ܮ௝,௚௧ூ,ோ/ܮ௝,௚௧ே ,
where ܮ௝,௚௧ூ,ோ is the number of native workers employed in municipality j in year t who were not
employed in the previous year. Our data allow us to further distinguish between those individuals who
were registered as unemployed from those who were not; corresponding estimates are available upon
request. The definition of outflows is accordingly.
34 The dependent variable in population regressions is the percentage growth in population levels
between year t and the previous year.
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is due to workers either not entering the respective local labor market, or moving out of that
labor market, while the remaining 83 percent are due to movements into and out of
employment. Column 4 shows that while the relative importance of geographic movements
increases when its definition includes movements through non-employment, the coefficient
estimates are still far lower than those on movement into and out of non-employment within a
local area. Column 5 suggests that about half of the employment reduction through spatial
movements is due to changes in the number of movements over long distances.
Finally, the estimate in column 6 suggests that a 1 percent increase in the share of Czech
commuters – who do not live in the affected German border region – decreases local
population levels by 0.3 percent. This coefficient is close to the estimated geographic
displacement of native workers that we estimated based on the tracking of individual workers
in the social security data, reported in column 4. While the two coefficients do not have to
match – workers who leave or do not enter exposed areas in response to Czech inflows may
have more or less dependents than the average native workers – it is nevertheless reassuring
that the evidence from a second, independent data source is consistent with estimates from our
more evolved analysis of the social security data.
When splitting up these decompositions by skill groups (Panel B), the numbers show
that for unskilled workers, almost the entire employment effect is due to movements into and
out of employment within the local labor market, while for the skilled, geographic mobility
plays a more important role: For these workers, almost 25 percent of the overall employment
response is due to movements across areas.35 This suggests that different skill groups adopt
different responses to labor supply shocks, with the effect of immigration on skilled workers
being more quickly dispersed across areas than the effect on unskilled workers.
In panel C, we distinguish between different age groups instead. Again, the first column
reports the overall employment effects. The largest employment response is by individuals in
the oldest age group, almost all of which is due to movements into and out of employment. In
stark contrast, young workers (those below the age of 30) react far more strongly through
changes in geographical movements, while workers in the age range between 30 and 49 have
an intermediate position in this respect. These findings point at different underlying
35 These findings are consistent with the general mobility patterns across skill groups. While only
about 3.5 percent of all unskilled workers switch from employment in one to another municipality
within a year, the share is close to 6.5 percent for skilled workers.
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mechanisms for overall employment responses of workers in different age- and skill groups to
local labor supply shocks. While the unskilled and older workers absorb such shocks almost
entirely by changes in movements into and out of employment within those areas that are
affected by labor supply shocks, skilled and younger workers respond also by adjusting their
movements across areas. Note however that the overall employment response of these latter
groups is far smaller, which explains that overall – and as reported in Panel A – the response to
local labor supply shocks by movements across areas is far less important than by movements
from and to employment.
In Table 8, we break the different responses down further. The structure of the Table is
the same than Table 7, with Panel A reporting the employment effects for the overall
population, while Panels B and C distinguish by skill- and age groups. However, other than in
the previous Table, we now decompose the total employment effect into inflows and outflows
(column 1 and 2; these are the cumulated yearly effects between 1990 and 1993 that are
displayed in Figure 6a and 6b). We then further decompose inflows and outflows into
movements from (to) non-employment, and movements from (to) other areas (columns 3-6 and
5-8).
As suggested by Figure 5, the numbers in the first two columns in Panel A show that
overall, inflows are far more important to explain the total employment response than
outflows, a finding that stands in stark contrast to the way employment responses to
immigration are commonly interpreted. Furthermore, columns 3 and 4 suggest that such
inflows are mainly driven by a reduction of inflows from non-employment (73 percent of the
overall effect), with the reminder driven by a reduction in inflows from other labor markets.
Column 5 shows this finding to be robust to a widened definition of geographic inflows,
counting also those individuals who come from non-employment but were previously
employed in a different area (within a 3-year window). Column 6 shows that about half of the
reduction in geographic inflows is due to a reduction of short-range movements, between
municipalities within the same district. Estimates in columns 7 and 8 suggest further that the
increase in outflows is mainly driven by increased outflows into non-employment. Outflows of
native workers into employment in other areas are not found to increase in response to Czech
inflows.
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This suggests that total employment responses to the immigration-induced supply shock
are mainly driven by non-employed natives not entering employment in the affected area,
although they would have done so in the absence of immigration. In addition, some workers
who would have switched from other areas into the local labor market in the absence of
immigration refrain from doing so. The share of native workers exiting into non-employment –
the common interpretation of immigration-induced employment responses of native workers –
is relatively small in magnitude. The results suggest further that spatial spillovers and in
particular spillovers to neighboring areas (which in our setting would be particularly
problematic), are modest, at least in the short run.
We have shown above that labor supply elasticities differ for workers in different skill-
and age groups, and we note in Section 2 that the intensity of responses into and out of non-
employment, and across areas will differ according to opportunity costs. These costs are in
turn likely to differ across age- and skill groups, which may lead to different responses in
inflows and outflows across the different groups. To investigate this further, we perform the
de-composition in Panel A by skill (Panel B) and age groups (Panel C).
For unskilled workers, the overall employment response is large, as we discuss above,
and nearly entirely driven by decreased inflows. Columns 3-6 show that this decrease is mainly
driven by a reduction in inflows from non-employment. For skilled workers, the same pattern
hold, but a reduction of inflows from other areas as well as increase of outflows into non-
employment are likewise important, although smaller in magnitude. Geographic inflows are
reduced mainly because fewer workers from far-away areas enter employment in exposed
areas. In contrast, for unskilled workers, the reduction in geographic inflows is nearly entirely
due to decreased inflows from nearby areas.
Interestingly, we find not only geographic inflows but also outflows of native workers to
decrease in response to the entering of Czech workers. The likely reason is their particular
distribution – areas along the border receive a particularly high share of Czech commuters, but
as their surroundings are likewise in close distance to the border, they tend to also receive high
shares. Geographic mobility over short range thus becomes unattractive for natives, in
particular unskilled workers, whose movements are far more local than for skilled workers.
This finding illustrates that the channels via which aggregate employment adjusts may depend
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on the spatial distribution of the immigration-induced labor supply shock, and are therefore
likely to differ across studies.
When we distinguish by different age classes, a distinct pattern evolves, where the
employment effect of middle-aged workers is mainly driven by a reduction of inflows from
non-employment, while outflows into non-employment are small and insignificant. On the
other hand, while effects for older and younger workers are still mainly driven by a reduction
in inflows, increase of outflows into non-employment are also important, in particular in the
older age group. Thus, we find that the employment response to Czech inflows differs across
age groups not only in magnitude, but also in the channels via which the aggregate level
adjusts.
5.6 Discussion and Conclusions
A large literature examines the impact of immigration-induced labor supply shocks on
native workers’ labor market outcomes. However, there is little agreement on the degree to
which these have adverse effects on employment and wages of natives. This lack of consensus
is partly due to methodological difficulties that plague this literature – immigrants self-select
into areas, responses of natives may be selective, and may dissipate their effect through the
economy, and those responses are difficult to distinguish from other sources for area- or skill-
specific trends.
In this paper we revisit this issue. We develop a methodological framework that allows
responses of native workers to depend on group specific labor supply elasticities – an
extension that we confirm to be important for the interpretation of estimates. We base our
analysis on a uniquely suited natural experiment in Germany and the availability of detailed,
population-wide panel data on individual workers, where in the aftermath of the fall of the iron
curtain the German border region with the Czech Republic experienced an unexpected,
sudden, and large inflow of Czech workers during the early 1990s. This supply shock had a
distinctive and, for our purposes, useful feature – Czech workers were required to commute
daily from their residence in the Czech Republic. This not only constitutes a unique
experiment creating a pure labor supply shock, but it also allows us to use distance to border as
additional exogenous variation for the magnitude of the labor supply shock affecting the
eligible border areas.
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Studying the short-run response, we document a modest but rapid decline in wages, and
a large decline in the employment of native workers. The observed response supports one of
the core hypothesis held by the literature: as of imperfect substitutability, the negative effect of
immigration falls most strongly on those workers whose qualifications become relatively more
abundant. In our setting, the inflow of predominantly unskilled Czech workers led to
particularly negative responses in employment and wages for unskilled native workers.
However, our findings are in stark contrast to other assumptions that are standard in the
literature. First, we find both skilled and unskilled workers to be negatively affected – in
contrast to the strand of literature that assume immigration to have (or that can identify) only
distributionary, but no average effects. More importantly, we find that the notion of imperfect
substitutability, while useful, does not suffice to explain the distributionary effect of
immigration. In particular, we find the decline in employment to be strongest among older
native workers, even though only few Czech commuters enter that age group.
Within our theoretical model, we can explain that finding by variation in workers’
responsiveness to wage changes, that is, heterogeneity in the elasticity of labor supply across
groups. This innovation, while consistent with evidence from other literatures, overturns
standard assumptions on the distribution of the wage effect of immigration – with potentially
severe implications, as these assumptions are directly used for the identification in one of the
two dominant strands of the literature, the “skill cell” approach. Our results suggest that while
differences in immigrant density across education groups can indeed be exploited, extension of
that strategy along other dimensions, such as age or experience, are fragile, as workers are
likely to respond differently to wage changes along those dimensions.
Overall, our results suggest that immigration had a large effect on native labor market
outcomes. However, the results are less dramatic upon closer inspection. First, we focused on
the short run, and the region under consideration is rural and received only few migrants
before the fall of the iron curtain. Such areas may be less able to absorb large immigrant
inflows than, for example, Miami or California. The particularities of the observed supply
shock are also important. The inflow of Czech workers was unexpected, sudden, and of
exceptional magnitude. Such shocks are likely to have far more negative effects than the
gradual and potentially anticipated arrival of a smaller number of migrants. Second, Czech
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workers had to commute, such that their contribution to local consumption was comparatively
small. Indeed, we find that local population levels decreased in response to Czech inflows.
As such, the numbers presented in this study cannot be simply generalized to any type of
immigration-induced supply shock. Instead, our estimates reflect the result from an atypical,
but highly informative experiment – an experiment that in our view provides a more direct test
of the core theoretical models in the literature than previous empirical work. Theoretical work
almost always considers sudden, unexpected supply shocks that occur in isolation – ignoring
the fact that immigrants may also shift local demand. Our “pure” supply shock comes closer to
that stylized thought experiment than other natural experiments that have been studied in the
literature. Our results suggest that such shock can indeed have substantially negative, both
absolute and distributionary, effects on native workers. This result may come as a relief to
those who argue that standard theories of factor demand are simply not consistent with studies
that find immigration to have no negative effects on natives even in the short run.
Our findings may thus help to reconcile some of the existing arguments and strands in
the literature. However, the availability of population-wide of our data allows us also to extend
the literature in various new directions, and to study aspects of the adjustment process in local
labor markets about which only little is known – the mechanisms via which the level of
employment adjusts, the timing of those processes, and the degree to which they matter for
different groups of workers.
First, we find the decline in native employment to be predominantly explained by
movements from and to non-employment, while geographic movements across areas are far
less important. The relative importance of the two channels varies with education and age,
with young or skilled natives being more geographically mobile than older and unskilled
workers.
Second, we decompose the overall employment effect further into changes in inflows –
native workers who enter local employment – and changes in outflows of existing workers.
Our findings suggest that inflows explain a far greater share of the total employment response
than outflows, in stark contrast to the way employment responses to immigration are
commonly interpreted. Inflows respond also more rapidly than outflows, which may explain
why employment can adjust so rapidly – the adverse effect on native employment achieves full
strength only one year after the inflow of Czech workers reached its peak Finally, we find the
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relative importance of the various inflow and outflow channels to differ in distinct and
predictive ways with age and skill.
These findings are interesting not only for the immigration literature, but more
generally, as they shed light on the channels via which labor markets, and native workers,
adjust to local shocks. Our analysis provides a coherent picture of these processes, but more
work is needed to assess their implications. For example, as each process affects different
groups of workers, the welfare implications of immigration may depend crucially on what
channel dominates in the adjustment of employment levels. Moreover, it seems likely that the
importance of some processes depends strongly on the institutional environment, such as
employment protection laws. The ways via which labor markets adjust to immigration, and the
type of workers that are predominantly affected, might then differ across countries.
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Appendix A: Derivation of Equilibrium Wage and Employment
Responses
The equilibrium wage and employment response is determined by the two skill-specific
labor demand curves,
݈݀݋݃ݓ௎ ൌ ɔ݈݀݋݃ܮ + (ߚ െ ͳ)(݈݀݋݃ܮ௎ െ ݈݀݋݃ܮ) (A1)
݈݀݋݃ݓௌ ൌ ɔ݈݀݋݃ܮ + (ߚ െ ͳ)(݈݀݋݃ܮௌ െ ݈݀݋݃ܮ) (A2)
where ݈݀݋݃ܮ = ݏ௎ ൬݈݀݋݃ܮ௎ே + ݀I గೆ಺గೆಿ൰+  ݏு ൬݈݀݋݃ܮௌே + ݀I గೄ಺గೄಿ൰, and
݀logܮ௎ே = ߟ௎݀logݓ௎ (A3)
݀logܮௌே = ߟௌ݀logݓௌ. (A4)
By plugging (A3) and (A4) into (A1) and (A2) we have
݈݀݋݃ݓ௎ ൌ ɔ൫(ݏ௎ߟ௎݈݀݋݃ݓ௎ + ݏௌߟௌ݈݀݋݃ݓௌ) ൅ ȫ݀ܫ൯+(ߚ െ ͳ) ൬ߟ௎݈݀݋݃ݓ௎ െ (ݏ௎ߟ௎݈݀݋݃ݓ௎ + ݏௌߟௌ݈݀݋݃ݓௌ) + ൬గೆ಺గೆಿ െ ȫ൰݀ܫ൰
(A5)
݈݀݋݃ݓௌ ൌ ɔ൫(ݏ௎ߟ௎݈݀݋݃ݓ௎ + ݏௌߟௌ݈݀݋݃ݓௌ)൅ ȫ݀ܫ൯+(ߚ െ ͳ) ൬ߟௌ݈݀݋݃ݓௌ െ (ݏ௎ߟ௎݈݀݋݃ݓ௎ + ݏௌߟௌ݈݀݋݃ݓௌ) + ൬గೄ಺గೄಿ െ ȫ൰݀ܫ൰
(A6)
Solving (A5) and (A6) for ݈݀݋݃ݓ௎ܽ݊݀݈݀݋݃ݓௌ, respectively, we have
݈݀݋݃ݓ௎
= ൫ɔ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)൯ݏௌߟௌ݈݀݋݃ݓௌ + ߮ȫ݀ܫ + (ߚ െ ͳ) ൬గೆ಺గೆಿ െ ȫ൰݀ܫͳ െ ɔݏ௎ߟ௎ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)ݏௌߟ௎ (A7)
݈݀݋݃ݓௌ
= ൫ɔ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)൯ݏ௎ߟ௎݈݀݋݃ݓ௎ + ߮ȫ݀ܫ + (ߚ െ ͳ) ൬గೄ಺గೄಿ െ ȫ൰݀ܫͳ െ ɔݏௌߟௌ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)ݏ௎ߟௌ . (A8)
Plugging (A8) into (A7) and bringing all terms on a common denominator we have
݈݀݋݃ݓ௎
= ൫߮ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)൯ଶݏ௎ݏௌߟ௎ߟௌ݈݀݋݃ݓ௎ + ൫߮ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)൯ݏௌߟௌ ቆ߮ȫ൅ (ߚ െ ͳ) ൬గೄ಺గೄಿ െ ȫ൰ቇ(ͳ െ ߮ݏ௎ߟ௎ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)ݏௌߟ௎)(ͳ െ ɔݏௌߟௌ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)ݏ௎ߟௌ) ݀ܫ
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+(ͳ െ ߮ݏௌߪௌ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)ݏ௎ߟௌ)߮ȫ൅ (ͳ െ ߮ݏௌߟௌ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)ݏ௎ߟௌ)(ߚ െ ͳ) ൬గೆ಺గೆಿ െ ȫ൰(ͳ െ ߮ݏ௎ߟ௎ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)ݏௌߟ௎)(ͳ െ ߮ݏௌߟௌ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)ݏ௎ߟௌ) ݀ܫ.
Solving for ݈݀݋݃ݓ௎ yields
݈݀݋݃ݓ௅
= ൫ɔ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)൯ݏௌߟௌ ቆ߮ȫ ൅ (ߚ െ ͳ) ൬గೄ಺గೄಿ െ ȫ൰ቇ(ͳ െ ߮ݏ௎ߟ௎ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)ݏௌߟ௎)(ͳ െ ߮ݏௌߟௌ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)ݏ௎ߟௌ)െ ൫߮ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)൯ଶݏ௎ݏௌߟ௎ߟௌ ݀ܫ
+ (ͳ െ ߮ݏௌߟௌ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)ݏ௎ߟௌ)߮ȫ൅ (ͳ െ ߮ݏௌߟௌ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)ݏ௎ߟௌ)(ߚ െ ͳ) ൬గೆ಺గೆಿ െ ȫ൰(ͳ െ ߮ݏ௎ߟ௎ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)ݏௌߟ௎)(ͳ െ ߮ݏௌߟௌ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)ݏ௎ߟௌ)െ ൫߮ െ (ߚ െ ͳ)൯ଶݏ௎ݏௌߟ௎ߟௌ ݀ܫ
Simplifying both the numerators and the denominator, and using ߶ = ఝஒିଵെ ͳǡ we find that the
wage response equals
݀logw௎
= (ߚ െ ͳ) ൤గೆ಺గೆಿ (ͳ െ ߮Ʉୗ)െ ȫሺͳ െ ఝஒିଵ)൨1െ (ߚ െ 1)[ߟ௎(1 + ݏ௎߶) + ߟௌ(1 + ݏௌ߶)െ ߟ௎ߟௌ(1 + ߶)(ߚ െ 1)]݀ܫ (A9)
Appendix B: Wage and Employment Responses with Three Skill
Groups
We now extend the model to three skill groups, but impose the restriction that capital is
fully elastic (i.e., ߮ = 0). With three skill groups, labor ܮ is a CES aggregate of low (L),
medium (M), and high (H) skilled labor, such that
ܮ = ቂߠ௅ܮ௅ఉ + ߠெܮெఉ + ߠுܮுఉ ቃభഁ (B1)
As before, we have ݈݀݋݃ܮ௚ = గ೒಺గ೒ಿ ݀ܫ + ߟ௚݀logݓ௚, see equation (4b), while equation (5)
becomes
݈݀݋݃ܮ ൌ ȫ݀ܫ + ݏ௅ߟ௅݈݀݋݃ݓ௅ + ݏெߟெ݈݀݋݃ݓெ + ݏுߟு݈݀݋݃ݓு ,
with ݏ௚ = ఏ೒௅೒ഁቂఏಽ௅ಽഁାఏಾ௅ಾഁ ାఏಹ௅ಹഁ ቃ. Since ɔ ൌ Ͳ, totally differentiating equation (8) yields
݈݀݋݃ݓ௚ = (ߚ െ ͳ)൫݈݀݋݃ܮ௚ െ ݈݀݋݃ܮ൯. (B2)
Plugging in the expressions for ݈݀݋݃ܮ௚ and ݈݀݋݃ܮ, and solving for ݈݀݋݃ݓ௚ we obtain, for
݃ = ܮ,
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݈݀݋݃ݓ௅ = (ߚ െ 1)ቆ(ݏெ(1െ (ߚ െ 1)ߟு) ቀగಽ಺గಽಿ െ గಾ಺గಾಿቁ+ ݏு(1െ (ߚ െ 1)ߟெ) ቀగಽ಺గಽಿ െ గಹ಺గಹಿቁቇ1െ (ߚ െ 1)#1 + (ߚ െ 1)ଶ#2 ݀ܫ
where #1 = ൫(ͳ െ ݏ௅)ߟ௅ + (ͳ െ ݏெ)ߟெ + (ͳ െ ݏு)ߟு൯#2 = ൫(ͳ െ ݏ௅ െ ݏெ)ߟ௅ߟெ + (ͳ െ ݏெ െ ݏு)ߟெߟு + (ͳ െ ݏ௅ െ ݏு)ߟ௅ߟு൯.
The employment response follows from
݈݀݋݃ܮ௅ே = ߟ௅݈݀݋݃ݓ௅
“Perverse” wage effects are possible. Suppose that
ߨ௅ூ
ߨ௅ே
> ߨெூߨெே > ߨுூߨுே
that is, migrant concentration high in skill group L, medium in skill group M, and low in skill
group H. It is nevertheless possible that wages of the medium skilled decline more than wages
of the unskilled (i.e., ݈݀݋݃ݓெ < ݈݀݋݃ݓ௅) if the local labor supply elasticity of the medium
skilled is large relative to that of the unskilled. It is, however, not possible that wages of the
skilled (which must increase if capital is fully flexible) decline relative to wages of the
unskilled (which decline).
Appendix C: The Commuting Policy
Various schemes for legal employment of foreign nationals in Germany were extended
or introduced with effect to January 1st, 1991.36 The provision introduced new nationwide
immigration rules such as the controversial “Werkvertragsregelung”, which granted firms the
right to contract foreign workers for specific work assignments. But it also comprised a locally
constrained scheme that received little public attention: the commuting scheme
“Grenzgängerregelung”, which granted foreign nationals from neighboring countries the right
to work in dependent employment in German border regions. However, it did not grant
residency; Grenzgänger were required to commute daily from their country of origin or to
work for a maximum of two days per week. The policy was otherwise non-restrictive, e.g. it
was not constrained to specific industries or applicants with specific qualifications. Since the
movement of labor was in principal unrestricted within the European Econmic Community
(bilateral agreements already covered tax and other issues on the western borders), this policy
36 See “Anwerbestoppausnahme-Verordnung”, Bundesgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1990, Teil I.
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had consequences only at the eastern German borders to Poland and Czechoslovakia (from
1993 Czech Republic).37 We restrict our analysis to the West-German border region with the
Czech Republic because social security records for the workforce in East Germany are only
fully available from 1992 onwards, and because the East was subject to strong institutional and
economic transitions after reunification. The intended implementation of the policy along the
Czech-German border was first reported in September 1990, only shortly before the scheme
came into effect.38
Figure 1 maps the region that was affected by the scheme, comprising 21 districts that
lie within an approximate eighty kilometers band from the Czech-German border. The initial
provision lists only 18 districts explicitly, and does not include the districts Straubing,
Deggendorf, and Straubing-Bogen. However, these districts were in a similar distance from the
border as other, listed, districts, and experienced a similar inflow of Czech workers. Moreover,
the districts are listed in the revised provision from 1998. We thus consider all 21 districts as
treated. Our results are robust to the exclusion of the three districts in question.
After German reunification in 1990, districts close to the former inner-German border
were also affected by commuters from East Germany. To avoid contamination we thus exclude
all districts located within about eighty kilometres of the inner-German border. This choice is
motivated by external data on regional commuting flows from the late 1990s, which shows that
areas directly adjacent to the inner German border received a high share of commuters;39 and,
from our own data, by the spatial distribution of newly registered workers, which in 1990 and
1991 are substantial higher as East-Germans entered West-German labor markets for the first
time. Thirteen from 21 districts remain, as illustrated in Figure 1. We use the term border
region to refer to the remaining districts. The policy remained in effect throughout the time
37 A summary of the existing commuting schemes within the European Community is given in
IAB (1993), Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung 26/93, “Beschäftigung von
Grenzarbeitnehmern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”.
38 See Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1./2.9.1990. Implementation of the scheme along the Czech-German
border occurred shortly before its general introduction on January 1, 1991 (see Hönekopp, “Ost-West-
Wanderungen: Die neuen Migrationsbewegungen”). A detailed examination of daily employment
records confirms that the inflow of Czech nationals started already in September 1990.
39 See for example Kropp (2010), “Veränderungen der Pendlerverflechtungen in Deutschland
zwischen 1993 und 2008”. In: Troeger-Weiß and Jurczek (Eds.), “Nationale und regionale Mobilität von
Unternehmen und Arbeitnehmern”, and IAB (1992), Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt und
Berufsforschung 25/92, “Ostdeutsche Arbeitskräfte in Westdeutschland”.
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period studied in this paper, with minor changes in subsequent revisions of the legislation.40
The substantial increase of foreign workers in Germany in general and of the Czech
commuters in the border region was perceived to have negative consequences for native
workers. Commentators deplored in particular that Czech and other foreign workers were
employed at wages far below the prevailing wage level for German workers, and that worker
protection laws and rights were circumvented. However, the main political backlash was
directed not against the locally constraint commuting schemes, but against the temporary
employment of foreign workers in German firms under the national “Werkvertragsregelung”
scheme.41
40 See “Anwerbestoppausnahme-Verordnung”, Bundesgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1998, Teil I, §6. The
revision restricted the eligibility of marginally employed and individuals who receive social benefits in
their country of origin.
41 See for example the motion against its abuse by the Social Democratic Party in the German
parliament, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/3299, 23.9.1992.
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Tables and Figures
Table 5.1: Characteristics of Treated, Inland and Matched Control Districts
border all(inland matched(inland
skill
low 0.274 0.229 0.244
medium 0.695 0.703 0.723
high 0.030 0.069 0.034
age
(below(30 0.434 0.351 0.420
(30(to(49 0.410 0.454 0.412
50(and(above 0.157 0.195 0.168
(((female 0.411 0.401 0.414
(((foreign 0.025 0.081 0.035
(((mean(log(wages((censored) 3.881 4.055 3.879
share(censored 0.023 0.048 0.027
number(of(districts 13 329 24
Note: The table compares average characteristics (weighted by employment level) in 1989 in eligible districts
in the border region; all other West-German districts; and matched inland districts (see Figure 1). Low-skilled
workers have no postsecondary education. Medium-skilled workers completed an apprenticeship or a high school
degree (Abitur). High-skilled workers graduated from a university or college (Universita¨t or Fachhochschule).
Longitudinal information used to impute education variable, following Fitzenberger et al. (2006). Remaining
missings (3.9 percent) classified as low skilled.
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Table 5.2: Characteristics of Czech and Non-Czech Nationals in Border Region
Non$Czech Czech
skill%distribution
low,skilled 0.276 0.505
high,skilled, 0.724 0.495
age%distribution
below,30 0.435 0.344
30$49 0.408 0.619
50,and,above 0.157 0.0368
age%distribution:%low%skilled
below,30 0.138 0.187
30$49 0.08 0.2995
50,and,above 0.0577 0.0185
age%distribution:%high%skilled
below,30 0.297 0.157
30$49 0.328 0.32
50,and,above 0.0993 0.0183
share,female 0.411 0.163
mean,log,wages,(imputed) 4.085 3.850
industries
,,,public,sector 0.171 0.0213
,,,pit,and,quarry 0.0273 0.0479
,,,wood,processing 0.0323 0.0736
,,,construction 0.0987 0.249
,,,hotels,and,restaurants 0.0299 0.0924
N 323,039 9,996
Note: The table compares average characteristics of Czech commuters (in 1992) against the pre-existing, non-Czech
workforce (in 1989).
Table 5.3: First Stage
distance
distance)squared
constant
N
R0sq
F
0.0000268
0.387
(.0000103)
0.115
(.0160)
00.00338
(.000860)
48.97
290
Czech1992 −Czech1990
Employment1990
Note: The table reports coe cient estimates from the first stage regression of the growth in the employment
share of Czech workers on airline distance (km) and distance squared to the next border crossing. Estimated
across municipalities within the border region, weighted by emloyment in 1990. Pooling also over inland areas,
and interacting the distance variables with an indicator variable equal to 1 if a municipality is part of the border
region, yields an R-squared of 0.544 and a F-statistic of 57.07.
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Table 5.4: Wage and Employment Baseline Estimates by Skill
employment wages
Panel&A:&all
(i) coef2912on 50.425 50.160 2.661
(0.265) (0.053)
(ii) coef2912+2922on 50.620 50.121 5.130
(0.198) (0.037)
(iii) coef2912+2922+2932on 50.926 50.134 6.885
(0.247) (0.051)
(iv) as2(iii),2but2OLS 50.289 50.059
(0.143) (0.036)
Panel&B:&low,skilled
(i) coef2912on 51.087 50.176 6.177
(0.402) (0.080)
(ii) coef2912+2922on 51.022 50.169 6.034
(0.257) (0.053)
(iii) coef2912+2922+2932on 51.371 50.202 6.794
(0.322) (0.064)
(iv) as2(iii),2but2OLS 50.805 50.095
(0.182) (0.051)
Panel&C:&high,skilled
(i) coef2912on 50.058 50.148 0.394
(0.246) (0.052)
(ii) coef2912+2922on 50.313 50.102 3.062
(0.182) (0.038)
(iii) coef2912+2922+2932on 50.501 50.106 4.712
(0.224) (0.053)
(iv) as2(iii),2but2OLS 0.020 50.055
(0.142) (0.037)
local2labor2suply2
elasticity
Czech1992 −Czech1990
Employment1990
Czech1991 −Czech1990
Employment1990
Czech1992 −Czech1990
Employment1990
Czech1992 −Czech1990
Employment1990
Czech1991 −Czech1990
Employment1990
Czech1992 −Czech1990
Employment1990
Czech1992 −Czech1990
Employment1990
Czech1991 −Czech1990
Employment1990
Czech1992 −Czech1990
Employment1990
Note: The Table is based on coe cient estimates from the 2SLS (rows i-iii) or OLS (row iv) regression of yearly
employment or wage growth of natives (Panel A) or natives in a specific skill group (Panel B and C) on the growth
in the employment share of Czech workers in the municipality, see equations (17) and (18). Yearly coe cient
estimates are added to show the cumulative e↵ect, relative to the 1990 baseline. See Table 3 for first stage. Each
oservation is weighted by the group-specific number of native workers employed in the base year in that particular
municipality. Standard errors are computed using the bootstrap method (500 replications, resampling on the
municipality level).
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Table 5.5: Robustness Checks
Panel&A:&Wage&Effects (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Baseline trend.adjusted long3differences border3only
all .0.131 .0.178 0.002 .0.134 .0.124
(0.049) (0.034) (0.052) (0.047) (0.103)
low3skilled .0.178 .0.224 .0.057 .0.189 .0.250
(0.064) (0.064) (0.088) (0.060) (0.124)
high3skilled .0.115 .0.170 .0.052 .0.115 .0.100
(0.052) (0.034) (0.052) (0.050) (0.103)
Panel&B:&Employment&Effects (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Baseline trend.adjusted long3differences border3only
all .0.926 .0.927 .0.930 .0.963 .0.952
(0.224) (0.287) (0.260) (0.241) (0.338)
low3skilled .1.371 .1.417 .1.218 .1.411 .1.036
(0.308) (0.417) (0.288) (0.304) (0.410)
high3skilled .0.501 .0.866 .0.521 .0.550 .0.586
(0.216) (0.280) (0.245) (0.230) (0.362)
inner3border3
vs.3inland
inner3border3
vs.3inland
Note: The table presents coe cient estimates from various robustness tests. Column 1 reports our baseline
estimates (see Table 4). Column 2 reports estimates from pooled (over years 1987-1993) regressions, in which the
pre-treatment observations identify municipality-specific di↵erences in trend. In column 3 we report estimates for
which we take long di↵erences (between 1990 and 1993) instead of accumulating yearly coe cients (employment
and wage coe cients) and average wages over all observed workers (wage coe cients). For column 5 we pool
municipalities from the inland and that half of the border region that is closer to the Czech-German border, and
which received the majority of Czech commuters. For column 6 we pool municipalities within the border region
only.
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Table 5.6: Employment and Wage E↵ects by Skill and Age Groups
Panel&A:&all&
!!!below!30 !0.832 !0.316 2.64 !0.604 !0.305 1.98
(share2Czechs:20.031) (0.325) (0.079) (0.392) (0.066)
!!!30!to!49 !0.534 !0.100 5.36 !0.964 !0.147 6.54
(share2Czechs:20.040) (0.259) (0.055) (0.321) (0.069)
!!!50!and!above !1.945 !0.068 28.65 !1.428 !0.172 8.32
(chare2Czechs:20.007) (0.359) (0.048) (0.417) (0.057)
&&&test&LS&elasticity&(one2sided&p2value):
&&&&&&(1)&30&to&49&>=&below&30& 0.888 0.974
&&&&&&(2)&50&and&above&>=&below&30& 0.904 0.994
Panel&B:&low2skilled&
!below!30 !2.262 !0.558 4.05 !1.601 !0.441 3.63
(share2Czechs:20.112) (0.573) (0.104) (0.663) (0.130)
!30!to!49 !0.704 !0.179 3.94 !1.428 !0.237 6.02
(share2Czechs:20.107) (0.349) (0.087) (0.476) (0.121)
50!and!above !1.364 !0.097 14.10 !1.324 !0.194 6.82
(share2Czechs:20.011) (0.388) (0.073) (0.502) (0.088)
&&&test&LS&elasticity&(one2sided&p2value):
&&&&&&(1)&30&to&49&>=&below&30& 0.470 0.786
&&&&&&(2)&50&and&above&>=&below&30& 0.904 0.836
Panel&C:&high2skilled
!below!30 !0.283 !0.276 1.02 !0.457 !0.281 1.63
(share2Czechs:20.017) (0.295) (0.085) (0.394) (0.068)
!30!to!49 !0.191 !0.090 2.12 !1.012 !0.142 7.13
(share2Czechs:20.025) (0.252) (0.057) (0.332) (0.061)
50!and!above !1.636 !0.066 24.72 !1.337 !0.158 8.47
(share2Czechs:20.005) (0.336) (0.050) (0.434) (0.058)
&&&test&LS&elasticity&(one2sided&p2value):
&&&&&&(1)&30&to&49&>=&below&30& 0.674 0.988
&&&&&&(2)&50&and&above&>=&below&30& 0.890 0.994
unadjusted trend5adjusted
local2labor2
supply2
elasticity
local2labor2
supply2
elasticityemployment wages employment wages
Note: The Table is based on coe cient estimates from the 2SLS regression of yearly employment or wage growth
of natives (Panel A) or natives in a specific skill group (Panel B and C) on the growth in the employment share of
Czech workers in the municipality, see equations (17) and (18). Yearly coe cient estimates for 1991, 1992 and 1993
are added to show the cumulative e↵ect relative to 1990. Trend-adjusted estimates are from a pooled regression
over years 1987-1993, in which the pre-treatment observations are used to identify municipality-specific di↵erences
in trend. See Table 3 for first stage. Each oservation is weighted by the group-specific number of native workers
employed in the base year in that particular municipality. Standard errors are computed using the bootstrap
method (500 replications, resampling on the municipality level). Test statistics (1) and (2) are computed as the
proportion of bootstrap samples (500 repetitions) where the LS elasticity of natives aged 30 to 49 (aged 50 and
above) was greater than or equal to the labor supply elasticity of natives below age 30.
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Figure 5.1: Border Region
Nuremberg
Regensburg
BayreuthBamberg
Hof
Passau
Pilsen
Carlsbad
Dropped
Border
Controls
Note: The map depicts districts eligible under the commuting policy (dark and medium-dark grey), matched
control districts (medium grey), and other districts in West and former East Germany (light grey). Eligible
districts close to the inner German border (dark grey) are dropped in the analysis. The map further depicts
crossings along and cities near the Czech-German border. Plot produced with the package ”spmap” for Stata.
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Figure 5.2: Employment Shares of Czech nationals: Border vs Inland
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Note: The Figure plots the share of Czech workers in local employment in border region and matched inland
districts (see Figure 1) before and after introduction of the commuting policy in 1991.
Figure 5.3: Spatial Distribution of Czech Nationals in Border Region
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Note: The Figure plots, for each municipality within the eligible border region (see Figure 1), the increase in the
number of Czech workers as a share of employment in 1990 against the airline distance of the centroid of the
municipality to the closest border crossing. The size of each circle is proportional to emloyment in 1990. Fitted
values are from a regression on distance and distance squared.
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Figure 5.4: Aggregate Wage and Employment E↵ects
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Note: The Figures are based on coe cient estimates from the 2SLS regressions of yearly employment or wage
growth of natives on the growth in the employment share of Czech workers in the municipality, see equations
(17) and (18). Yearly coe cient estimates are added to show the cumulative e↵ect, relative to the 1990 baseline.
See Table 3 for first stage. Each oservation is weighted by the number of native workers employed in the base
year in that particular municipality. The 95% confidence intervals are computed using the bootstrap method (500
replications, resampling on the municipality level).
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Figure 5.5: Synthetic Control Method, Wage and Employment E↵ects
(a) Employment e↵ects
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Note: Trends in wage and employment growth of native workers (relative to 1990 baseline), inner border region
vs. synthetic control.
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Figure 5.6: Yearly Native Inflow and Outflow E↵ects
(a) Inflow e↵ects
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Note: The Figures present coe cient estimates from the 2SLS regressions of yearly inflow or outflow rates of
natives on the growth in the employment share of Czech workers in the municipality, see main text. See Table
3 for first stage. Each oservation is weighted by the number of native workers employed in the base year in that
particular municipality. The 95% confidence intervals are computed using the bootstrap method (500 replications,
resampling on the municipality level). The coe cient estimate for outflows in 1989 and inflows in 1988 represent
outliers (see main text) and are plotted, but not connected to othe coe cient estimates.
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